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ABSTRACT
Agriculture in the East Jordan Valley, the Ghor in the
vernacular, has undergone over the last three decades what
amounts to a Super-Green Revolution(see map for location).
An irrigation project, the East Ghor Canal, was constructed
in the 1960s with the assistance of USAID; drip irrigation
and plasticovers, combined irrigation and cultivation
methods, were introduced in the mid-1970s; use of
fertilizers, pesticides, machinery and other modern inputs
has steadily increased. The objective of this dissertation
is to study the multilevel (international, state, local)
determinants of this technological transformation as well as
its impact on both the agricultural economy of the region
and the national economy.
The analysis is informed by the Dependency perspective and
the literature on technological diffusion in Third World
agriculture, both mainstream and critical. The Dependency
perspective is used as a theoretical framework; and the
diffusion literature is used to provide a basis for
understanding the factors that account for the uneven
adoption of the new technologies by the various classes of
cultivators. The basic argument of Dependency is interpreted
as follows. Whether or not, and the extent to which,
development occurs in Third World countries is governed by
the size of the surplus and its use, which in turn are
governed by the kinds of domestic structures these countries
have and how they interact with the existing international
structure. Based on this interpretation, two models of
Degendency were abstracted, Model I and Model II, describing
opposing trends in the size of economic surplus, its use,
and consequences for development. Much of the discussion of
the technological transformation in Jordan Valley
agriculture is organized around the basic Dependency
argument.
More specifically, the research procedure entailed
investigation of two main questions: what were the factors--
economic, political, and social--operating at the local and
international level that made the surplus available for
investment in Jordan Valley agriculture? And how appropriate
were the technologies that proliferated in the area? The
latter question can be broken down into several parts on the
basis of the criteria used to assess technological
appropriateness. Thus we ask: what are the characteristics
of the technologies, especially their resource use? Which
groups among the various social classes have been most able
to adopt the technologies? What impact have the technologies
had on various aspects of the agricultural economy,
including growth of production, employment, social relations
of production, and income distribution? And, finally, what
impact have the technologies had on the country's dependence
as well as its integration within the Arab region?
The findings indicated that external factors opened the
opportunity for the technological transformation of Jordan
Valley agriculture. The United States underwrote the
construction of irrigation works and other infrastructure;
and the oil boom afforded the investment surplus and the
export market in the Arab region. But the transformation
itself was realized mainly by a "commuter" class of large
capitalist landowners. And although other farmer groups and
agricultural workers benefited from the resulting growth of
production, the "lion's share" of benefits was captured by
the large landowners. Drip irrigation was judged to be a
more appropriate technology than plastic houses. Whereas the
yields of the latter technology were several times greater
than those of the former, drip irrigation was more
compatible with the area's and the country's resource base,
and affected equity and Jordan's dependence less adversely
than plastic houses.
On the theoretical plane, the study confimed the hypothesis
that access to economic resources is the principal factor in
technological adoption decisions. It also corroborated the
hypothesis that sharecropping does not constitute an
obstacle to technological change in agriculture. The
findings were largely compatible with the postulates of
Model II of the Dependency perspective. They suggested,
however, that the insufficient attention paid by Dependency
theorists to technological spillover effects, aspects other
than the capital intensity of technology, and trends of
Third World regional integration results in inaccuracies in
their prognosis for technology and dependence.
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INTRODUCTION
Agriculture in the East Jordan Valley, the Ghor in the
vernacular, has undergone over the last three decades what
amounts to a Super-Green Revolution(see map for location).
An irrigation project, the East Ghor Canal, was constructed
in the 1960s with the assistance of USAID; drip irrigation
and plasticovers, combined irrigation and cultivation
methods, were introduced in the mid-1970s; use of
fertilizers, pesticides, machinery and other modern inputs
has steadily increased. The objective of this dissertation
is to study the multilevel (international, state, local)
determinants of this technological transformation as well as
its impact on both the agricultural economy of the region
and the national economy.
The undertaking is justified on practical as well as
theoretical grounds. Although the region accounts for only
6.0 per cent of Jordan's cultivated land, and less than .5
per cent of its population, its contribution to the
country's economy is indispensible. It produces 81, 48, and
60 per cent of Jordan's vegetables, fruits, and agricultural
exports respectively (Wadi al-Urdun, 1980:12). It pools 75
per cent of its surface water and 25 per cent of its ground
water resources (Ibid.:6). Agricultural techonology in the
region is one of the most advanced in the Arab world; hence
lessons learned can be of value to other countries seeking
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to modernize their own agriculture. This acquires special
importance in light of the fact that Arab food imports have
risen dramatically, from $1 billion in 1970 to $32 billion
in 1982, as a result of rising incomes and population (IHR,
April 9-10:7S). Jordan itself imports 80 per cent of its
food consumption (Zeitun, 1982:18). Much is said about Arab
food security and independence, but little attention is
given as to how to make the process of production secure and
independent. Furthermore, technological change in Arab
agriculture has been sparsely studied. Writings on the
Jordan Valley have been in the nature of official surveys,
feasibility studies and evaluation reports; as such, they
lack theoretical coherence and perspective.
The Jordan Valley provides a microcosm in which we can
observe national and international developments and
policies. It has been an arena of military conflict and
dispute over water rights. International aid, particularly
from the U.S., served to hasten change. Demographically, the
Valley hosts East Jordanians, Palestinian refugees
(themselves a product of international and regional
conflicts), and Egyptian migrant laborers (oil). The economy
of the region, like the rest of Jordan, is largely
capitalist; yet it is affected by government planning,
expenditures, and policies on land ownership. The diversity
of these influences resulted, as a recent USAID report
concludes, in the planners' inability to predict actual
outcomes despite the availability of an impressive amount of
"baseline" data regarding the Valley (Frankel, 1980:7). The
report attributes this inability to the failure of data
collection efforts to account for:
...variables related to linkages between the Valley and
its regional, national, and international context, and
for having stressed aggregate quantitative data at the
expense of information about specific local
relationships and problems. (1980:7-8)
After almost two decades of industrial fundamentalism,
the important place that agriculture occupies in the
development process has been gradually resuscitated by
development theorists. Not only are its contributions (food,
raw materials, foreign exchange) recognized, but it is no
longer seen as a synonym of backwardness. Emmanuel (1974:66)
observes that there can be modern agriculture and backward
industry: he points out that the industrial output/capita in
the Third World in 1959 was $592, whereas agricultural
output/capita was $3,760 in OECD countries, and $7,180 in
the United States. The stress now in development economics
is on compitmentarity rather than contradiction between
agriculture and industry, and on their structural
integration. We do not wish to repeat the sermon on
agriculture, for it has already been delivered by many; the
point we want to make is that understanding the problems of
development in agriculture is vital to understanding
development in general.
The centrality of technological advancement to this
sector's development is accepted by both advocates of high
and intermediate technologies. In this dissertation,
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technology is viewed not merely as "know how" or "modern
inputs", but as an indivisible part of the social process,
at once produced by society and producing it. We subscribe
neither to technological determinism, the view that changes
in technology are the determining factor in social change,
nor to its opposite, technological volunterism, the view
that people are ab-le to control completely technological choice and
outcones . So we speak of both the determinants of
technological change and its impact. The discourse on
technological change in the Third World is an integral part
of the discourse on development in general.
A great number of ideas, models, and theories have
already been suggested and advanced on the topic. Instead of
adding more to the pile, we try here to pick up the pieces,
as it were, put them in a coherent form, and see to what
extent they help us in analyzing our case. More.
specifically, two classes of theoretical work are relevant
to this study. One is diffusion research, done mainly in
rural sociology, and the other is the corpus of the
Dependency perspective. Diffusion research models are most
pertinent for the discussion of adoption of the new
technologies among various farmer groups in the Valley. The
Dependency perspective, on the other hand, is used as a
conceptual framework. It has been the subject of many
interpretations, and, as Evans says, "Those who would use it
are forced first to make clear how they have interpreted it"
(1979:9). Its barebones argument, in our view, can be stated
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as follows. Development or the lack of it in Third World
countries is governed by the size of the surplus and its
use, which in turn are governed by the kinds of domestic
structures these countries have and how they interact with
the existing international structure. Much of the dicussion
in the dissertation is organized around this argument.
We try to answer two main questions: what were the
factors--economic, political, and social--operating at the
local and international level that made the surplus
available for investment in Jordan Valley agriculture? And
how appropriate were the technologies that proliferated in
the area? The latter question can be broken down into
several parts on the basis of the criteria used to assess
technological appropriateness. Thus we ask: what are the
characteristics of the technologies, especially their
resource use? Which groups among the various social classes
have been most able to adopt the technologies? What impact
have the technologies had on various aspects of the
agricultural economy, including growth of production,
employment, social relations of production, and income
distribution? And, finally, what impact have the
technologies had on the country's dependence as well as its
integration within the Arab region?
In Chapter 1, we introduce the method, concepts, and
approach that underlie the rest of the study, from diffusion
research and the Dependency perspective. In Chapter 2, we
set the scene with an historical overview of the changes
introduced by the British mandate into Jordan's agricultural
sector. This is followed by a discussion of the situation
that placed the Valley on the development agenda of the U.
S. and Jordanian governments. Most of the Chapter, however,
is devoted to an analysis of the system of production and
exchange and farm credit disbursements. In Chapter 3, we
discuss the nature of technological change and its impact on
the various aspects of the agricultural economy, especially
social relations of production and income distribution. The
factors that govern adoption of the technologies by
different classes of farmers are also elaborated. In Chapter
4, we assess the impact of the transformation of the
Valley's agriculture on Jordan's dependence as well as
integration within the Arab region. In Chapter 5, we
conclude the study by ranking the technologies as to their
appropriateness, and stating some of the implications of the
study for Dependency work and diffusion research.
In essence, this is the story of a small region which
half a century ago was hardly aware of the world beyond
itself. Gradually it became enmeshed in this world, at first
through the visible web of politics, and then through the
invisible web of economics, acquiring a modern face in the
process.
17
CHAPTER 1
CONCEPTUAL CONSIDERATIONS
Oh! Blessed rage for order, Pale Ramon
The maker's rage to order words of the sea
Wallace Stevens
The discourse on technological change in the Third
World is part and parcel of the discourse on development in
general. Numerous authors have written in these topics over
the last three decades. The perspectives contained in their
works have been classified in a variety of ways. Dependency
is often considered as one of two or more perspectives.1 The
Dependency perspective is used here as a basis for
formulating our problematic. Of immediate relevance to our
investigation is also the literature on agriculture in the
Third World, especially that which deals with the Green
Revolution. This literature is of two types. One is
represented by mainstream diffusion reserarch, rooted in the
Modernization perspective. The other is critical. We utilize
both to examine specific issues, mainly those relating to
factors that influence the adoption of the new
technologies. In Section I, we identify two models in
diffusion research. The first model takes characteristics of
the individual as the basis for technological change. We
refer to it as the individual-based model. In the second
model, the problem of tecknological change is analyzed
within a social, structural context. It is called here the
social-structural model. The second section is devoted to
the Dependency perspective. First, we indicate the basic
assumptions and methods of the perspective. Then we
delineate the elements of what we suggest are two distinct
models within Dependency. Broadly speaking, the first model,
Model I, describes development in the perilphery before the
Second World War, and the second, Model II, in the period
since the War. It is proposed that the critical literature
on the Green Revolution complements Model II, and can be
fruitfully incorporated into it. In the last section, we
review some recent writings on Arab economic development
that take the Dependency perspective as a springboard for
their interpretations of the topic.
Section I
The Individual-based and Social-Structural Models
of Technological Change in Agriculture
Of the two models, the social-structural model is more
relevant to our work. The advocates of the social-structural
model, however, often compare and contrast their work with
that of the individual-based model. We therefore review the
main postulates of the individual-based model in order to
provide the intellectual backdrop for the second model. Both
models are discussed as they appear in rural sociology and
development economics, the two fields that have most
frequently addressed the topic of technical change in
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agriculture.
The edifice of Modernization hinges on a vision of the
world as made up of two Weberian ideal types, of persons and
social organization, located at two opposite poles of the
evolutionary process: the traditional versus the modern.
Each type possesses certain characteristics -psychological,
eocnomic, technological - which set it apart from the other.
The traditional is viewed as both a cause and expression of
underdevelopment. To develop, a society must shed its
traditional garb and replace it by a modern one. Although
early dualists like Boeke (1976:130) held it impossible to
transform the traditional into modern, Modernization writers
had the virtue of rejecting this thesis. For them,
modernization can be accomplished by the exogenous process
of diffusion of money capital and modern technologies,
institutions, and values from the developed West. The main
question that a Modernization writer poses then is how this
diffusion can be accomplished (Frank, 1972:321-322; Higgins,
1976:131-146; Lerner, 1958; Valenzuela and Valenzuela,
1979).
Until recently, Modernization held sway in development
studies in both the U.S. and many underdeveloped countries.
According to a comprehensive review by Rogers and Shoemaker
(1971) of research on technological diffusion in several
social sciences, most of this research was conducted by U.S.
and U.S.-trained researchers. As a result, the bulk of it
falls within the Modernization perspective. U.S.
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intellectual dominance in this field can be attributed to
its dominance as a world power, to its involvement in the
Third World hinterland, especially its initiation and
promotion of the Green Revolution, and, as Rogers and
Shoemaker indicate, to the strong tradition of diffusion
research that already existed in the country.
In terms of the division among academic disciplines,
investigations of technological change in agriculture have
come to be dominated by rural sociology (Goss, 1979).
Paradoxically, however, in the discipline that must look for
social determinants of technological change, the majority of
the analyses take the individual as the unit of analysis. In
what we term the individual-based model, the farmer's access
to information on a particular technology, plus a set of
"personality variables," are the principal factors affecting
adoption decisions (Rogers and Shoemaker, 1971:185-187). The
personality variables include sociological and psychological
attributes. The sociological attributes--age, education,
social status, and financial position--are seen as adhering
to the individual (Cancian, 1979:5). It is true that Rogers
and Shoemaker include these attributes under the heading
"socioeconomic characteristics," which are distinguished
from personality variables. But as Cancian points out: "It
is also true that the dependent variable in adoption studies
is often conceptualized as innovativeness, an individual
characteristic"(1979:5). Innovativeness is defined by Rogers
and Shoemaker as "...the degree to which an individual is
relatively earlier in adopting new ideas than other members
of his social system" (1971:40). For the more
psychologically-minded writers, such as Lerner and
McClelland, the motivational characteristics thought to be
central to adopting new tedinologies, have different names.
Lerner, whose work on the Middle East (The Passing of
Traditional Society) served as a prototype for the
individual-based studies, identifies "empathy", the inner
mechanism that enables newly mobile persons to operate
efficiently in a changing world, as decisive for innovation
(Lerner, 1958:49-50). McClelland, another major writer in
the field, posited the need to Achieve (n Achievement) as
the motor force of entrepreneurship, and a "key factor in
economic growth" (McClelland, 1976: 550-558). The net result
was that in 72 to 98 per cent of the publications surveyed
by Rogers and Shoemaker, the individual was taken as the
unit of analysis. And as Goss notes:
Although 31 per cent of empirical diffusion
publications were based on observations in
underdeveloped countries..., a very small number of the
resulting generalizations were derived with the social
system (versus individual) as the unit of analysis.
(1979:756)
The other discipline that concerned itself with'
technology and agriculture was development economics. As in
rural sociology, dualism constituted the crux of this
discipline's theoretical underpinnings. For macroeconomists,
the poles of tradition and modernity were manifested in
agriculture and industry, respectively. In the transition
from one pole to the other, industry would function as the
"leading" sector, whereas agriculture would be a supportive
and subordinate sector, providing it with capital, labor,
food, and raw materials. This was one of the main themes of
Rostow's stage theory which left an indelible imprint on
economic development thought (Rostow:1975).
Models more rigorous and precise than Rostow's sought
to explain how the transition would occur. Lewis' article
on "Economic Development with Unlimited Supply of Labor"
(1958), now a classic, exemplifies this genre. He showed how
increasing agricultural productivity through adoption of
labor-saving techniques would release labor, which in turn
would be naturally attracted to the higher wages offered by
industry in the urban centers.
Microeconomics, on the other hand, dealt with the
question in two ways. One was to accept the postulates of
communication:
Underlying the receptivity of a country to the
diffusion of new technology is the rationality of the
culture, the level of literacy and education, the
existence of channels of communication and techniques
of demonstration (Kindleberger, 1965:48).
But to accept varying degrees of rationality in economic
behavior deprives microeconomics of its analytic tools
which, in order to be applied, must assume a rational,
sovereign consumer who enjoys access to, and knowledge of, a
perfect market. Some economists, Shultz being the most
prominent among them, made exactly these assumptions. He
argued (1964) that traditional agriculture was rational,
market efficient, and all it needed to raise productivity
was technical advancement. Whether a peasant adopts new
techniques depends, in this view, on the profitability of
the technique; hence, analytically he can be treated as a
"firm" (Yudelman, 1971).
11.2 The Social-Structural Model
By the late 1960s, not long after these theories were
expounded, a growing dissatisfaction, if not
disillusionment, with the development path of the Third
World was beginning to be expressed. For, despite the
impressive record of aggregate economic growth,
international, regional (within countries), and class
disparities were widening. Industry, the leading sector was
unable to lead; it neither provided the promised employment
for the massive number of migrants who thronged into the
cities, nor did it serve the needs of agriculture. The rural
areas themselves remained a breeding ground for poverty. In
any case, the story has already become a textbook subject
and need not be restated. What is relevant here is the
widespread criticism of Modernization by "insiders," who, as
Goss defines them, are generally committed to the validity
and utility of modernization and are more concerned about
revisions of postulates (1978:758).
Goss (1976), himself an "insider", groups the criticism
of the individual-based approach into five items: (1) the
approach is insufficient for sciological theory building;
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(2) it assumes explicitly or implicitly that individual
clients enjoy equal access to resources; (3) it ignores the
distributional impact of change; (4) it creates a "person-
blame" attribution; and (5) it suffers from raw empiricism.
In development economics, the agriculture versus
industry dichotomy has been recognized as "false." Meier
(1976:561) summarizes the changing attitude:
The earlier confrontation of industrial development
versus agriculture has been shown to be a false issue,
and the concern now is rather with the
interrelationships between industry and agriculture and
the contribution that each can make to the other.
Microeconomic theory, though not psychological, still takes
the individual as its unit of analysis and thus can be
criticized on the same grounds as the psycho-individual
approach. Its utility as an analytical or policy-making tool
has been seriously questioned. Todaro, in his textbook
Economic Development in the Third World (1977), states:
Unfortunately, the facts of economic life in both
thedeveloped and the less developed nations of the
world are such as to render much of traditional
microeconomic theory of negligible importance for
analysis or policy.... Consumers as a whole are rarely
sovereign about anything, let alone with regard to
questions of what goods and services are to be
produced, in what quantities, and for whom. Producers,
whether private or public, have a great power in
determining market prices and quantities sold. The
ideal of competition is typically just that - an
'ideal' with little relation to reality....Finally, the
so-called 'invisible hand' often acts not to promote
the general welfare of all, but to lift up those who
are already well-off while pushing down the vast
majority of the population which is striving to free
itself from poverty, malnutritution and illiteracy.
(Todaro, 1977:11-12)
Critics did more than just criticize; they put forward
an alternative model for the study of technological change.
This model, which is called here the social-structural
model, views the social, economic and political positions of
farmers, rather than their personality variables, as
determining, by and large, their decisions on whether or not
to adopt new technologies. Thus, while Cancian may consider
"economic rank," Gartell "social status," and Freeman
"social power" to be the key variables in the innovative
process, these rural sociologists acknowledge the primacy of
social structures (Cancian, 1977; Gartell, 1977; Freeman et
al, 1982). Take Cancian, for example. He consciously
contrasts his work with the individual-based model:
In this study [The Innovator's Situation] it is the
variance in situations that ultimately explains
variance in people's behavior. The contrasting approach
sees many diverse people in similar situations, and it
is the variable in personal characteristics that
ultimately explains variance in behavior. (1979:4)
In the study, Cancian expounds a thesis of "upper class
conservatism." He claims that in the short run, i.e., while
uncertainty about the consequences of innovation is still
high, this class is less innovative than the lower middle
class. The reason lies in the fact that members of this
class have much to lose, should they move into a lower rank.
So they avoid taking risks in the short run. In the long
run, however, access to resources is the decisive factor in
adopting new technologies, and the upper middle class adopts
these with more frequency than the lower middle class. We
indicate in Chapter 3 how the results from the Jordan Valley
compare with Cancian's thesis.
In their overview of the emerging trend, Freeman et al
conclude that regardless of their empirical findings, the
researchers agree that "structural attributes associated
with the stratification system provide fertile ground for
developing improved explanation of adoption behavior"
(1982:69). The article is recent and thus can be taken to
represent the "state of the art" in the field. As can be
seen, the social-structural model is a micro-level analysis.
It does not bring in the role of state policy in the process
of technological change in agriculture, nor does it consider
the interaction between agriculture and other sectors of the
economy. Furthermore, the consequences of technological
change for such aspects of the rural eocomy as distribution
of landholdings, tenure patterns, employment, etc., receive
little attention in works based on the new model. This is
not inherent in the methodology, but reflects the concerns
of the researchers. Still the model introduces economics
(economic rank), politics (social power), and sociology
(status, stratification) into diffusion research. As shown
in Chapter 3, these are factors that we found to be decisive
in determining the identity of adopters of the new
technologies in the Jordan Valley.
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Section II
The Dependency Perspective:
Two Models of Third World Development
We use the term perspective rather than theory in
conjunction with Dependency, because Dependency does not
have the tight logical structure and propositions of a
theory. This view is also shared by a number of its
proponents (S. Amin, 1983:374; Cardoso and Faletto,
1979:xxiii). Evans describes the status of writings as
",..an eclectic body of work and even individual authors
within the tradition are not always consistent in their
argument"(1978:9). Nevertheless, as Duvall et al. point out,
there exists within this diversity of opinions a resonably
clear convergence on a set of analytic concepts and fairly
substantial agreement on some basic arguments (1981:313).
The Dependency perspective has been approached in
several ways. Some use it to build formal models with
measurable variables in order to test some of Dependency's
basic arguments. The most elaborate of these to date is, as
far as we know, the model constructed by Duvall et al.
(1981). Others are critical of the perspective or certain
aspects of it (e.g., Brewer, 1980; Chilcote, 1974; Haggard,
1984; Schiffer, 1981). Some types of this criticism are
indicated in Section III. Even within the tradition itself,
some authors try to distance themselves from others. This is
best exemplified in Cardoso and Faletto (1979) and Palma
(1978), who are critical of Frank's work. Still others
utilize it to provide theoretical frameworks for their
research. Evans' study of the "triple alliance" among local,
state, and international capital is a case in point (Evans,
1978). This is the manner in which the Dependency
perspective is approached in our current study of Jordan
Valley agriculture. We claim that it is possible to
construct two models of Dependency that explain Third World
development and/or underdevelopment in two historical
epochs, before and after the Second World War. Our attitude
is to identify the common grounds, not point of divergence,
among the perspective's authors. The hope is that the models
represent a degree of synthesis rather than a patchwork of
Dependency writings.
The two models are essentially elaboations on what we
view as the basic argument of the Dependency perspective.
The argument also underlies much of the discussion of Jordan
Valley agriculture. It can be stated as follows. Whether or
not, and to what extent, a Third World country develops is
predicated upon the surplus available to it and the manner
in which it is used. Surplus and its use are, in turn,
governed by the characteristics of, and interaction between,
the domestic and international structures. Before discussing
the two models, we advance the basic argument.
II.I Dependency: The Basic Argument
The Dependency perspective has sought from the start to
anaylze the nature of development, or the lack of it, in
Third World societies using the tools of political economy.
As early as 1957, Baran, the acknowledged father of
Dependency, titled his book The Political Economy of Growth.
Dependency writers thus accent relations among states,
classes, and institutions. They find the categories of
traditional and modern neither broad enough to cover the
existing social situations, nor specific enough to
distinguish the structures that define the ways of life in
different societies (Cardoso and Faletto, 1979:9). In
addition, they object to Modernization's thesis on the
absence of ties between the two categories. The world
economy, according to Frank (1972), is made up of a series
of "metropolis" and "satellites" that have been historically
linked. By failing to comprehend the linkages between the
two poles, Modernization fails, Cardoso and Faletto (1979:9-
10) point out, to show how the different economic stages,
e.g., development through exports or income substitution,
are connected to the various types of social structures that
are attributed to traditional and modern societies, or how
the transition from one type of society to the other takes
place. Change of social structures, in their view, far from
being only a cumulative process of incorporating new
"variables," involves a series of relations among social
groups, forces, and classes; "...analyses that relate
development to modern society and underdevelopment to
traditional society are too simple" (1979:9-10)
A most important, and perhaps original, contribution of
Dependency, however, lies in its thesis that development in
the Third World can only be understood in the context of its
historical incorporation within the international capitalist
system. But despite its insistence that the "world-system"
is the proper unit of analysis, the actual studies of
Dependency are singularly focusd on the development of Asia,
Africa, and Latin America. In this manner, Dependency is
seen as an extension, a complement, to the theory of
Imperialism, whose subject matter is the modes of expansion
of the center (Bodenheimer, 1971).
Whether or not, and the manner in which, a Third World
country will develop is governed by the size of surplus
available to it, and how the surplus is disposed of. Baran
distinguishes three types of surplus: actual, potential, and
planned. Underdeveloped countries, he argues, are short on
actual surplus, which is equal to net investment funds plus
the outflow outside the boundaries (Baran, 1957:23-43, 226).
In addition, he places equal weight on the "mode of
utilization" of the surplus (1957:164). This, as Brewer
notes, is consistent with Baran's view of developemnt as
essentially quantitative, referring to growth of output per
capita of material goods over time (Brewer, 1980:139).
Economic surplus is of paramount importance for Prebisch
also; it underlies his concern with the deterioration of
terms of trade to the disadvantage of the periphery (Baer,
1969; Prebisch, 1983:3). In the work of later Dependency
writers, Emmanuel, Amin, Frank, Dos Santos, Cardoso,
economic surplus and its mode of utilization are key
elements.
Whereas Baran sees development mainly in quantitative
terms, other Dependency writers view it, implicitly or
explicitly, in qualitative terms also. The qualitative
aspect involves the structure of the economy and the
distribution of benefits of development among the various
social classes. S. Amin comes close at times to equating
development with the structural development of the economy
(1976:201). This view is also shared by Evans (1979),
Ougaard (1983), and Senghaas (1981). The meaning of
structural development will become clear later on in the
chapter (see also Chapter 4). The second qualitative aspect
of development, the distribution of benefits among the
social classes, is often implied by the criticism which
Dependency writers apply to the high level of inequality in
industrializing countries like Brazil (e.g., Evans, 1979;
Frank, 1982).
Yet the size of surplus and its use and the attendant
development are seen by the Dependency perspective as
predicated upon the characteristics and interplay of
international and domestic structures. These structures,
although they may be modified and transformed over
historical time, are relatively stable. Most of the folowing
criteria for defining the characteristics of these
structures are explicitly stated by Bodenheimer, the rest we
glean from other writers, particularly Cardoso.
For the international structure, these criteria are:
(1) the dominant form of competing social systems (e.g.,
capitalism, socialist, mixed economies); (2) the principal
demand of the dominant nations in the system (agricultural
commodities, minerals, cheap labor); (3) the degree of
concentration of capital in dominant nations (competitive or
monopolistic); (4) the degree of concentration of
international hegemonic power or rival powers; and (5) the
typical form of world trade (free, mercantilism,
protectionism) (Bodenheimer, 1971:160; Cardoso and Faletto,
1979:177-216). Likewise, the domestic counterparts may be
defined according to: (1) the function of the country in the
system (supplier of raw materials, political strategic); (2)
the degree of foreign control in the principal economic
sector; (3) the nature of political ties to the dominant
powers (colonial, independence); and (4) the dominant social
classes (e.g., oligarchical, capitalist) (Bodenheimer,
1971:161; Cardoso and Faletto, 1979).
So the basic argument of Dependency is really a simple
one, and can be stated thus: whether or not, and the mode in
which, a peripheral country develops is governed by the size
of its surplus and how it is used, which are themselves
governed by the interplay of the country's domestic and
international structures. The two models of Dependency
consist essentially of detailing this argument for Third
World development before and after World War II.
11.2 The Two Models of Dependency, MI and MII
The question of whether or not peripheral nations would
develop as a result of their incorpoation into the world
capitalist system predates Dependency writings. It is found
in the works of several classical Marxist authors, including
Marx himself. Answers given by these authors still inspire
and inform some of the debate among Dependency writers and
other Marxists critical of the perspective. A brief review
of the classical Marxist positions on the question can
therefore serve to place the corresponding postulates of
Dependency in historical perspective. 2
We restrict ourselves here to Marx and Lenin. Marx, in
his journalistic articles on India, seems to have taken it
for granted that capitalist development similar to that of
the colonial power would be effected in its colony.
I know that the English millocracy intent to endow
India with railways with the exclusive view of
extracting at diminished expenses the cotton and other
raw materials for their manufactures, But when you have
once introduced machinery into the locomotion of a
country which possesses iron and coal, you are unable
to withhold its fabrication. You cannot maintain a nett*"
of railways over an immense country without introducing
all those industrial processes necessary to meet the
immediate and current needs of railway locomotion, and
out of which there must grow the application of
machinery to those branches of industry not immediately
connected with the railways. The railway system will
therefore become, in India, truly the forerunner of
modern industry.(Marx, in Tucker, 1978:662)
So while Marx recognized that a main intention of the
British was to extract raw materials, he assumed that the
introduction of railways would have a snowball effect; with
hindsight, we could say that he expected that a chain of
backward and forward linkages would ensue in the wake of the
advent of railways. He also thought this process would be
particularly aided by India's acquisition of scientific and
technical knowledge (Ibid:662). On the other hand, and
insofar as the mass of the Indian population was concerned,
such development would not, Marx argued, bring them
prosperity. Such a postulate is consistent with his dual
perspective of capitalism: at once a progressive and
regressive system. Its impressive advance in the material
realm is not matched by social progress.
Lenin followed in the footsteps of Marx. In his volume
The Development of Capitalism in Russia (1977), he claimed
that capitalism had, by the end of the nineteenth century,
become the dominant economic force in Russia. In
agriculture, he endorsed wholeheartedly Kautsky's
conclusions on the subject; he saw in interior Russian
agriculture features similar to those of Western Euvcpe.
Lenin described capitalist development in terms of the
emergence of wage labor, increasing division of labor,
capital accumulation by rich peasants, development of the
home market, use of modern machinery, and application of
science (Ibid; Lenin, 1980). He, however, restricted his
analysis to Russia, and offered only general statements
about how imperialism , by exporting capital, would hasten
capitalist development in the colonies, and at the same time
render them dependent (Lenin, 1973; Palma, 1978). He did not
show much concern about the implications of the fact that
such capital was being invested in raw material extraction
and related activities, nor of the unfolding international
division of labor. These were to become the kernel of
Dependency analyses. Needless to say, by the mid-1950s,
Marx's and Lenin's predictions had not come to pass.
When Baran (1957:136) posed the question:
...why is it that in the backward capitalist countries
there has been no advance along the lines of capitalist
development that are familiar from the history of other
capitalist countries, and why is it that forward
movement there has been either slow or altogether
absent?,
he was responding not only to Rostow and other Modernization
theorists but to classical Marxism as well. Although Baran
himself regards capitalist development as unlikely or at
best slower than potential surplus makes possible, the
importance of his work lies, as Brewer (1980:158) observes,
in the possible lines of analysis suggested in the text.
Dependency authors would subsequently elaborate, modify, and
amplify certain elements of his writings. It is possible, by
using the concept of surplus and its mode of utilization as
a hinge around which to organize Dependency postulates, to
abstract two models of Dependency. Henceforth, they will be
denoted Model I and Model II, or MI and MII.
Model I is essentially a model of overall economic
stagnation in the periphery, save in enclave sectors, such
as mining and plantations. The lack of investment in
industry is attributed to the low level of surplus and to
the competition of center manufactured goods. Model II
posits that, for a variety of reasons, surplus is more
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available to peripheral countries. Part of this surplus is
invested in industry and, to a much lesser extent, in
agriculture. The main features of the two models are
summarized in Table 1.1. The two models describe opposing
and divergent trends with regard to the size and fate of
surplus, and are rooted in different structures of the.world
economy and polity as well as Third World societies. They
must be thought of as "ideal type" constructions. No country
or author fits strictly within a single one of them,
although, broadly speaking, Model II begins to emerge after
World War I and crystallizes after World War II.
Agricultural development in the Jordan Valley over the last
three decades conforms substantially to the postulates of
MII (see Chapter 5). The bulk of the discussion below is
therefore devoted to this model.
In Model I, surplus is not invested, either because it
is drained away from the region or the country, or because
the incentive to invest is low. Surplus is extracted by
direct tax or tribute, based on unequal exchange, and
transfer of profits by foreign investors. The British
imposition of the "native hut and poll tax" in Kenya is a
case in point. This tax sharply reduced the purchasing power
of African labor, and hence the home market (Wolff,
1974:116-119). In the Middle East, the Ottoman government
intensified the extraction of tribute during the last
quarter of the nineteenth century from its subject
territories in order to repay its debt to European lenders
Table 1.1
Main Features of Dependency Models, MI and MII
Element Model I Model II
1. Size of surplus
2. Productive
investment of
surplus
3. Main features
of economy
4. Social structure
Drained:
a.Direct taxation, tribute
b. Unequal exchange
c. Transfer of profits
d. Luxury and conspicuous
consumption
a. Primary materials
(minerals, cash crops)
a. Slow growth or stagnation
b. Dominance of one crop
(monoculture) or mining
c. Lack of linkages among
sectors
a. oligarchies or large
landowners are dominant
b. Capital: mercantile
c. Some small peasants
d. Bulk of population is
disenfranchised
Augmented:
a. Aid (bilateral, multilateral)
b. Commercial loans
c. Oil price rise
a. Industry
b. Agriculture
a. Some capital accumulation in
industry, and, to a much lesser
degree, in agriculture
b. More diversified economy
c. Weak linkages among sectors,
distortion of structure
(hypertrophy of service sector,
uneveness, etc.)
a. Power of oligarchies eroded
b. Capital: agrarian and industrial
capitalists
c. Small peasants persist
d. Small working class
e. Civil servants, professionals
f. Bulk of population is
Table 1.1(contd.)
Element Model I Model II
disenfranchised
a. Colonial, or weak,
dominated by oligarchies
and mercantile capital
whose interests are tied
to the center
b. Not interested in
industrialization
a. Independent
b. Stronger state (bureaucratic
and authoritarian
c. Entreprenurial (state capitalism)
6. International Structures
a. Division a. Unequal: manufacturing
of labor in the center, raw
materials in the
periphery
b. International b. Mercantile
capital operating
in periphery
c. Balance of Power c. Among European
capitalist states
a. Unequal: high technology in the
center, manufacturing in the
periphery
b. Industrial and agribusiness
(MNCs)
c. Varying degrees of bipolar,
among capitalist and socialist
systems
5. State
which, in 1874, absorbed some four-fifths of government
revenues (Amin, 1976:308). At the end of the nineteenth
century, over 80 per cent of the revenue collected in the
provinces of Syria and Mesopotamia was paid to the central
government as tribute, leaving less than 20 per cent to be
devoted to the expenditures of local administration (Ibid:
308].
Unequal exchange, or uneven terms of trade, as a way of
surplus transfer from the periphery to the center countries,
has been extensively argued by Prebisch (Baer, 1969),
Emmanuel (1972), and Amin (1976). Unequal exchange can
result from differing levels of productivity or the
maintenance of lower wages in the periphery by coercive
means and monopoly. Amin calculates that about $22 billion
were transferred in 1966 from the Third World, which would
be double the amount of aid given that year, and the
equivalent of 20 per cent of its GDP (Amin, 1976:143-145).
He maintains that such transfers are sufficient to block the
development of these countries; thus,he echos Baran's
statement about India: "...there can be no doubt that had
the amount of economic surplus that Britain has torn from
India been invested in India, India's econmomic development
to date would have borne little similarity to the actual
somber record (emphasis in the original) (Baran, 1957:148).
Even if surplus did not find its way across the border,
competition from abroad would still stymie the development
of local industries, if not actually destroy existing ones.
This is best illustrated by the destruction of textile
cottage industry in India or the Levant as a consequence of
the influx of British manufactured cotton goods (Baran,
1957:147; Amin, 1976:308). Therefore, it is not really in
the interest of foreign capital and the metropolis to
develop the satellites. The center thus tries to maintain an
international hierarchical division of labor, whereby it
specializes in higher technology goods, while the periphery
specializes in lower-technology based production, chiefly in
primary goods, agriculture, and raw materials.
To accomplish this, the core uses a variety of means,
from direct occupation in the era of colonialism to the
creation and bolstering of client regimes. The regimes
themselves rely on a social base whose interests converge
with those of the center. As Cardoso and Faletto (in Evans,
1981:27) say,
...there is-no such thing as a metaphysical relation of
dependency between one nation and another, one state
and another. Such relations are made concrete
possibilities through the existence of a network of
interests and interactions which link certian social
groups to other social groups, certain social classes
to other classes....
These classes are often comprised of landed aristocracy and
what is sometimes grouped under mercantile capital:
merchants, money lenders, and middlemen (Baran, 1957).
The surplus generated in agriculture, if it does not
flow abroad, is transferred to the urban centers. The land-
owning classes expend a large share of the surplus on excess
consumption, luxuries serving as symbols of wealth and
status, large numbers of servants, entertainment, and travel
(Baran, 1957:166). Small peasants do not invest either
because of the meager size of the surplus relative to the
price of technology. Even in capitalist agriculture,
investment is deterred due to the availability of cheap
labor and the risks and uncertainties surrounding
agricultural investment in general (Ibid:166). Whatever
investment obtained was confined to a single crop geared for
export to the center. The phenomena of monoculture and
plantations are characteristic features of many
underdeveloped countries' agriculture.
In industry, the narrowness of the local markets,
engendered by competition from foreign products and a
general low level of wages, deter investment. Moreover, the
feudal and mercantile classes endeavor to preserve the
status quo: the former because the rise of capitalism could
threaten its hold on the land, and the latter because its
position is predicated upon its continuous trading with, and
marketing of, center's goods. The net outcome is retardation
of the evolution of a native capitalist class in both
agriculture and industry, the obvious corollary being
relative stagnation of both sectors (Amin, 1976; Baran,
1957).
In brief, elements of Model I can be stated as follows.
The mercantile nature of international capital, and the
colonial, or the oligarchical and mercantile-based states in
the periphery, conspired to drain surplus from Third World
nations into the developed ones, and from the hinterlands to
the cities; little incentive existed for industrialization
or agricultural development because of external competition,
and when investment was undertaken, it was limited to raw
materials of a single cash crop. The rest of the
agricultural sector was kept stagnant and industry remained
largely absent.
Model II essentially describes countervailing trends
with regard to surplus and its utilization, engendered by
the alteration of the structure of the world economy and
polity after the Second World War. Whatever surlpus is
transferred through unequal exchange or repatriated profits
by foreign firms, is compensated for by foreign aid. The
question of foreign aid and finance is a complex matter and
cannot be treated in any detail here. Suffice it to say that
insofar as surplus is concerned, this source of funds
contributes to the pool of surplus. Its volume has increased
palpably over the years, both in absolute and retative terms
(World Bank, 1979). At a minimum, it balances some of the
outflow; even those who are highly critical of foreign aid
admit this much. Amin (1976:182) writes: "Apart from its
political significance.. .aid enables the contradiction
between the inflow of private investments and the outflow of
profits to be overcome...." Dos Santos (1971:230) also makes
a similar observation. A major source of surplus for some
Third World nations in the 1970s was oil revenues, following
the dramatic rise in its price in 1973 by the Organziation
of Petroleum Exporting Countries OPEC). Some oil countries,
such as the Gulf states and Saudi Arabia, have themselves
become net "exporters of capital" because of the incapacity
of their nascent economies to absorb all the oil income.
Moreover, many neighboring countries have acquired some of
this income through aid or labor migration. There is scant
attention among Dependency writers to local savings as a
source of surplus. Amin (1976) argues that whatever surplus
local capitalists possess is channelled primarily into real
estate investments and the purchase of luxury consumer
items. The evidence from Evans (1979:101-162) contradicts
Amin's assertion. And it appears that local savings in many
Third World countries are an important source of surplus
(Schiffer, 1981:520).
The ends to which surplus is channeled have widened.
Industry, and to a much lesser degree, agriculture have
received a portion of the surplus. Dependency authors are in
agreement that a process of industrialization has been
underway in peripheral states. Cardoso's proposition of
associated dependent development, further elaborated by
Evans (1981), implies both the accumulation of capital and
some degree of industrialization in part of the periphery.
Frank, whose name has been associated with the notion of
Third World stagnation and with whom, in addition,
Dependency has been closely identified, recognizes in his
recent book, Crisis: In the Third World (1982), that certain
countries such as Brazil, Mexico, and India have achieved a
level of industrial development sufficient to make them
"semi-peripheral" (a Wallerstein category).
On the other hand, industrialization is not being
matched by structural development. Amin regards the new
industrialization as a mere shift to a higher plane of
unequal exchange in which the center specializes in high
technology production and the periphery in manufacturing. On
the domestic level, Third World economies are seen as being
still characterized by distortion. Evans (1979), quotes
approvingly both Furtado and Amin on the "uneven,"
"distorted," and "disarticulated" structures of the
peripheral economies. The lack of structural development is
manifested, for instance, in the absence of strong linkages
amongst various branches and sectors of the economy, highly
uneven levels of productivity, hypertrophy of the tertiary
(service) sector (Evans, 1979; Amin, 1976:198-203).
The social benefits of industrialization have accrued
to a small percentage of the population. Brazil and Mexico,
highly industrialized in the Third-World context, have been
consistently rated as some of the most inegalitarian states.
Megapoles, shantytowns, malnutrition, and pollution are the
hallmarks of this process. The industrial sector which was
supposed to employ the migrant has failed to do so. Only a
small segment have become "working class" in the Marxian
sense of the concept. In short, this model of
industrialization is a model of exclusion for the bulk of
the people (Amin, 1976; Cardoso, 1979; Evans, 1981; Frank,
1982). This is seen mainly as a result of the use of
capital-intensive technologies that absorb large amounts of
investment outlays but fail to generate equivalent
employment opportunities (Amin, 1976; Evans, 1979).)
Dependency exegeses on postwar development have
occupied themselves with industry; agriculture receives only
peripheral attention. Their contribution to the Green
Revolution debate is limited to the types of modes of
production - feudal, colonial, capitalist, or combinations
of them - that exist in Third World agriculture. The debate
on Indian agriculture (Alavi, 1975; Rudra, 1969-1970; Sau,
1973) and that of Latin America (between Frank, 1969, 1972;
and Laclau, 1971) are prominent examples. While the
controversy has shed light on the nature of social relations
in the rural sector, and helped debunk the dualist thesis,
it did very little to discover, in Brewer's (1982:270)
words, the "...conditions under which accumulation will take
place and the forms that it takes." These issues are better
treated in the critical writings of, among others, Griffin
(1973),, Lipton (1976), DeAlcantara (1973-1974), and Mahmood
(1977). On the other hand, these writers have not concerned
themselves with placing their work within a particular
perspective of development studies, nor with formulating
general theoretical propositions and concepts. The focus of
their work is principally local. Yet the analyses of
development in agriculture on purely academic grounds are as
revealing as industrialization, and run the whole gamut of
Dependency's concerns: surplus and its use, structural
development of the economy, and the international and
national context of development. We suggest here, therefore,
that the critical works on the Green Revolution complement
the work of Dependency writings on industry, and can be
fruitfully incorporated into Model II.
Investment of economic surplus has not been confined to
industry. Funds have also been allocated to agriculture. It
is true that the sum is much smaller than in industry and,
as Lipton (1976) among others has forcefully argued, does
not balance the outflow of the agricultural surplus.
Nonetheless, a steady growth in the sector's output has
taken place in many Third World countries, notably India,
over the last three decades (World Bank, 1979:128).
Introduction of the technical package of high yielding
varities (HYVs) of rice and wheat, what has come to be known
as the Green Revolution, has accelerated growth rates in
these staples in irrigated areas in the Far East, and less
prominently so in the Near East, Latin America, and Africa
(Griffin, 1973:1-4).
The structural relations with the rest of the economy
that accompanied this growth have been scantily researched,
and no general statement parallel to that about industry can
be made from either Dependency or critical literature. On
the other hand, the social impact of the Green Revolution
has been widely treated. Critics of the Revolution, while
cognizant of the fact that growth in production has been
achieved, maintain that the main beneficiaries have been the
richer peasants; small pasants have in many cases lost part
of their land, turned into agricultural labor, or migrated
to the city (DeAlcantara, 1974; Cleaver, 1973; Griffin,
1973; Lipton, 1976; Mahmood, 1977). Nor has employment been
enhanced. Furthermore, malnutrition continues to be the fate
of the bulk of the rural population, especially in the
heavily populated areas of Asia ( India, Pakistan), many
parts of Africa, and Latin America. In other words,
technological development and capital accumulation in
agriculture, like in industry, have been marked by social
exclusion.
Thus far, Model II describes the countervailing
tendencies of surplus augmentation and its utilization in
industry and agriculture as well as their attendant social
and structural features. The third part of MII is concerned
with explaining how these trends were brought about by the
altered configurations of the world economy and polity, and
the Third World states, which crystallized after the Second
World War. Three features are relevant. First, - the world
was divided initially into a "bipolar" power-balancing
system in which the United States held a hegemonic position.
But unlike the systems that operated amongst European
capitalist states in the previous period, this one rested,
at least until the break-up of the Sino-Soviet alliance, on
the opposition of two social systems, capitalist and
socialist. Second, the multinational corporation emerged as
a decisive agency in the economic sphere; American at the
start, the MNC was to be joined later by European and
Japanese counterparts. And third, the periphery itself has
undergone a process of decolonialization, and practically
all countries gained formal political independence. Internal
social and political conflict effected a gradual erosion in
the power of oligarchies and big landowners; stronger states
with a different social base - civil servants and
professionals, industrial and agricultural capitalists -
began to take form.
Multinational corporations expanded rapidly after the
war in peripheral countries. The bulk of industrialization
in South Korea, Taiwan, and Brazil, to mention only a few,
can be ascribed to MNCs' expansion. The MNC finds it
necessary to spread its operations overseas, whether to
secure its monopolistic position as Hymer (1971) contends,
or, as Vernon (1971) shows in his product-cycle thesis, to
ensure its survival in the face of growing competition from
other countries. In other words, the MNC, unlike merchant
capital of the preceding era, does not see industrialization
of the periphery as a threat. The USSR also played its role
in Third-World industrialization. Its double image of being
similar to peripheral nations in its pre-revolutionary
period and to the developed nations in the wake of the
revolution, made it an attractive model for the periphery to
emulate (Horowitz, 1966:10). The Soviet Union itself
promoted the idea through financial and technical aid.
Egypt's industrial build-up during Nasser's regime, and that
of China before the Great Leap Forward, were made possible
through Soviet assistance.
Land reform and the Green Revolution had their impetus
in the U.S.-U.S.S.R. capitalist-socialist confrontation.
There is a consensus among analysts that that primary,
although not exclusive, motivation of American involvement
in the countryside was the combatting of communism
(Gittinger, 1961; Warriner, 1957; Olson, 1975; Blaufarb,
1977). American policy makers believed, rightly or wrongly,
that the creation of groups of prosperous small farmers in
the hinterland of the Third World was the best insurance,
coupled with military assistance, against communist
insurrection. The actual outcome of this policy is indicated
in Chapter 2.
Superpower rivalry, Multinationals, and foreign aid
have their impact largely through Third-World states.
Nationalism, anticolonial wars, and class conflict won most
of the periphery at least formal political independence, and
gradually eroded the power of big landowners and
oligarchies. The new state that emerged was usually
bureaucratic, often authoritarian, but what "lends it
dynamic," notes Cardoso (1979:202), is its "entreprenurial
aspect."4 In this manner, the state fills the vacuum created
by the absence or weakness of domestic capitalists. Only in
a few cases, such as China, Tanzania, Cuba, Egypt under
Nasser, and Chile under Allende, did the state try to break
away from international capitalism and opt for some form of
socialism. The vast majority of peripheral states
maintained, and often intensified, their relations and
transactions with international capitalism. Thus the state
becomes: "...a strategic element functioning as a hinge that
permits the opening of the portals through which capitalism
passes..." into the periphery and through which the battle
between classes and the relationship of dependency is
fought. As such, the state constitutes the "nuclear subject
matter of dependency" (Ibid:202-203).
The state acts as an "entrepreneur" and as an agent of
economic growth through a multitude of means. It undertakes
investments on its own or in joint ventures with
local/international capital; it sets tariff rates and taxes,
and imposes protectionist restrictions to aid the survival
of nascent industries; it institutes land reforms,
establishes credit institutions, and provides what Hirschman
calls "social overhead capital": roads, schools, extension
services, and land reclamation; it oversees the direction of
the whole economy through planning. This is not to suggest
that the state is a deus ex machina acting above and beyond
society, nor that it is the sole economic agent. "Mixed
economies" are characteristic of many a peripheral nation.
Private investments are carried out by individual
capitalists in industry and more so in agriculture since it
requires less money and has generally a shorter gestation
period. Moreover, these classes, together with the old
mercantile capital, affect the state's policies and
direction of development. Nevertheless, the Third World
state today plays a strategic role in economic development
which far surpasses that of the European state in the early
days of capitalism (Dickinson, 1983:28).
Model II can be summarized as follows. (1) The size of
the surplus is augmented. (2) Investment takes place in
industry and much less so in agriculture. (3) The state is a
central agency of economic development. (4) The resulting
development excludes the majority of the population. (5) The
international system is characterized by varying degrees of
bipolarity among capitalist, socialist, and mixed economy
states. (6) The MNCs are a major economic actor and promote
certain types of industrial development.
Section III
Dependency in Arab Studies
The Dependency perspective has been most widely
applied, elaborated, and debated in the context of Latin
America's development and underdevelopment. It was easy to
explain underdevelopment in Asia and Africa as a product of
colonialism; Latin American countries, on the other hand,
had gained independence much earlier yet failed to develop
in ways parallel to western capitalism. Development studies
of Arab countries, however, have been dominated by the
Modernization perspective (Mursi, 1982:7), an expression of
what Palloix (1978:174) calls the dependency of theory.
Zureik (1981:231-232) notes that a central theme of
development in the Near East is to attribute its
underdevelopment to so-called Islamic values, while
relegating structural factors to a residual and secondary
place. Exogenous forces have often been ignored as a result,
and emphasis is laid on internal obstacles to development
(Amin, 1979:10). It is rare, according to Ibrahim (1980:6),
to find analyses of Arab economies based on the Dependency
perspective. Dependency analysis is beginning, however, to
"infiltrate" gradually into the writings of Arab economists
and official Arab documents (1980:6). The same can be said
for non-Arab economists and other social scientists who
study the Arab world. In the rest of this section, we
present a brief and critical assessment of five works which
utilize Dependency, either to support it, refute it, or
correct its shortcomings when applied to specific countries
or sectors.
Hussein (1982), in a two-volume inclusive work on
Egypt, sets out to demonstrate how Nasser's economic policy
was geared toward the structuring of an independent and
autocentered economy, based on agricultural and industrial
development, integration of sectors and branches, social
equity, etc. Thus attempts were made in industry, for
example, to manufacture agricultural tools and machinery as
well as to consolidate and expand textile and processing
industries. This strategy has been altered, under Sadat,
toward dependence and linking Egypt's economy with the West.
In agriculture, the new policy is clear in USAID's and
IBRD's advocacy of the use of modern inputs and machinery
imported from western nations, particularly the United
States, or by their attempt to undermine the production of
cotton, by now an indigenous crop fully mastered by the
Egyptian peasant, because its major markets are the USSR and
Eastern Bloc countries (Ibid:442-447). The outcome of such
policies, although not yet fully matured, include the
concentration of production assets, such as land and
machinery, and the linking of the kulaks to the world
market. For Hussein, external influences on the economy,
operating through a weak state, are paramount in explaining
the course of Egypt's development; class and state play a
secondary role.
Waterbury(1982), treating the same phenomena, argues,
on the other hand, that Egypt's development can be explained
through a statist approach, i.e., by viewing the state as an
autonomous entity whose decisions are motivated by the
desire to bolster its own position. Dependence for him has
had a positive impact for it makes surplus available to the
state for investment. He considers dependence in terms of
the leverage that foreign governments, whether the Soviet
Union or the United States, exercise in their relations with
the Egyptian government, but does not inquire into its
effects on policies relating to, and structures of, the
economy. Although his interpretation differs from that of
Hussein, they both downplay the explanatory power of the
concept of class (Owen, 1983:7).
Yet a third book on Egypt (Davis, 1982) takes a
different tack. It represents an attempt to explain the rise
and demise of Bank Misr as a central force in Egypt's
industrialization in the period between the early 1920s and
late 1930s. His point of departure is the inclusion of Egypt
in the world economy during the nineteenth century, i.e., at
the historical moment when Dependency analysis starts. He
concludes that a proper understanding of Bank Misr is
possible only through an account of the interplay amongst
endogenous classes and the state as well as exogenous
forces. He criticizes Dependency "theory" for failing to
incorporate endogenous forces (1982:192-211).
In her doctoral dissertation, Pfeifer (1981) evaluates
consequences of the agrarian reform, executed in Algiers in
1971, on the country's agricultural development. She
advances what she calls the theory of the capitalist way as
a tool for interpreting Algeria's experience. Here, social
relations of production are paramount; other phenomena such
as technological change, political institutions, and
ideology are "... explained as endogenous factors in terms
of their interaction with...[a] dialectical class
relationship" (Ibid:365). This theory is essentially one
strand of classical Marxism. In Algeria, class relationships
are primarily of the capitalist-wage labor mode; the aim of
production whether in private or state enterprise is to
maximize profit (Ibid:7). The social and economic edifice
built on this foundation, "state capitalism," perpetuates
inequality. Dependency, as represented by Amin, is valid, in
Pfeifer's view, only for the colonial period.
As for Jordan, the only work of this genre, as far as
we know, is Ameri's Ph.D. dissertation (1981). By studying
the scioeconomic development of Jordan, Ameri aims to
examine some basic assumptions of Dependency and put forward
an alternative framework. She does so by studying the
historical evolution of the various sectors of the economy.
Her premise is that the cause of the underdeveloped
structure of Jordan's economy (minerals and agriculture as
main exports, the prevalence of the service sector, the
tangible uneveness of productivity and distribution of
wealth and income) is to be sought more in decisions made by
local capitalists than in international connections and
influence. If minerals are produced, or if investments are
made in real estate rather than industry, this is because it
is profitable for the domestic capitalist to do so. She does
not, however, ask the further question of why these types of
ventures, and not others, happen to be profitable. Another
point she finds deficient in Dependency concerns the surplus
drain from the periphery to the center. She estimates that
Jordan has been a net recipient, not an exporter, of surplus
partly because of the continuous inflow of aid, at first
from western powers and now from the Arab oil-states, in
exchange for the regime's role as a political stabilizer in
the region.
Admittedly, we have given simplified versions of the
main thrusts of these studies, but they do illustrate
certain relevant themes. First, all of them are recent,
which reflects the dominance of Modernization and the long
absence of the Dependency perspective in Middle East
studies. If they signal a trend, then we can expect that
other works with similar approaches will be forthcoming.
Second, they all represent a shift away from the dualism of
Modernization; class, state, and international politics and
economics are taken as the factors that condition the path
of development. Third, although their authors have different
academic backgrounds (Hussein and Pfeifer are economists,
Waterbury and Davis are political scientists, Ameri is a
sociologist), they are not bound by their disciplines: the
social, political, and economic blend and merge to give a
comprehensive picture of the phenomenon under consideration.
With respect to Dependency, their views vary. Hussein
judges external forces as paramount; Waterbury considers
dependence only in terms of transactions and flows without
reference to domestic impact; both Ameri and Davis argue for
class and state analysis within the context of world
capitalism. Pfeifer rejects Amin's thesis and sees domestic
class contradictions as the motor force of development. All
these readings of Dependency literature are, in our view,
partial. We have already presented an interpretation of the
perspective that is at variance with some of them, and at
the same time does not suffer from the shortcomings present
authors attribute to the perspective. A few points, however,
require further emphasis. Except for Hussein and Waterbury,
the authors treat Dependency as a "theory" not a perspective
and, in the case of Pfeifer, may ascribe it to a single
author like Amin.
Furthermore, the claims that Dependency does not
account for state and class forces in the periphery is
unfounded. The point of emphasis in Dependency, however, is
their historical evolution in relationship to the center. A
main thesis of Amin is that capitalism, impinging on
precapitalist modes of production, did not transform them
into capitalist-wage labor relationships as in core
capitalism; rather it created different class relations to
be understood on the basis of concrete studies. Evans'
recent book on Brazil's dependent development (1983) devotes
itself to the study of the tripartite relationship of
conflict and compromise among international capital (MNCs),
state, and private capitalists. Brewer, who is not
particularly sympathetic to Frank's work (taken by many
critics of Dependency as an example of the dismissal of
domestic class and state forces) singles out his stress on
political consequences as Frank's strongest point. For him,
the heart of Frank's argument is that state policy is a
critical element in economic development, that this policy
is the outcome of conflict between classes and factions of
classes with conflicting interests, and that those classes
and factions that benefit from existing economic structures
will both have an interest in perpetuating them, and be in a
strong position to succeed (Brewer, 1981:164). The problem,
in our opinion, may lie elsewhere, and it is not peculiar to
the Dependency perspective. There is a lack of adequate
understanding of class structures and the nature of states
in the Third World in general, and the Middle East in
particular, let alone how they "articulate" with world
capitalism. This is partly due to the rapid economic,
social, and political changes that these societies have
undergone, and the relatively small number of scholars
studying the subject.
Summary
Our aim in this chapter has been to define a conceptual
framework for our study of Jordan Valley agriculture. We
first cited the mainstream literature on the diffusion of
technologies in agriculture. Two models were abstracted, the
individual-based model, and the social-structural model. The
second model views farmers' access to economic resources as
the decisive factor in their adoption of the new
technologies. This is the approach we take in the present
study.
We gave an account of the Dependency perspective, its
assumptions, method, and basic argument. The Dependency
perspective sees development as being governed by the size
of surplus and its availability to a Third World country.
These two aspects of surplus are, in turn, governed by the
interplay of domestic and international structures.
Afterwards, we constructed two models from the gamut of
Dependency writings. Model I described a general state of
stagnation in Third World economies, save for the enclave
sector. In the model, surplus was seen as drained away from
the countryside to the city and/or to the core. The dominant
classes in the periphery were oligarchies and mercantile
capitalists. In the center, the dominant powers were
capitalists. The periphery's lack of industrialization
stemmed from the low level of surplus and/or the competition
of center goods.
Model II described countervailing trends with respect
to surplus and its use, resulting from the transformation of
the domestic and international structure. Surplus was
augmented from local savings, foreign aid, and, in some
countries, as a result of the dramatic rise in oil prices.
Surplus was invested in industry and, to a much lesser
extent, in agriculture. The power of the oligarchies was
gradually eroded, and new classes--industrial and agrarian
capitalists, techno-bureaucrats--began to consolidate
themselves. The new state that emerged was often
authoritarian and bureaucratic, and was the main agency of
development in the periphery. On the international level, a
system of power balancing based on the competition between
different social systems emerged. The Multinational
Corporation (MNC) emerged as a principal economic actor in
the international system. In order to maintain its
monopolistic position and/or take advantage of cheap factors
of production, the MNC branched out into the periphery.
Industrial growth in the periphery was not matched by
structural development in the economy, however, and did not
generate sufficient employment because of its reliance on
capital-intensive technologies. As a result, the mass of the
population benefited little from this industrialization. The
trend in agriculture resembled that of industry. Although
the Green Revolution led to a significant growth in
agricultural production, small peasants, tenants, and
agricultural workers were also excluded form the benefits of
this growth.
The extent to which the foregoing propositions help us
explain how the combination of international, state, and
local factors made surplus available for investment in the
Jordan Vally, the types of technologies in which it was
invested, their impact on social and economic structures,
the attendant linkages with the national and international
economies and implications for Jordan's economic dependence
is the task of the following chapters.
ENDNOTES
1. Some writers classify the perspectives on development
into two, Modernization and Dependency (Chilcote, 1974;
Foster-Carter, 1976; Valenzuela and Valenzuela, 1979).
Others find these two categories inadequate. Petras (1978)
identifies three "approaches" to development: (1) Liberal
Transnational, (2) Structural, and (3) Radical World System
or Dependency. Most recently, Biersteker (n.d.) groups
development authors into five categories: (1) Conservative,
Neo-classical Realists, (2) Liberal Internationalists, (3)
"Vulgar" Dependentistas, (4) "Sophisticated" Dependentistas,
and (5) Classical Marxists. Classifications are influenced
by, among other things, the issues under consideration, as
well as the level of aggregation, hence the level of
generality, authors choose to maintain.
2.The recent book by Brewer (1980) gives an excellent
exposition of the classical Marxist positions.
3.This result may have to do also, as Haggard (1986)
suggests, with the organization of the rural sector. In
Taiwan, for example, where land reform was implemented in
the early 1950s and where a level of industrialization as
high as that of Brazil was achieved, income distribution is
much less skewed than in Brazil. It does not necessarily
follow, however, as Haggard argues, that this was the
consequence of domestic policies undertaken by Brazil and
Taiwan. The land reform in Taiwan was made possible by U.S.
encouragement, if not pressure, and assistance, which he
acknowledges. Be that as it may, Haggard's argument draws
attention to a la6una in Dependency analyses, reflected in
this lack of attention to the rural sector. This is a point
we stress in the present work.
4. Duvall (1983:570) views state entrepreneurship in more
restrictive terms than simply state ownership of economic
enterprises. The concept of the state as an entrepreneur,
for him, applies when enterprises owned and operated,
jointly or solely, by the state produce or sell goods and
services in unplanned markets, and the enterprises are
evaluated in substantial part in terms of market performance
criteria. As such, the state both competes and collaborates
with private capital.
CHAPTER TWO:
THE SYSTEM OF PRODUCTION AND EXCHANGE
IN JORDAN VALLEY AGRICULTURE
Important local, state, and international conditions
determined the process and character of technological
transformation in the Jordan Valley. Our primary stress,
however, in this chapter is on the system of production and
exchange in the Ghor itself, through which we can also
examine how state and international influences are "felt."
The chapter is divided into five sections. The first
section gives an overview of the historical transformation
of Jordan's agriculture as a whole, covering the British
mandate period (1922-1946) when Jordan became directly
incorporated into the international political and economic
system. The second section traces how the ensemble of social
and political forces--the arrival of Palestinian refugees;
water disputes among Jordan, Syria and Israel; the United
States' global policy of containment of the Soviet Union
which perceived the refugees as a potential ground for
communist infiltration and instability--put the Jordan
Valley on the development agenda of the U.S. and Jordanian
governments. Although we also indicate the nature of the
agrarian reform package promoted by the United States for
that purpose, only the institutional elements of this
package are considered. Discussion of the technological
aspects, reflected principally in irrigation works, is
deferred to the next chapter. The system of production--land
distribution before and following land reform, tenure
patterns, and the characteristics and nature of relations
among producers--is elaborated in section three. Relations
among producers, it is argued in section four, extend beyond
production into the sphere of exchange. Other aspects of
exchange, export of produce and import of inputs, are
treated in Chapter 4. The last section examines the
distribution of credit among different groups of farmers and
its effect on their capacity for adoption of agricultural
technologies.
Section I
Historical Overview of Jordan's Agriculture
Ottoman rule over Transjordan, as present day Jordan was
called until its independence in 1950, came to an end with
the Axis defeat in World War I. Toward the end of that rule,
the country was sparsely populated and economically
heterogeneous and disconnected. In 1915, its population was
estimated to be about 132,000 (Konikoff, 1946: 17). The
predominant economic activity was pastoral and agricultural,
cereals being the major cultivated crop; the people were
nomadic and semi-nomadic in the south, more settled in the
middle of the country and north.
The two predominant forms of land tenure were mushac and
mafruz. Individuals held no legal title to the land because
the land was nominally owned by the Ottoman state. In the
mushac system, which made up about 57 per cent 1 of the land
area tilled by villages, the land belonged, in theory, to
the village or tribe (Ibid.: 36)..Individuals enjoyed the
legal right of land use or usufruct, and laid claim to
certain nominal shares, not specific parcels of land. Land
parcels corresponding to shares were realloted periodically,
at anywhere from two to nine years (Walpole, 1948: 55).
Although landownership was invested in the community, each
peasant family cultivated its alloted parcel individually.
As such, the mushac can be described as a part-communal and
a part-individual tenure system. Often, however, most
tribesmen and villagers were akin to tenants under the sway
of tribal chiefs, a relationship characterized by Hourani
(1978) as being semi-feudal. In some instances, inheritance,
by its continual fragmentation of shares, led to the
breakdown of the system, and individual ownership
established itself by customary right (Warriner, 1961: 75-
76). The second type of land tenure, the mafruz, was more
common in the hills in the middle and northern parts of
Transjordan where viticulture and olive cultivation
prevailed (Konikoff, 1946: 36). Permanent boundaries
demarcating individual plots were set up, but they were
often disputed among heirs and neighbors.
Peasants remained at a subsistence level, with no
discernible tendency towards accumulation. The lack of
accumulation stemmed in part from within and in part from
without the system. While a village's or a tribe's land
ownership was claimed communally, thereby securing access by
all its members to cultivation, the community did not pool
its resources to improve the land. Individual peasants
probably felt they had no incentive to do so, because they
would be allotted new parcels in subsequent years. As a
result, the economic surplus generated was low. Furthermore,
whatever surplus was generated by the peasantry was subject
to appropriation by one form of coercion or another. The
local potentates or tribal chiefs enjoyed privileged access
to the economic surplus (Hourani, 1978: 29-32). Sometimes
villages would also be forced to pay khawah, a tribute to a
hostile tribe, to prevent attacks on the village (Ibid.: 29-
32). The Ottoman state itself collected a land tax of 10
precent of a peasant's production. In the closing years of
the Empire, however, when central authority was weakened,
the state employed tax collectors, multazimin, who
guaranteed the state the 10 per cent tax but often extorted
larger sums from the peasantry for themselves (Ibid.: 19).
In addition, the period was plagued by frequent warfare
among tribes vying for control of land resources and trade
routes, which posed a constant threat to a secure access to
the land--the most distinctive feature of the mushac tenure
system.
With the defeat of the Ottomans during the first World
War, control over Transjordan passed into British hands.
British rule was formalized in 1922 by the League of
Nations' designation of Britain as the Mandate power. The
Mandate period, which was to last until 1946, was also the
period of state-building in Transjordan. Because the process
of state-building was lengthy and complex and is not of
direct relevance to this study, we will not discuss it in
detail here. We only refer to the elements of that process
that shaped British agricultural policy in Transjordan.
First, British interest in creating the state of Jordan
stemmed from geopolitical, strategic considerations, rather
than economic motivations. 2 Second, the two principal
parties who set up the state, the British and cAbd Allah 3
who was to become the first king of the Hashemite dynasty
that still rules today's Jordan, were both outsiders. They
therefore had to'impose a government and graft a dynasty
onto an initially reluctant population. 4 Third, prior to the
British Mandate, Transjordan did not constitute a coherent
economic, social, or political unit; neither did it possess
even the rudiments of a state apparatus. Transjordan
possessed hardly any agricultural or mineral resources worth
coveting. With its small, largely impoverished population,
it could not offer an attractive potential market for either
consumer goods or capital investment. Whatever "investments"
the British made were, by and large, absorbed by the
bureaucracy and the newly constituted army; the economic
payoff for Britain came from elsewhere in the region.
Britain's major and direct intervention in the
agricultural economy was directed at the tenurial system. It
undertook the task of abolishing the mushac system and the
registration of individual titles to the land by enacting
the Land Settlement Law in 1933. In the words of Konikoff,
"The breaking up of the communal land ownership, the so-
called 'mush'a' tenure, was rightly considered to be a
principal object (of the land settlement operation)."
(Konikoff, 1946: 35). The Mandate authorities justified the
abolition of the mushac tenure on the grounds that it was
economically inefficient and unconducive to growth
(Konikoff, 1946; Walpole, 1948). This claim, as indicated
earlier, was not entirely false; but an examination of other
British practices with regard to Transjordan reveals how, to
a considerable extent, political motivations connected to
state-building overrode economic priorities.
In the first place, if the fledgling state were to
extend and assert its authority in the hinterland, it had to
effect a shift of individual primordial--village or tribe--
loyalties to the central authority. The transfer of communal
to individual title, and the investment of jurisdiction over
land in the state rather than in the communities, abetted
that objective. No longer would the peasant need the
authority of the village to claim his land; and, in the case
of disputed boundaries, he would resort to state courts to
settle the question. In addition, division and registration
of titles enabled the state to collect land taxes (Walpole,
1948:58), affirming in the process that it was the new
authority.
In the second place, agricultural policies of the
mandate government favored large landowners and tribal
chiefs in order to win their allegiance. The Land Settlement
Law of 1933, which served as the legal grounds for
transforming the mushac system, neglected, as Warriner
noted, the "real functions" that ought to be fulfilled by a
land-tenure code, such as offering security to tenants,
preventing exploitation, and stimulating investment (1948:
23). Thus, Hershlag notes the "particularly stringent
conditions of land tenure in the mountainous area in the
northern part of the country, as evidenced by the large
number of small holdings, and the large estates owned by a
few"(1980:267). The average size of landholding per family
in 1936 was assessed to be less than the area adequate to
ensure subsistence (Walpole, 1948: 62-63). The average even
declined in the following years because peasants,
particularly in areas of low rainfall, were forced to
mortgage their land, only gradually to lose it (Walpole,
1948:59; Warriner, 1948: 79).
Another aspect of the politically conditioned land
policy of the mandate government is to be found in the semi-
medieval practice of land grants. In the process of land
settlement and registration, tribal chiefs, army officers,
and other influential persons were given large tracts of
land from those designated as state domain, at nominal
prices. The extent to which this occurred is not well
documented; the outstanding example, however, is that of the
Idwan tribe, which had originally opposed Amir cAbd Allah
and been quelled by him with British aid. The tribe was
"sold" 108,000 dunums at .025 Palestinian pounds/dunum
(Konikoff, 1946: 35) in order to ensure its future loyalty. 5
The land, which was located in the Jordan Valley north of
the Dead Sea, was registered in the name of the tribe's
chief, not its members, in the manner of the mushac system
that the mandate authorities had deemed so inefficient! 6
Moreover, while settlement of land titles proceeded
promptly, government control over water distribution was
much delayed because of opposition from big landlords. In
irrigated zones, especially in the Jordan Valley, the big
landlords held a monopoly over water resources. It was not
until 1938, 16 years into the mandate, that the Water
Settlement Law, which gave the government the authority to
control water distribution, was enacted, although not
implemented because of big landowners' opposition (Hershlag,
1980: 267; Konikoff, 1946: 30-31).
Yet despite the transformation of the tenurial system
from the mushac to private ownership, agricultural
conditions exhibited little sign of improvement. The Mandate
authorities, preoccupied with consolidating the incipient
state, invested next to nothing in agriculture. The bulk of
the budget was absorbed by the new army and administration
(Ameri, 1980:85; Konikoff, 1946: 40-41). Landowners, on the
other hand, were either incapable of, or uninterested in,
investing in agriculture. The vast majority of the peasants,
with their small holdings and reliance on fluctuating
rainfall, hardly possessed enough surplus to invest in land
improvement (Hershlag, 1980: 267). The bigger landlords and
tribal chiefs, on the other hand, had little inclination for
doing so. The number of tractors in Transjordan in 1939
totaled nine, of which six were sold and exported to
Palestine in the early years of the war (Konikoff, 1946:
39). There is no documented explanation for this
phenonmenon. We may conjecture, however, that the big
landlords were content to spend their income on consumption
and, in the case of the tribal chiefs, on being excessively
hospitable. Jawad (1974: 11-12) points out that the shaykhs
of tribes received financial grants from the government,
thereby lessening their dependence on income from
agriculture. Overall, recruitment for positions in the
bureaucracy and army lessened the importance of agriculture
as a source of livelihood in the countryside, and drew labor
power away from agriculture (Ameri, 1980:146).
Land productivity, as a result, remained unaltered,
"...at about the same level which may be deduced from
estimates made by the Turkish authorities in their day"
(Konikoff, 1946: 42), and subject, for the most part, to
rainfall irregularities. There are indications, however,
that the levels of production rose by the end of the 1930's
and early 1940's (Konikoff, 1946: 42-47). The growth of
output derived from the expansion of the cultivated area,
itself caused by the gradual settlement of the nomadic and
semi-nomadic tribes. The tribes, after land registration and
law enforcement by the state, found the scope of their
movement narrowing. They also lost their monopoly over wood
and meat supply as Transjordan was opened to international
trade (Hourani, 1978: 79). Transjordan became, during that
period, a net exporter of wheat, although in modest amounts
(Konikoff, 1946: 42-43).8
The cropping pattern stayed essentially the same.
Cereals continued to be the prevalent crop. In 1944, the
total area of cereals--wheat, barley, millet, and maize--
approached 2,000,000 dunums or about two-thirds of the total
cultivated area; wheat occupied about 70 per cent of this
area. The area planted with vegetables, fruit, and olive
trees was slightly over 100,000 dunums (Konikoff, 1946:
44,46).
To recapitulate, Transjordan, in the closing years of
Ottoman rule, did not constitute a homogeneous economic,
social, or political unit. The population was either
nomadic, semi-nomadic, or settled. Agriculture, which
remained at a subsistence level, dominated economic
activity. The main form of land tenure was the mushac, a
communal landownership which offered members of the village
or tribe the right to nominal shares, with corresponding
land parcels alloted periodically. In hill areas, in the
middle and the north where trees were planted, another form
of tenure, mafruz, was to be found, in which individual
peasants claimed particular units, but titles were not
settled and were therefore often disputed.
Under the British Mandate (1922-1950), which followed on
the heels of the Ottoman defeat in World War I, a
functioning state was erected and the Hashimite dynasty,
which originally came from the Hijaz in the Arabian
penninsula, was grafted onto the country. The agricultural
policy of the Mandate government was dictated by political
motives of building the state, and extending.its authority
to, and securing a loyal social base in, the hinterland.
These motivations were manifested in its abolition of the
mushac system and the institution of private property in
landownership, the favoring of big landlords, and the
granting of land of tribal chiefs and other influential
persons to ensure their loyalty. Transjordan's
overwhelmingly rainfed agriculture offered little economic
attraction to Britain. Consequently, Britain showed no
inclination to invest in this sector or to alter the
cropping pattern, as it had done, for instance, in Egypt or
the Sudan to obtain long staple cotton. Private investment
was also not forthcoming. The majority of peasants possessed
hardly any surplus for investment, and the big landowners
and tribal chiefs opted for spending the surplus on
consumption; in addition, tribal chiefs and their sons, who
were appointed to top administrative and army positions,
received financial allowances and salaries that made them
less dependent on agriculture. Under the circumstances,
agricultural productivity stagnated and cereals remained the
prevalant crop. Whatever increase in production was achieved
derived from the expansion of cultivated land under the
tribes who were gradually being settled. And as indicated in
chapter 4, the agricultural sector continued to stagnate
after political independence, the principal exception to
this being Jordan Valley agriculture. Here, cultivation
methods and practices, cropping patterns, and tenure
arrangements, among other things, have undergone radical
transformation.
Section II
The Valley on the U.S. Agenda of Development
The transformation of the Valley's agriculture was
effected by the coalescing of a set of factors and interests
operating at the international, state and local levels. A
separate explanation of the nature of the Jordanian state is
beyond the intent of the present work. Therefore, the role.
of the Jordanian state in the Valley's development will
appear in conjunction with the treatment of both
international and local determinants.
Britain was the mandate power not only in Transjordan,
but also in Palestine where the Palestinian-Zionist conflict
was taking root. The Jordan Valley, with its water
resources, was seen by some Zionist immigrants as a
potential place for resettling Palestinians, or even, by
others, for their own colonization. Several surveys were
conducted, and plans were drafted by British and American
emissaries for tapping the basin's water. 1 0 M.G.
Ionides, the then Brtitish Director of Development in
Transjordan who conducted the first comprehensive
hydrographic survey of the Valley in 1938, identified the
objective of the survey by quoting the Palestine Royal
Commission in the opening section of his report:
The number of new settlers for whom room
could be found in Transjordan is assessed by
some Jewish writers in millions; by those who
are opposed to Jewish immigration in thou-
sands. It is clearly desireable that this
uncertainty should be as far as possible
removed, and we recommend that, as soon as
the financial position permits, a survey of
Transjordan should be made and a scheme pre-
pared for its irrigation and development.
(Ionides, 1939: xvii)
But, as Khouri (1981: 54) observes, "Developing the Valley
remained tangential to both regional and international
affairs." Ionides' proposals for harnessing the region's
waters, like many before and after them, were shelved as a
result.11 This was to change after the Second World War.
In 1948, a decade after Ionides' survey, the state of
Israel was created and Palestinians were made refugees;
about 86,000 of them flocked into the Jordan Valley, on both
sides of the Jordan River. Resettling them became an urgent
matter for Israel, Jordan, and the United States. In
addition, disputes over the division of the Valley's waters
erupted among Israel, Jordan, and Syria (see below).
At the international level, a new global order, grounded
in the conflict between two opposing social and economic
systems, capitalism and socialism, emerged. Bipolarity
between the United Statess the dominant power in the
capitalist block, and the Soviet Union, the chief power in
the socialist camp, characterized the system until the early
1960s. The United States pursued a policy of containment of
the Soviet Union in which the Middle East, with its
proximity to the USSR, figured prominently. Furthermore, the
oil potential of the region was becoming apparent. Again,
the United States found in Jordan geopolitical interests
similar to those Britain had earlier, and sought to ensure
the continued stability of the Hashemite monarchy. The
Palestinian refugees were viewed as a possible source of
threat to the stability of Jordan, as well as to Israel, the
new western ally in the region. The policy objectives of the
United States were succinctly summarized in 1953 by the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee:
The United States has an interest in
doing what it can to help solve the refugee
problem because of its direct relationship to
the economic and political stability and
security of the Middle East. The United
States does not wish to see internal order
and independence of the countries of the Near
East threatened by economic chaos, communist
penetration, or military hostilities.
(Quoted in Shadid, 1981: 55)
After prolonged diplomatic activity and financial and
technical offers, the United States was able to seal
separate agreements with Israel and Jordan on developing the
Jordan Valley. 12 The history of this water dispute has been
detailed elsewhere (Kahhaleh, 1981; Khouri, 1981: 60-86;
Saliba, 1968; Shadid, 1981: 53-75). On the Jordanian side,
the United States acted jointly with the Jordanian
government and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency
for Palestinian Refugees (UNRWA)--the financial backing for
which came chiefly from the United States--to harness
Jordan's share of irrigation water and to resettle the
refugees. UNRWA conducted a census in 1955 for that purpose
(Khouri, 1981: 68-70; Sutcliffe, 1973; Fraenkel, 1980: 9).
UNRWA's plan envisaged that the state would own the
irrigated land and lease it to refugee farm operators, as
was done in the Gezira Cotton Scheme in the Sudan1 3
(Fraenkel 1980). It was, however, overridden by the
agreement that was concluded between the U.S. International
Cooperation Administration, the forerunner of the U.S.
Agency for International Development, for a joint
development scheme in the Ghor (Dees, 1959). The agreement
included the construction of irrigation canals, dams,
electric power stations, and grids, and investment in other
rural development projects (Dees, 1958). According to
Sutcliffe (1973: 47), this was "...the largest and most
important development project ever undertaken by Jordan; it
also is [was] one of the largest investments ever made by
the United States in the development of the Arab Middle
East."
The outlines of the rural development scheme were
parallel to other schemes sponsored by the United States
elsewhere in the Third World (see Chapter I). They included
an "integrated" package of land reform, irrigation schemes,
provision of credit, marketing centers, extension services,
etc., the aim being the creation of a system of family farms
thought to be conducive to rural stability (Warriner,
1958:4).
Thus, although the United States pursued political goals
similar to those of Britain in Jordan, namely the
undergirding of the Hashemite monarchy, it became more
deeply involved in Jordan's economic development, the Jordan
Valley being a prime example, than Britain had been. Britain
had sought to graft the Hashemite dynasty onto Jordan and
induce stability by securing the allegiance of the
hinterland elite, the large landlords, and tribal chiefs.
In the post-war United States, on the other hand, a new
strand of Third World rural policy was crystallizing. In
order to prevent rural areas in Asia, Latin America, and
Africa from falling under communist influence, countries
would have to establish a certain stratum of small, family-
based farms (see, for example, Blaufarb, 1977; Olson, 1974;
Warriner, 1958). An example of this policy is the land
reform program in Taiwan. The program was implemented in the
aftermath of the defeat of the Nationalist forces on
mainland China by U.S. and Taiwanese officials working in
the Joint Commission for Rural Reconstruction (JCRR). The
U.S. provided the technical and financial backing that,
according to Gittinger, "played a critical part" in
realizing the goal of the program: land-to-the-tiller. As a
result of the reform, the majority of farmers became
landowners. The owner-cultivated area to total farmland rose
from 55 per cent in 1948 to 87 per cent in 1959 (Olson,
1974:60).
This is not to suggest that the U.S. was carrying out
its stated land-reform goal around the globe. Here
contingency played a vital role. Where peasant movements
were powerful (Japan, Korea, and Taiwan), the United States
pressed for agrarian reform (Ibid:148). This contrasts with
the Philippines and Latin America, where U.S. strategic
objectives were present, to be sure, but more clearly
subordinate to U.S. economic goals; in Guatemala, for
instance, U.S. companies held large tracts of land and the
United States toppled the country's government after it
enacted reforms that touched the landholdings of U.S.
concerns (Ibid:104). Furthermore, the Green Revolution was
confined to irrigated area in accordance with the capitalist
"building-on-the-best" approach (Cleaver, 1973:191-192).
The newly dispossessed Palestinian refugees in the Valley
were viewed as a likely target of communist penetration. The
potential threat the refugees might pose to Israel
heightened the concern of the United States, and encouraged
the attempt to introduce some measure of agrarian reform in
the Ghor. But, as will be shown in the next section, the
land reform program failed to achieve its stated objective
of establishing an owner-cultivated farming system.
Section III
The System of Production
The system of production refers to the various types of
production relations existing in Valley agriculture as
manifested in land distribution, tenure patterns, and labor
organization.
III.1 Land Distribution and Land Reform
Land distribution and ownership in the Jordan Valley
remains a foggy realm. The ambiguity can be attributed to
several sources. The first problem lies in methods of
agricultural land distribution, of which there are two. One
is based on ownership, and the other on so-called "holding,"
i.e., the unit of operation regardless of the legal identity
of the operator. The former is considered an indicator of
equity, the latter of efficiency (Mazur, 1979:149; Dajani,
1980:39). This claim, in our opinion, is only partly true
and, sometimes, may be misleading. Ownership-based
measurements indicate only the level of equity of ownership,
not necessarily income. Over the past eight years, the
adoption of high productivity technologies in the Ghor made
the difference in production, hence in income, between
adopting and nonadopting farms very pronounced. Moreover,
holding-based distribution may, in some types of tenure,
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hide rather than reveal efficiency and the potential of
adopting technologies. A sharecropped holding of 10 dunums
(one dunum = .24 acres) for instance, may be only one
parcel among many owned by a single owner, often the case in
this tenurial arrangement. As such, the holding-based method
would introduce an error as to the relationship between size
and efficiency and potential for capital accumulation. At
any rate, official statistics, except in rare cases, contain
data based on holdings, which makes it extremely difficult
to give a proper assessment of land distribution in the
Ghor. There are, in addition, purely technical sources of
error. Surveys have often not covered the same land area,
and size of holdings in these surveys has only recently been
standardized. Data discontinuity created by these practices
is difficult to bridge. Finally, a serious lacuna in data
collection occurred in the aftermath of the 1967 Arab-
Israeli War, when the Valley became a confrontation zone
between Israel and Palestinian guerrillas. Many residents
were displaced, and agricultural production in the Ghor was
disrupted for several years. The 1973 census was the first
to be taken since 1959-1960.
Land surveys have been conducted and land reform
implemented in conjunction with the phases of construction
of the East Ghor Canal, the central public piece in the
Valley's development scheme. The four stages of construction
are as follows: (1) the main canal, or the first 70
Kilometers (kms) strip, (2) the eight kilometers extension,
(3) the 18 kilometers extension, and (4) the Dead Sea
extension (see Figure 2.1). All phases have now been
completed, with the exception of the fourth, which is in the
preparation stage. (see Chapter III)
In order to evaluate the results of land reform, we
first examine land distribution before reform. In(ormation
is avaliable only for the 70 kms and 18 kms sections. Table
2.1 illustrates land distribution in the 70 kms strip in
July, 1959-1960. The categories of small, middle, upper
middle, and big farmers are our own. They correspond to
classifications often used for landownership, but the cut-
off points are Ghor-specific. They signify the hierarchy of
owners as well as the potential for adopting the recent
capital-intensive technologies. In addition, they are more
convenient referrents than the highly disaggregated
intervals.
The data reveal a high level of concentration of
landownership. The small farmers, those who owned less than
20 dunums, comprised about 55.0 per cent of total
landowners, but owned only 9.8 per cent of the total land
area. The corresponding ratios for big landowners, on the
other hand, were 8.1 and 53.6 per cent. In addition, a
minority, tantamount to a landed oligarchy, of only slightly
above 1 per cent of landholders claimed over 23 per cent of
the land. Middle and upper middle farmers combined
constituted 37.0 per cent of the owners and held about 36.6
per cent of the land area. This picture of land distribution
Figure 2.1
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Source: Sharab(1975:12)
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Table 2.1
Land Distribution in the Main Canal Section--Before Reform
Category Size of Owners Area
of Owners Ownership No. % No. of %
(dunums) dunums
Small 1-9 1,309 35.7 5,496 3.5
10-19 708 19.3 9,935 6.3
Middle and 20-29 378 10.3 9,069 5.7
Upper Middle 30-75 866 23.6 39,068 24.7
75-100 113 3.1 9.869 6.2
101-500 252 6.9 47,815 30.2
Big 501-1000 32 .9 31,782 13.8
Over 1000 10 .3 15,244 9.6
Total* 3,668 100.0 158,296 100.0
quoted in Depa.rtment of Statistics (1961).Source: Department of Lands and Surveys,
*Totals may not add due to rounding.
in the main Canal strip can be plotted on a smoothed Lorenz
curve (see Figure 2.2). The high degree of skewness on land
distribution is also evidenced by the high value, .65, of [
Gini coefficient.
Because agriculture was the chief source of livelihood
for the majority of the Ghor's population, an estimation of
the number of landless is relevant (see Appendix 2.1). Our
computations indicate that the vast majority of the
population did not own any land: 90 per cent of the total
households in the project area, and 85 per cent of
households engaged in agriculture.
Land distribution in the 18 kms extension before reform
is shown in Table 2.2. Again a high level of concentration,
although less than in the main Canal strip, marked land
distribution conditions in this segment of the Ghor: 59.9
per cent of landowners were small farmers who possessed only
15.1 per cent of the land, compared with ratios of 5.7 and
37.8 for big holders. It should be noted that the big
landowners in this strip controlled tangibly less area than
their counterparts in the main Canal zone, and the incidence
of small farmers was higher. The middle and upper middle
farmers were comparable in both segments. Probably the
middle farmers made up most of the owners and ownerships
here, since these ratios plummet for the interval 75-100
dunums. Thus, there may be a dominance of middle farmers in
this group. The average size of ownership in the 18 kms
extension was 30.9 dunums, compared with 43.1 in the main
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Table 2.2
Land Distribution in the 18 km Extension--Before Reform
Category of Size of Owners Area
Owners Ownership No. % No. of %
(dunums) dunums
<5 178 15.7 511 1.4
Small 5-10 300 26.3 2,084 5.9
10-20 204 17.9 2,759 7.8
Middle 20-30 103 9.0 2,558 7.3
30-40 102 9.0 3.343 9.5
Upper-middle 40-50 101 8.9 4,663 13.3
50-100 92 8.1 5,972 17.0-
100-200 37 3.2 5,342 15.2
200-300 11 1.0 2,499 7.1
Big 300-400 4 .3 1,399 4.0
400-500 2 .2 996 2.8
500-1000 6 .5 3,075 8.7
Total* 1,140 100.0 35,200 100.0
Source: Jordan Valley Authority, quoted
*Totals may not add due to rounding.
in Dajani, et al. (1980).
Canal area. Still the Gini coefficients for both zones were
close.15
Another aspect of land distribution that is important
for development, and which land reforms commonly address, is
land fragmentation. The problem of fragmentation is perhaps
most pertinent in the case of small and medium holdings.
Based on information in the Department of Statistics (1961:
161), we calculated that in the main Canal zone, 75 per cent
of small holdings were composed of a single parcel, 20 per
cent of two, and 5 per cent of three or more. This is to be
expected because the units themselves are small to begin
with. But fragmentation was more pronounced in the case of
medium holdings: 54 per cent were constituted of one parcel,
30 per cent of two, and 16 per cent of three or more. No
information, prior to land reform, is available for the rest
of the region.
The "package" of Valley development included a land
reform. The stated aim of the project was the creation of a
class of middle, owner-operator farmers. The political aims
of the reform have already been mentioned, although they
were hedged around in official documents (Sutcliffe, 1973),
and couched in economic terms. Spencer, an early advisor to
the project, was quoted in a later report prepared for USAID
by Dajani, et al (1980:40) as saying:
...a stated purpose of the East Ghor Canal
scheme is to provide an opportunity for a
larger number of farmers to participate in
the benefits that will derive when a firm
water supply is available for good
lands....Long experience reveals that an
irrigation economy is far more sound and
successful when the landowners live on the
project and operate their farms...landowners
must be owner-operators and not absentee
landowners renting their land to tenants or
farming by "proxy"....The ultimate objective
of the project is to create a class of owner-
operators with economic size holdings.
A series of laws were enacted to provide the legal basis
of reform, as the reform itself was carried out piecemeal.1 6
Here we point out the main elements of the 1962 Land Law
(Table 2.3), according to which the first redistribution was
intended to be carried out, and the changes that were made
in 1977. The two key items in these laws pertain to the size
allotment of ownerships and priorities of recipients.
According to the 1962 Law, the maximum size of ownership was
to be set at 200 dunums and the minimum size at 30 dunums.
The cut in the maximum size of ownership implied that the
upper crust of big landholders and oligarchs would have been
the chief target of land expropriation. Land was also to be
taken away from upper middle owners at a progressive rate,
i.e., at higher rates for larger ownerships, as indicated in
Table 2.3. The mimimum size of 30 dunums was considered
sufficient, on inferior land, to provide an above-
subsistence level of income for the family holding the
farm.17 Law 18 of 1977 altered the mimimum size to 40
dunums, as the USAID mission anticipated adoption of
sprinkler irrigation, for which a 30 dunum holding was
deemed inefficient (Dajani, et al, 1980:42). The 1977 Law
kept the rest of the size allotment categories unchanged.
Table 2.4 presents the hierarchy of land recipients.18
Table 2.3
Principles of Land Allotment of Law 31, 1962, in the Jordan Valley
Size of Ownership Amount allotted to original owner
(dunums) (dunums)
30-50 all
51-100 50 + 25% of excess area
101-500 62 + 17% of excess area
501-1000 130 + 17% of excess area
over 1000 200
Source: Hazleton (1974).
Table 2.4
Land Allotment Priorities in the Jordan Valley.
Law 31, 1962
1. Holders cultivating their own
land in the Canal area
2. Professional farmers living in
the project area (rentiers)
3. Professional farmers residing in
the same district as the project
4. Professional farmers living in
othe districts
5. Holders utilizing land by
sharecropping or leasing
Law 18, 1977
1. Owner-cultivators residing in the
Kingdom of Jordan
2. Sharecroppers or renters residing
in the Kingdom
3. Professional farmers residing in
the Jordan Valley
4. Professional farmers outside
the valley
5. Owners outside the Kingdom
Sources: Hazleton (1974); Dajani, et al. (1980).
The procedure of landownership transfer was dubbed
"...expropriation with compensation followed by
redistribution." (Hazleton, 1974:20). In the 1962 Law, farms
less than 30 dunums would either be sold or leased in order
to bring their area to the legal mimimum size. Owners of
more than 30 dunums were permitted to select the units that
they would prefer to retain (Ibid: 23). They were to be
compensated for the appraised value of the land.1 9 Whereas
recipient farmers were to pay the appraised value, plus JD
20 as a first payment, in annual installments up to a total
of ten payments.
What were the results of land reform? As a first step in
our evaluation, we examine the data in Tables 2.5 and 2.6.
Table 2.5 covers the main Canal zone in addition to the
eight kilometer extension; the area included in this survey,
however, is smaller than the area included in the earlier
census (Table 2.1). The data in Table 2.5 were released by
the Jordan Valley Authority to the USAID mission in Amman.
Because no other information is given to determine whether
or not the data are representative of the entire land
distribution in this zone, they must be used with caution.
The proportion of small farmers after reform reached 60 per
cent of total landowners, a rise of 6 per cent from pre-
reform figures. This could be a consequence of fragmentation
stemming from inheritance, redistribution of small plots to
new owners, transfer of titles to family members by owners
to avoid expropriation, or a combination of the three.
Table 2.5
Land Distribution in the Main Canal and 8 km Extension Sections--After Reform
Category of Size of Owners Area
Ownersa Ownershipb No. % No. of %
(dunums) dunums
5.2 1,312 29.1 6,750 7.1
Small 10.0 486 10.8 4,860 5.1
15.0 9,910 20.2 13,650 14.2
Middle 30.0 1,425 31.6 42,750 44.5
Upper-middle 60.0 262 5.8 15,720 16.4
90.0 74 1.6 6,660 7.0
120.0 19 .4 2,280 2.4
Big 150.0 9 .2 1,350 1.4
180.0 4 .1 720 .8
210.0 6 .1 1,260 1.3
Total 4,507 100.0 96,000 100.0
Source: Jordan Valley Authority, quoted in Dajani, et al. (1980).
Notes: aBecause ownership sizes, as given by the Jordan Valley Authority, are in discrete
rather than interval form, the categories of owners do not match exactly those in
Table 2.1. This is another illustration of the lack of standardization in data
collection.
bThe size classes are based on approximately 30 dunum farms. Thus, 5.15 dunums
means that each unit was divided among 5.8 holders on the average; 10.0 dunums
implies an average of 3 holders per farm unit; 15.0 dunums implies an average of 2
holders per unit; and the remaining sizes are based on one holder and 1 through 7
units.
Table 2.6
Land Distribution in the 18 km Extension--After Reform
Category of Size of Owners Area
Owners Ownership No. % No. of %
(dunums) dunums
<5 20 1.6 79 0.2
Small 5-10 142 11.6 1,069 3.0
10-20 291 23.9 3,628 10.3
Middle 20-30 229 18.7 4,756 13.5
30-40 5 3.4 159 .4
40-50 436 35.7 17,504 49.7
Upper-middle 50-120 87 7.2 6,330 18.1
and Big 120-180 9 .7 1,240 3.5
>180 2 .2 440 1.3
Total* 1,221 100.0 35,200 100.0
Source: Jordan Valley Authority, quoted in Dajani,
Note: *Totals may not add up due to rounding.
et al. (1980).
Dajani et al (1980:44) claim that some 500 previously
landless farmers or laborers received nearly 11,000 dunums
in the land redistribution program, i.e., an average of 22
dunums, slightly above the small land-holding category.
Moreover, the sum of the area held by small farmers rose
from 9.7 to 26.4 per cent, but the area owned by big
landholders dropped substantially, from 53.6 before the
reform to only 5.9 per cent afterwards. Table 2.5 also
points to the disappearance of large oligarchical size
holdings. Still, the biggest shift appears to have occurred
in the middle farmers category: their ratio jumped from 10.3
to 31.6 per cent of total landowners, and their ownership
almost doubled, from 24.7 to 44.5 per cent. The attenuation
of polarization in landownership after the reform is
illustrated in the upward shift of the Lorenz curve (Figure
2.2), and the corresponding drop of Gini coefficient from
.65 to .43.
Similar trends in the 18 km extension can be discerned
from Table 2.6; the only noticeable difference is the lower
proportion of small farmers than in the previous segment.
Even if we assume that the information released by the
Jordan Valley Authority is trustworthy, the results of land
reform turn out to be a far cry from its designated goal,
namely the creation of a class of middle, owner-operated
family farms. Were the aim to be fulfilled, different laws
would have had to be devised from the start. In the main
Canal segment, for example, Hazleton (1974: 30-31)
calculates that it would have required expropriation of
94,758 dunums to bring the small holdings up to the minimum
size of 30 dunums. In addition, if the maximum size of
holdings were limited to 100 dunums, only 65,441 dunums
would have been spared for distribution. Yet, the maximum
size was set at 200 dunums, which made the goal even harder
to accomplish.
Serious doubt has also been cast in USAID reports on the
redistribution processs itself, as land titles have been
passed to family members of big owners to eschew
expropriation.20 Law 31 of 1962 permitted such transfers by
extending the definition of "holder" to include all persons
in whose names land or water or both were registered
(Hazleton, 1974: 22; Sutcliffe, 1973: 473fn). The extent of
land transfer is not known. But Dajani et al (1980: 49)
state:
...the transfers of ownership of holdings
into the names of individual family members
in anticipation of the redistribution program
has substantially lessened the impact of the
program in reducing concentration of
ownership by families. Such transfers have
not only reduced the amount of excess
holdings, limiting thereby the land available
for redistribution to those owning small
holdings and to the landless, but have also
increased the number of holdings below the
minimum size (of 30 dunums) farming unit,
thus creating more rights to additional
allotments than can be fulfilled.
(emphasis added)
Another study by Fikry (Fraenkel, 1980:33), an
anthropologist, concluded that the continuity of control
over land exercised by privileged families kept "the reins
of power in the Valley...unchanged." In any case, in the
absence of definitive statistics, the burden of proof of
alleged changes brought about by land reform lies with the
government.
The legal "loophole" which permitted the transfer of
land within families was formally closed in the 1977 Law,
and the process of transfer itself was halted in 1975
(Dajani, 1980: 43). It remains to be seen how such closure
will affect the redistribution programs in the upcoming
stage.
The limitations of the land reform become even more
apparent if we take into account the fact that land
"circulation" was essentially confined to those who already
owned land. Sharecroppers occupied, under the 1962 Law, the
bottom position in the land allotment hierarchy (Table 2.4).
Wage laborers and the landless were altogether excluded from
the list. It is true that the 1977 Law promoted
sharecroppers to second priority instead of fifth, but there
is little land left now to bring the minimum size up to the
new level of 40 dunums, and, at the same time, to give land
to sharecroppers. Agricultural laborers are still not being
considered eligible for land allotment in the new 1977 Law.
Land consolidation data are as scarce as those on land
redistribution. On the basis of a rather doubtful survey 21
sponsored by the Royal Scientific Society (Hazleton, 1974),
Hazelton states that fragmentation of holdings fell from an
average of 2.9 fragments per ownership to 1.2 fragments per
ownership after the reform. But a different kind of
fragmentation, which derives from joint ownership, still
exists with as many as 21 or more joint owners for some
parcels (Ibid.). Spatial fragmentation has been effectively
halted by the 1977 Law, which prohibits subdivision of land
units of less than 30 dunums (Dajani et al, 1980: 235).
Parcellization by joint ownership will continue and perhaps
grow, however, as land is further divided by inheritance. It
is common in joint-ownership fragmentation to find the land
being cultivated in fragments below the minimum size
(Hazleton, 1974:37).
111.2 Land Tenure and Operation
The system of land tenure and operation means the forms
of social relationships and labor utilization that exist on
land holdings. This is both an expression and embodiment of
the agrarian class structure, which is only partly defined
by land distribution. Certain forms of land tenure are said
to be conducoive to agricultural development, while others
are thought to stymie it. In the Jordan Valley, an amalgam
of forces--historical, economic, and technological--has
shaped, and continues to shape, an intricate set of tenure
relations.
A landholding may be owned, rented in cash or in kind,
or sharecropped. Labor may be provided by the family or
hired for wages, it may be performed by male or female,
local or foreign, workers. These categories are not mutually
exclusive; several forms of tenure and operation may exist
simultaneously on the same parcel. The simplest arrangement
consists of an owner-occupied holding with family or hired
labor.
The various surveys conducted to describe these tenurial
patterns do not identify these possible combinations. They
refer to landholdings as owner-operated, sharecropped,
rented, or mixed; the latter category collapses the rest of
the combinations. Moreover, they decouple types of tenure
from forms of labor utilization. The complexity of tenure
and operation forms raises, as Dajani et al (1980a: 55)
note, "...some question(s) about the validity of the census
responses, as well as the significance that should be
attached to them." Nevertheless, a temporal and spatial
comparison may help give some qualitative indications of the
question, as well as of the factors that shape the tenure
and operational patterns.
Tenure conditions in 1959-1960 (Department of
Statistics, 1961: 159) are shown in Table 2.7. Sharecropping
and owner-operated farming were the prevailing forms of
tenure--together they made up 71.5 per cent of tenurial
patterns. The ratio was probably higher because some of the
"mixed" modes must have included owner-operated and
sharecropped farms. Cash rent was negligible. Perhaps the
availability of sharecroppers made it more attractive for
landowners, who otherwise would not cultivate their parcels,
to hire sharecroppers than to rent the land for cash,
Table 2.7
Land Tenure in the Main Canal Section--1959-1
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Type of Tenure Percentage of Area
Owner Operated 32.5
Sharecropped 39.0
Cash Rent 1.8
Mixed 26.7
Total 100.0
Source: Department of Statistics (1961).
because the latter option, less risky than sharecropping, is
less profitable.
Data on land tenure for subsequent years have been
presented in official reports in a different spatial manner,
creating another informational discontinuity. The Valley has
been divided since 1971 into three statistical zones: North,
Middlet and South. Because the main Canal lies within the
Middle and Northern sections, direct comparison is not
possible. The problem may be overcome by considering 1973
and 1981 data for the three zones (Table 2.8). With a
reasonable degree of confidence, we can say that the tenure
pattern has remained relatively stable, with sharecropped
and owner-operated farms constituting the dominant forms of
tenure. The apparent substantial shift in the southern
sector in favor of sharecropping derived, most likely, from
the evacuation of large numbers of Palestinian refugees from
the Valley on the heels of the Israeli invasion of the
Karameh refugee camp in 1968 and its war with Palestinian
guerillas stationed in the area thereafter. The 1973 figures
suggest a higher ratio of owner-operated holdings than
sharecropped, as most of the sharecroppers came from
Karameh. This explanation is supported by the 1975 and 1978
census data of the Department of Statistics (Dajani et al.
1980:53-54), which show a rise in sharecropping once
stability returned to the area.
Owner-operated farming is more prevalent in the North
than in the South or the Middle sections. Dajani et al
Table 2.8
Land Tenure in the Jordan Valley in 1973 and 1981
Segment and Type of Tenure Percentage of Area
1973 1981
(1) (2)
North
Owner Operated 34.0 44.0
Sharecropped 46.1 35.0
Cash Rent 4.2 3.2
Mixed 15.7 17.8
Total 100.0 100.0
Middle
Owner Operated 33.1 30.0
Sharecropped 48.5 54.2
Cash Rent 1.4 3.4
Mixed 16.7 12.4
Total 100.0 100.0
South
Owner Operated 50.3 21.5
Sharecropped 47.0 63.0
Cash Rent 2.4 1.1
Mixed .3 14.4
Total 100.0 100.0
Sources: Column (1) , Department of Statistics (1973); column (2), compiled by the author
from questionaire forms provided by the Jordan Valley Authority (1981).
(1980a:51) argue that this pattern is correlated with the
existence of the East Ghor Canal in the North and in part of
the Middle sections. It seems to us that the construction of
the Canal would have the opposite effect. For as it brought
more land under intensive cultivation, the demand for labor
would be expected to rise. This, in turn, would strengthen
the bargaining position of laborers who, in all likelihood,
would prefer the more remunerative sharecropping
arrangement. Furthermore, if the Canal could account for the
difference in tenure conditions between North and South, it
should have, in the first place, altered conditions in the
North. But as it stands, tenure in the North showed only a
slight shift between the two periods preceding and following
the building of the Canal. A more plausible explanation, in
our opinion, is to be found in the pattern of landownership,
which exhibits more concentration in the South than in the
North. 22 Owner-operated farming is more likely to be
practiced on smaller farms (Dajani et al, 1980:155). Based
on Jordan Valley Authority Questionnaire forms, we compared
tenure conditions between the two villages of Balawneh and
Karameh; in the latter, landownership concentration is known
to be quite high. Almost all farms in Karameh were
sharecropped as opposed to about 45 per cent of those in
Balawneh: this is yet another instance where measuring
variations in tenure in relation to land ownership
distribution would be fruitful. Another factor that
contributes to the difference in tenure between the North
and the South is the existence of the landless Palestinian
refugees, as confirmed by the aforementioned fact that
sharecropping dropped sharply when the refugees were
displaced after 1967.
The patterns of land tenure reinforce our earlier
conclusion about the failure of the land reform program to
establish the medium-sized, owner-operated farms. Owner-
operated farming rose from 39 per cent in 1959-60 to 44 per
cent in 1981 (Tables 2.7 and 2.8), i.e., only five
percentage points. Still more revealing features of the
production system and its capacity for accumulation are to
be found in the characteristics of, as well as the
relationships among, the chief protagonists: landlords,
sharecroppers, and laborers.
(1) Landlords
Landlords, by the degree to which they involved
themselves in the operation of the land and the risks they
are willing to take, hold the key to decisions that affect
surplus generation and the manner in which it is disposed.
We divide landlords in the Valley into three types: (i)
resident-owner operators, (ii) commuter, and (iii)
absentee.23
(i) Resident owner-operators. Resident owner-operators
are farmers who reside with their families on the farm and
fully participate in their operations. This type of operator
commonly utilizes family labor, save where the volume of
operations exceeds the capacity of family members, in which
case they hire supplemental workers. There is conflicting
evidence with respect to the difference in surplus
generation between this and other forms of tenure. The staff
of the Department of Statistics (1961: 251) found in the
1961 census that, for the same farm area, the average net
income of owner-operated farms was less than one-third of
that on sharecropped land. In another study Sharab (1975)
showed that yields exhibited only slight and irregular
variations between the two forms of tenure, But because most
owner-operated farms are small to medium-sized, their
capacity for investment in capital-intensive technologies is
likely to be limited. (We treat the question of the
relationship between tenure and adoption of technologies in
more detail in Chapter 3.) The persistence of owner-operated
farming may stem from the access of resident-owners to
unpaid labor. In addition, because land sales have been
prohibited in the-Valley by the 1977 Law (Dajani et al,
1980:235),, a landholder has only one of two options, either
to rent the land or cultivate it, the latter being the more
profitable option.
(ii) Commuters. Commuters are those actively involved in
farm operations; they may make weekly, biweekly, or more
frequent visits, especially in more demanding periods. They
commonly reside in the cities of Irbid, Salt, or Amman,
depending on the geographical locations of their holdings.
They may sharecrop their holdings, or hire a resident
manager who either operates it with hired labor or rents it
to sharecroppers. Resident managers are more likely to be
found on larger holdings than on small ones, for owners of
the former can afford to pay a manager's salary. In Karameh,
where landownership is highly concentrated and many farmers
are of the commuter type, we found (Jordan Valley Authority,
1981) that 23 out of 35 farms surveyed hired managers, and
all but one hired sharecroppers. This group of farmers is
sometimes confused with absentee landlords, when absenteeism
is taken to be synonymous with nonresidency, as, for
example, Sharab does (1975).
The agricultural income of commuters is probably the
highest of all categories. Although they are nonresidents,
they can count on sharecroppers to perform routine tasks in
their absence. Their residence in the city, on the other
hand, offers them better information about, and access to,
markets, something resident operators do not enjoy. The
commuters' stratum is comprised mostly of merchants,
professionals, and government officials. It is also the
stratum that has been associated with the Ghor's "Green
Revolution."
(iii) Absentee landlords. Absentee landlords are
minimally, or not at all, involved in the cultivation of
their holdings. They may or may not be Valley residents.
They may rent their land for a fixed fee or hire a manager
to run the farm. Members of this group are less uniform in
economic position than commuters; they range from a high
government official to an elderly person incapable of
farming. The absentee landowners who are also Valley
rsidents make up 15 per cent of landowners (Sharab,
1975:18). No data are available on nonValley residents.
Returns to this category of owners are likely to be lower
than to commuters or resident-operators, particularly if the
absentee owners rent their land for cash. Hence, they have
little incentive to improve the land. This is true also of
the renters themselves, unless they obtain long-term
leases.
(2) Sharecroppers
Sharecropping has been used as a generic term to denote
a wide variety of tenancy arrangements, a common feature of
which is the remuneration of the tiller for his labor by a
share of the yield (Tamari, 1981: 1). It has been a subject
of lively controversy in agrarian studies on three counts:
(a) the nature of sharecropping as a mode of production; (b)
the place of the sharecropper in the peasant hierarchy; and
(c) whether or not sharecropping poses obstacles to the
development of agriculture (Ibid.: 1-2). Only the first two
points are considered in the present chapter; the third is
addressed in Chapter 3 in conjunction with the diffusion of
modern technologies in the Valley.
Sharecropping, in its present form, was brought into the
Valley with the Palestinian refugees in 1948. To be sure,
there were isolated cases of sharecropping in the Ghor
before this date, but they were of little moment (Khouri,
1981: 79). The reason commonly offered to explain the rise
of sharecropping in the Valley is the landlessness of the
refugees (Sharab, 1975; Dajani et al, 1980). Landlessness,
although a prerequisite for the existence of sharecropping,
cannot, in our opinion, explain this phenomenon nor the form
it assumes; an historical account of sharecropping in
Palestine itself prior to 1948 is necessary.
Earlier in the century, share tenants obtained a share
in the crop but had to perform obligatory corvee labor in
exchange for the protection provided by the landlord from
state tax collectors and for credit advances (Firestone,
1975; Tamari, 1981). Gradually, the impingement of market
forces on the peasant subsistence economy and the
residential shift of the rural potentates from villages to
metropolitan areas effected a devolution of the landlords'
control over land in favor of tenants. Toward the end of the
British mandate, the feudal aspect--protection for corvee
labor--diminished, but patronage continued (Ibid.). 25 The
year 1948 witnessed the uprooting of Palestinians from their
towns and villages, their dispersal into neighboring Arab
countries, and the attendant breakdown and alteration of
their old social structures.
In the Jordan Valley, a modified system of sharecropping
survives with a notable difference from the old system,
namely, the disappearance of patronage. Sharecropping
persisted because of the presence of big landowners on the
one hand, and the relatively large numbers of landless
refugees on the other hand. The landowners, commuters or
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absentees, found in sharecropping a means of obtaining
reliable labor from the refugees who were already familiar
with cultivation. And the landless preferred sharecropping
over wage labor, which is less financially rewarding and of
lower social status than sharecropping. There is no doubt
that acquaintance with the system facilitated its prompt
resumption. Patronage, however, was no longer possible or
necessary. In the new state of Jordan, labor markets were
open and many refugees migrated to the cities, and slowly to
the Gulf states. In addition, the tax was land-based rather
than production-based, which meant that its payment was the
obligation of the landowner, not the tenant.
The terms of sharecropping have remained largely stable
over the past three decades; only on farms utilizing plastic
houses or tunnels have they begun to show signs of
modification as explained in the following chapter. We reach
this conclusion about the stability of sharecroppping terms
from a comparison of the impressionistic statements of the
Department of Statistics (1961) staff from the 1961 census,
with the more comprehensive study of Sharab (1975). Sharab,
whose survey included 7.1 per cent of the Valley's farms,
found several sharing arrangements of both inputs and
output. The most widespread was the "50-50" pattern. Here
the typical situation is for the landlord and sharecropper
to each pay half the costs of inputs, excluding labor, and
receive half of the payment for the produce. Labor was
solely the responsibility of the sharecropper, which might
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include both the family and hired labor. The arrangement was
succinctly described to us by the wife of one sharecropper
as "an exchange of hoe for land." There are, of course, a
myriad of idiosyncracies in individual agreements, such as
the tenant not paying for water when obtained from the
landowner's well, nor for ploughing when by the landlord's
machinery.
Overall, 85.5 per cent of sharecroppers in the survey
reported that they operated under the "50-50" arrangement.
But there were differences among sections of the Ghor. In
the South, this arrangement covered 97 per cent of
sharecroppers compared to 62 per cent in the North. The
remaining 38 per cent, in the latter segment, received
either one-quarter or two-thirds of output. Sharab does not
say why this is the case. From our conversations with
farmers, it appears that crop variation between North and
South is an underlying cause. On fruit orchards, which are
more present in the North than in the South, the
sharecropper receives one-quarter of the produce value
because the landlord has already invested in inputs. Whereas
on grain fields, which are almost nonexistent in the South,
the sharecropper obtains two-thirds of the harvest value. In
contrast to orchards, the main input in grain cultivation is
labor; fertilizers and pesticides are rarely applied.
There are generally no written contracts between owners
and sharecroppers, only oral consent. None of the successive
land-reform laws obligated the landlords to sign leases with
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tenants or regulated the proportions of shares. The lease is
annual, and it may be renewed by mutual agreement. According
to Sharab, the majority of sharecroppers and landowners
preferred short-term over long-term leases, because they
were left free not to continue after a short term had
elapsed. The Department of Statistics (1961: 168) census
staff noted that one of the characteristics of sharecropping
was its impermanence. Sharecroppers changed landlords
frequently and vice versa. Sharab does not address this
point; but several of the farmers we spoke to indicated that
some sharecroppers now stayed on the same farm for up to
five years and more. The remarks of the census staff
probably reflected the fluidity of newly emerging
relationships. In addition to these sociological factors,
sharecroppers' mobility is regulated by a market mechanism,
akin to that of a labor market. The degree of market
imperfections and shifts in supply and demand are hard to
gauge, but the evident stability of the system suggests that
whatever contradictory forces may be at work tend to balance
one another.
Decision-making regarding land cultivation was,
according to Sharab, shared between tenant and landlord in
the majority of cases. Three factors, in our opinion, may
explain this situation. First, sharecroppers are not just
laborers; they are also providers of capital, a fact that
buttresses their position. Second, sharecroppers might, in
some instances, be even better farmers than the landowners
themselves, in which case the nurturing of their expertise
would be to the landowners' advantage. Third, because many
of the landowners on sharecropped farms are either commuters
or absentees, they cannot but delegate some responsibility
to their tenants.
Yet, this is only one side of the sharecropping picture.
Even if a free market in which sharecroppers circulate did
exist, and they also contributed to capital costs, the
relationship between landlords and sharecroppers is hardly
equal. First of all, sharecroppers are dependent on
landlords for access to land and not the opposite.
Typically, a landlord hires several sharecroppers, and each
of them tills a separate plot and deals individually with
the owner. Thus the landlord makes overall decisions
affecting the entire farm operations. He also finances
investments at the start of the season, which enhances his
power in the decision-making process (Dajani et al, 1980:
66). Furthermore, the majority of sharecroppers are
illiterate or have minimal education (Sharab, 1975).
Bookkeeping is therefore the domain of the landlord.
Sharecroppers' parcels are not uniform in area. They range
from as little as 7 dunums to as much as 30, depending on
the level of investment costs. There is no information about
this question, but sharecroppers do not, as a rule, generate
income sufficient to free themselves from their subsistence
condition. Khouri (1981: 193) states: "The major drawback of
the system is that it has rarely allowed the sharecropper to
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break out of the subsistence farming category, because he
could not achieve financial independence."
(3) Workers
Overall, agricultural labor comprises the bulk of the
labor force in the Valley, although their proportion seems
to have declined slightly over time. It made up three-
quarters of the working population in 1960, versus two-
thirds in 1978 (Department of Statistics, 1961:89; Dajani et
al, 1980:116).26 If this ratio has decreased, it is not the
result of a decline in agricultural employment, but because
of the more rapid rise in nonagricultural employment which
accompanied the green revolution in the Valley (Chapter 3).
Like landowners and sharecroppers, agricultural workers
are not a uniform group. Their differentiation runs along
three axes: (i) remuneration: wage versus family labor; (ii)
origin: local versus foreign labor; and (iii) gender: male
versus female labor. They may also overlap with other social
categories: the worker might be a landowner or sharecropper
(Figure 2.3).
The 1961 census does not include information on family
versus wage labor. But data for 1973 through 1978 show a
continual rise in wage labor until it begins to surpass
family labor (Figure 2.4). Wage labor grew from 44.4 per
cent of total agricultural employment in 1973 to 46.2 and
57.0 per cent in 1975 and 1978, respectively. If the spread
of wage labor is taken as a yardstick for measuring the
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capitalization of agriculture, then it can be said that
Jordan Valley agriculture has become increasingly
capitalized. The growth in the level of wage labor derives,
in part, from the intensification of agricultural production
in the Ghor in response to expanding regional demand,
following the hike in oil prices in 1973 and, in addition,
from the influx of foreign workers, particularly
Egyptians.
Expatriate laborers have so far received but scant
reference in official reports, most information being based
primarily on guesswork. One estimate put their number at
3,541 in 1980 (Jordan Valley Authority, 1981). Of the total,
97 per cent came from Egypt, 2 per cent from Pakistan, and 1
per cent from Syria. Foreign workers occupy the bottom rungs
of the social ladder in the Valley. Their wages are the
lowest and their jobs are insecure because they have to
obtain work permits on an annual basis. They perform, among
other things, the hard task of irrigation, as well as the
hazardous pesticide application. They are commonly
illiterate, coming from rural Egypt, or have only a meager
education. They live in crowded rooms or sometimes, as the
present author witnessed, in plastic shacks which appear
strikingly modest next to the cucumber greenhouses.
The third axis of worker differentiation is based on
gender. The occupations of and the wage paid to female labor
are at variance with those of male labor. Female workers
come from the Ghor itself. Their participation is
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conditioned both by age and marital status. In addition,
unless they are wage laborers, they may not spend regular
hours in the fields because they attend to household chores.
It is often difficult, however, to distinguish clearly, in
economic terms, between the two kinds of work, such as
preparing food for other working family members or fetching
seed. Women still engage in certain agricultural tasks, such
as picking, weeding, hauling, etc., on a regular basis
(Chapter 3). No comprehensive study of female labor has been
conducted so far. In the available censuses, the surveying
teams have been composed almost exclusively of males. In a
social milieu where the genders interact with difficulty,
these data cannot be very reliable. Besides, only the 1973
census (Department of Statistics, 1973) staff have
attempted, albeit in a cursory fashion, to evaluate women's
working conditions and status. Our information is therefore
sparse and impressionistic.
Some of the modalities of women's participation in
agricultural work have remained unchanged over the last two
decades. Agriculture still claims over 95 per cent of women
in the labor force (Department of Statistics, 1960: 96;
Ibid., 1973: 35). The degree of women's involvement in
relation to men has fluctuated slightly (Figure 2.5). If the
fluctuations represent more than statistical discrepancies,
then it can be said that the growth in women's participation
in agricultural work between 1960 and 1967 has been checked
and is on the decline. The inflow of foreign workers may be
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partly responsible for the decline. Another factor that
seems to have had a negative impact on women's entry into
the labor force is education. Among women with 6 years of
schooling, working women represented 15.4 per cent, in
comparison to 11.8 per cent among those with nine years of
schooling (Department of Statistics, 1973: 94). Thus, the
higher the education a woman receives, the less she is
inclined to work in agriculture. Because women perform only
manual tasks on the farm, the more educated are likely to
feel that these tasks are beneath their qualifications. It
may also be that women who obtain higher education come from
better-to-do families than women with lesser education, in
which case the families may not feel that their daughters'
work is economically necessary.
It is not that women with more schooling pursue other
occupations. Only teaching is open to them, but this
requires at least a high school diploma, which only a
miniscule number of Valley women receive. So these women may
end up not working altogether (Department of Statistics,
1973: 94). Paradoxically, education, which was meant to help
women find jobs, acts as a hindrance in the social context
of the Ghor.
Women's participation in work is also concomitant with
age. A clear inverse correlation exists between female age
range and their proportion in the labor force. The 1961
census data (Department of Statistics, 1961: 84) show that
about 80 per cent of women working were under 30 years old,
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and a full half of them were between ages 14 and 19. In the
latter age group, women are less likely to be married or
mothers.
A different trend seems to be emerging in the case of
female wage employment. The ratio of wage/non-wage women
workers has risen by 10 percentage points between 1975 and
1978, at a rate of 3.3 per cent per annum (Dajani et al,
1980:119). This is in keeping with the trend of growing wage
labor in general. Women were paid, until recently, half of a
man's wage on the premise that they perfomed lighter
functions, such as sowing, planting, and picking (Stetieh,
1978: 68). Now they are paid wages equivalent to those of
foreign workers, who earn even less than male Jordanian
workers (Dajani et al, 1980:125). While relative
participation in agricultural work may have declined, the
proportion of wage labor among women who work has risen, and
the women now receive higher wages than they did earlier.
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Section IV
Marketing
Social relations among agricultural producers as well as
the means of surplus extraction in the Valley extend beyond
the sphere of production on the farm into the market domain.
By the late 1950s, subsistence farming was already becoming
a thing of the past. In the 1959-60 season, 95 per cent of
all produced tomatoes, eggplants, and cauliflower were sold
(Department of Statistics, 1961:193). Only more durable
fruits, legumes, and other crops like onions and garlic sold
less than 90 per cent of the amounts produced (Ibid.)
Cereals were less often marketed, and now, at least in
monetary terms, have become insignificant (Chapter 3). So it
can be said that agricultural production is presently geared
fully for the market.
Commonly, produce is trucked from the farm to a central
wholesale market (hisbih), then to retail stores, and
finally to the consumer. An extremely limited attempt was
made in the 1961 census to calculate the "distributive
margins," i.e., consumer price relative to price received by
the farmer (Department of Statistics, 1961:203-205). The
statistical staff found that the margins ranged from two to
five times, depending on the season and produce.27 It
concluded that, in comparison with other countries, the
margins were not particularly high. A recent study (al-Qadi,
1980) included a wider range of crops. For tomatoes and
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cucumbers, which, in some seasons, occupy half of the
Valley's vegetable area, we computed the margins as being
equal to an average of 1.6 and 1.8 times respectively (Ibid:
67).
Such evaluations consider only formal or apparent
marketing costs, transportation, containers, and fees paid
to municipalities and middlemen. They do not take into
account the more covert costs stemming from the asymmetrical
relationships between middlemen and, in particular, small
farmers and sharecroppers. They are therefore likely to
overestimate the shares of these two categories of
producers.
There are two methods of marketing: (1) fixed price, and
(2) auctioning. In the fixed-price method, the wholesale
merchant purchases the produce directly from the farm for an
agreed-upon, fixed price. Often it is the small farmer, who
lacks the means of transportation or time to auction his
crops, who engages in such operations (League of Arab
States, 1974: 216; Department of Statistics, 1960: 192-195).
The wholesaler, who is usually a big farmer and truck owner,
manages the picking and transporation operations (Aresvik,
1976: 285). It is therefore difficult to know how much these
operations cost him and how much he charges the farmer. In
addition, he acts as a moneylender, although he is not a
major source of credit (Department of Statistics, 1961:
198). In the 1959-60 season, wholesalers handled about one-
quarter of the Valley's produce (Ibid.: 197). No
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investigations have been made recently concerning this
practice. But because these merchants specialized to some
extent in fruits, legumes, and cereals (Ibid.), it can be
expected that, with the falling position of the last two
types of crops, the fixed-price method may be in decline
also.
In the second method, auctioning, the produce is shipped
to one of three local marketing centers, one for each
section of the Valley. There it is auctioned by a peculiar
social breed of middlemen known as commissionyiah or
"commission agents." These commission agents have been the
subject of much writing but little throrough field
investigation. They are big merchants who control sections
of the central vegetable market and act as intermediaries
betwe'en the farmers and retailers by auctioning the produce
and selling it to the highest bidder. They charge, in
theory, a five to seven per cent fee, levied on the net
price (Khouri, 1981:197; Tamari, 1980: 13-14). The
commission agents, however, have gradually expanded the
scope of their operations and have vertically integrated
them in a manner akin to agribusiness. Besides auctioning
farmers' produce, they: (1) provide farm inputs such as
seeds, fertilizers, and pesticides;28 (2) supply the farmers
with containers (wooden boxes) for packing the produce; (3)
act as moneylenders to farmers; and (4) may rent land and
farm it with sharecroppers. The farmers among them belong to
what we have called the "commuter" group. It has been
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estimated that 25 per cent of the commission agents own or
operate farms (Aresvik, 1976: 284; Khouri, 1981: 197;
Tamari, 1980:14).
Although commission agents fulfill some useful
functions, their relationship to farmers involves a certain
degree of exploitation. First, there are about twelve agents
in the Valley (Khouri, 1981: 197) who dominate and hold an
oligopolistic, if not monopolistic, position over the
marketing process. Such a conclusion is supported by the
fact that their fees remained unchanged over time, an
indication of lack of competition. The entry of other agents
also seems restricted as evidenced by the stability of their
number. Second, their vertical control over marketing
operations gives them the opportunity to manipulate the
prices of several items. For instance, we learned that
commission agents now manufacture the packing containers,
sell them to farmers at a price equivalent to 10-20 per cent
of the produce they hold, and then buy them back from
retailers after use at a depreciated price. Third, as
suppliers of credit and inputs, they enjoy another avenue of
surplus extraction. In any case, many farmers and
sharecroppers do not have access to alternative services in
the market. It is probably impossible to pinpoint the value
of the surplus they appropriate in these operations. The
interest rate the commission agents set on their credit
advances has been estimated at 15 to 30 per cent (Khouri,
1981: 198; Tamari, 1980: 14). A USAID study by Dajani (1979:
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16) of the region south of the Dead Sea concludes that:
"owners/financiers, who monopolize both the supply and
marketing functions" of the small farmers, actually exploit
them. The result is that"many farmers do not manage to break
even during the season, and thus continue to be in
debt....They will have no choice but to continue to work the
land at subsistence levels, and to accept whatever terms are
dictated to them."(Ibid.)
To summarize, agricultural production in the Valley is
geared for the market. The marketing sphere itself is
dominated by big merchants and commission agents, many of
whom are also landowners. Through their control of marketing
operations, these middlemen render several types of services
to farmers, and in the process appropriate surplus
disproportionate to these services, especially from small
farmers and sharecroppers.
Section V
Credit
Class differentiation in Jordan Valley agriculture and
the ability of farmers to invest in technological
improvements are also manifested, as well as reinforced, by
their differential access to, and terms of obtaining,
credit. Big landowners traditionally have had easy access to
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formal channels of credit, both governmental institutions
and commercial banks, whereas middle and small farmers and
tenants have commonly obtained credit from the big landlords
themselves, relatives, and commission agents--the informal
suppliers of credit.
Among formal creditors, the semi-governmental
Agricultural Credit Corporation (ACC) has been a major
source. Its total lending for the whole country made up
about 80 per cent of all institutional loans by 1971; the
remaining 20 per cent were shared equally by the Jordan
Cooperative Organization (JCO) and commercial banks
(Aresvik, 1976:269). 29 Credit disbursements increased
markedly, particularly after 1973, as the government
received large sums of financial aid from Arab oil states,
and bank deposits rose because of remittances (ACC, 1979).
It is not possible to disaggregate, from the ACC annual
reports, credit destined to the Valley because disbursements
are tabulated by district, while the Valley itself falls
within several administrative districts. But irrigated
agriculture, which is located for the most part in the Ghor,
has received a disproportionate (relative to its cultivated
area) amount of the ACC lending, In 1979, the Ghor share of
credit was JDl.6 million, or 46.0 per cent of that year's
total outlay (ACC, 1979). Because the land area to which
these funds were allocated is not known, an estimation of
actual credit per dunum is not feasible. But if we divide
the amount over the total cultivated area of the Valley, it
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would average less than JD20 per dunum--less than 20 per
cent of production costs per dunum of tomatoes under drip
irrigation (Chapter 3).
ACC credit, however, is not distributed uniformly among
landowners. Big landholders and commuter farmers have won
the lion's share of loans (Khouri, 1981: 198; USAID, 1980a:
67). The bias in favor of big farmers is institutionalized.
A collateral in the form of land or other assets must be
pledged before a loan is issued, a condition that can
normally be met by big landowners or merchants and
professionals. Moreover, the farmers' representatives on the
ACC board of directors are known big landowners, which
places them in a position to exert direct influence on the
ACC decisions.30 Not only have big landowners obtained the
bulk of ACC credit, but they obtained it at low interest
rates of six to seven per cent per annum, a rate probably
lower than that provided by private capital. In any event,
lending to big owners has become an official policy of the
ACC as expressed by its General Director: "The ACC's policy
is to favor large capital development projects... .The
problem for the small farmer is the collateral...."(Khouri,
1981: 198). This represents an about-face from the original
objective of the ACC of providing "...all credit-worthy
farmers, but with preference to small farmer-operators, with
a source of credit to keep them in business, increase their
farm production, (and) raise their standard of living...."
(Aresvik, 1974: 272). The ACC policy has been justified on
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the grounds that a new institution, the Jordan Valley
Farmers Association (JVFA) has been set up to fulfill the
credit needs of small farmers and sharecroppers (Khouri,
1981: 198).
The JVFA, Jordan Valley Farmers' Association, was
founded in 1974 with ambitious aims, ranging from marketing,
to extension and research, to issuing credit ('JVFA, 1974).
In 1978, the JVFA initiated a credit program with financial
assistance from USAID, FAO, and the Jordanian government.
The program was designated to convey 80 per cent of the
number of loans, and 58 per cent of their volume, to owner-
operators in the middle and small farmer categories as well
as to sharecroppers (Dajani et al, 1980:67). It proposed to
substitute the property-based collateral of the ACC with a
crop-based collateral. The assumption was that the JVFA
would control the marketing of the produce to ensure loan
repayment (Ibid.). No reviews have yet been made of the JVFA
credit recipients, but one report found that 90 per cent of
the loans were granted to owner-operators and only 10 per
cent to tenants (Ibid.).
As bias against small farmers is institutionalized in
the ACC, so is bias against tenants in the JVFA. To qualify
for membership in the organization, the sharecropper must
present a three-year written lease. As noted earlier,
however, long-term share tenants' leases are rare, and few
of them are written. The JVFA laws also stipulate that the
sharecropper must make "...all decisions relating to
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production and marketing..." (JVFA, 1974: 2). The two
stipulations thus automatically disqualify all but a handful
of sharecroppers from joining the JVFA. Unlike the ACC, the
farmers' representatives on the organization's board of
directors are supposed to be elected by the farmers, not
appointed. So, in theory at least, farmers may be able to
take control of the organization. But in light of the
absence of democracy in the rest of the country, it is hard
to fathom how free elections might be held among the
Valley's farmers.
Another way of evaluating credit is to examine it at the
recipients', rather than the suppliers' end. We analyze here
data from a sample survey by the Jordan Valley Authority in
1981, made available to us in questionnaire form. The
results are illustrated in Tables 2.9 and 2.10. It is
important to note that the survey is based on size of
holdings rather than on ownership, a distinction we pointed
out above. As such, it reflects credit outlays among
operational units, not classes of farmers. Even in the case
of owner-operated farms, there are no indications as to
whether owners may hold additional land or jointly hold the
unit with partners.
Overall, the ratio of holdings receiving credit
represented 22.7 per cent of total surveyed units, and 28.4
per cent of their total area. Although the majority of
holdings had not obtained credit, the 1981 coverage was
about 2.5 times that of 1959-1960 (Department of Statistics,
Table 2.9
Aggregate Credit Received by Jordan Valley Farmers, 1980-1981
No. of No. of Col. 2 Surveyed Area Col. 5 Total Col. 7
Surveyed Holdings as % of Area Receiving as % of Value of divided by
Holdings Receiving Col. 1 (dunums) Credit Col. 4 Loans Col. 5
Credit (dunums) (JDs) (JDs)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
344 76 22.7 10,614 3,016 28.4 150,963 50.1
Source: Compiled by the author from questionnaire forms provided by the Jordan Valley
Authority (1981) .
Table 2.10
Credit Distribution in the Jordan Valley by Source and Size of Holdings
1980-1981
Source of Credit
Agricultural Credit Corporation (ACC) Jordan Valley Farmers Association (JVFA)
Holding No. of % of Value of % of No. of % of Value of % of
Size Loans Total Loan Total Loans Total Loan Total
(dunums) No. (JDs) Value No. (JDs) Value
<20 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 4.5 300 2.2
20-40 11 73.3 18,870 37.3 15 68.2 9,118 65.9
>40 4 26.7 31,700 62.7 6 27.3 4,415 31.9
Total 15 100.0 50,570 100.0 22 100.0 13,833 100.0
Table 2.10 (contd.)
Source of Credit
Jordan Cooperative Organization (JCO) Total Formal
Holding No. of % of Value of % of No. of % of Value of % of
Size Loans Total Loans Total Loans Total Loans Total
(dunums) No. (JDs) Value No. (JDs) Value
<20 5 18.5 4,400 8.4 6 9.0 4,700 4.1
20-40 1 6a 59.3 34,530 65.9 42 66.0 62,518 53.5
>40 6 22.2 13,450 25.7 16 25.0 49,565 42.4
Total 27 100.0 52,380 100.0 64 100.0 116,783 100.0
Table 2.10 (contd.)
Source of Credit
Informal Sector Total Formal and Informal
Holding No. of % of Value % of No. of % of Value % of Average
Size Loans Total of - Total Loans Total of Total Value
(dunums) No. Loans Value No. Loans Value per Dunum
(JDs) (JDs)
<20 8 40.0 7,400 22.9 14 16.7 12,540 8.3 76.0
20-40 7 35.0 9,140 27.5 49 58.3 71,928 47.7 51.1
>40 5 25.0 16,930 49.6 21 25.0 66,495 44.0 46.1
Total 20 100.0 34,180 100.0 84b,c 100.0 150,963 100.0 50.1
Source: Compiled by the author from questionnaire forms provided by the Jordan Valley
Authority (1981).
Notes: aWe omitted a loan of JD80,000 to the Society of Agricultural Engineers (a group of
professional farmers) because it would have skewed the average significantly. The
omission underestimates the value of loans to large farmers and professionals.
bThree loans were omitted, in addition to the JD80,000, because neither their
values nor sources were recorded on the questionnaire forms. It is unlikely they
will affect the conclusion because they are given to holdings less than 10 dunums
and cannot therefore be significant.
cThe total number of borrowers was 76; 8 farmers obtained credit from more than one
source.
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1961: 269). Institutional lenders supplied 77.3 per cent of
the total value of loans; the rest, 22.7 per cent, came from
informal sources (Table 2.10).
Middle, upper middle, and big holdings monopolized
virtually all official credit, and 91.7 per cent of the
total. The loans received by these holdings averaged about
JD50, or about 30 per cent of production costs per dunum
under drip irrigation. Small holdings, meanwhile, got merely
8.3 per cent of formal and informal loans. They received no
credit from the ACC, 8.4 per cent of the JCO's lending, and
4.5 per cent of JVFA's. It would seem, therefore, that the
JVFA, which was meant to assist small farmers, failed to do
so. Informal credit, on the other hand, was less skewed.
Small farmers received 40 per cent of the number of informal
sector loans and 22.9 per cent of the value. Practically all
of the small units were operated by share tenants. In fact,
85 per cent of informal credit recipients belonged to this
category: only one was a landlord, and two others were
renters. And in the southern section of the Ghor where
sharecropping is prevalent, all borrowing was informal.
Tenants borrowed credit from landlords and/or commission
agents. These results parallel Sharab's survey (Sharab,
1975: 48-51) in which he found tenants obtaining 95.4 per
cent of their credit from private sources, 65.5 per cent
from landlords and commission agents, and 29.9 per cent from
relatives (Table 2.11).
Table 2.11
Credit Distribution to Tenants in the Jordan Valley by Source, 1974
Sources of Credit No. of Loans % Value in JDs % Average per
Tenant
Formal
ACC & JCOb 8 6.2 945 4.6 118.1
Informal
Landlords and
Commission Agents 88 68.2 13,419 65.5 152.5
Relatives 33 25.6 6,125 29.9 185.7
Total 129 100.0 20,489 100.0 158.8
Source: Sharab (1975:24).
Notes: aAgricultural Credit Corporation
bJordan Cooperative Organization
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Probably both surveys underestimate the value of credit
advanced by "landowners/financiers," because they include
only cash loans and ignore possible price manipulation. We
have already indicated the higher interest rate, 15-30 per
cent, paid by sharecroppers for credit, some two to three
times higher than official rates charged to other groups of
farmers. In brief, middle to big farmers and commuters
monopolize formal credit sources and obtain loans at
discounted prices, whereas small farmers and sharecroppers
borrow their credit at high interest rates from the informal
sector where commission agents and big landowners hold
sway.
Summary
We have delineated in this chapter the major features
and evolution of the production and exchange system in
Jordan Valley agriculture. Our aim was to explain the
agrarian class structure, as well as to identify the
relative capacity of the protagonists to generate, control,
or have access to surplus--this being the first condition
for ability to reinvest in technology.
In the historical overview, we saw how the predominant
traditional tenure system, the mushac was dismantled by the
British mandate authorities and replaced by individual
ownership system. In order to build a state where none had
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existed in Transjordan, and to help CAbd Allah graft his
dynasty on the country, Britain sought, by abolishing the
traditional system, to extend the authority of the fledging
state into the hinterland and secure the allegiance of the
elite there, big landowners and tribal chiefs. Jordan had no
economic resources worth coveting, and Britain supplied the
government with its budget. The colonial authorities neither
invested in, nor "drained" surplus from, agriculture. During
the quarter century of British rule, agricultural
productivity remained stagnant.
In the Jordan Valley, the arrival of Palestinian
refugees in the region in 1948 brought about a demographic
transformation as well as a complex system of tenurial
arrangements. The refugees were, by and large, landless, and
land ownership was highly concentrated. These refugees were
perceived by Jordan, Israel, and the United States as a
potential source of instability. Resettling them was
therefore deemed necessary. Thus,U.S. and Jordanian
officials set up the development scheme in the Ghor to
resettle the refugees residing in the area as a way of
pacifying them. Among other items in the project, land
reform was meant to induce stability by establishing a
system of medium-sized, owner-operated farms. The government
has so far released only scant information on landownership,
insufficient for drawing plausible conlusions on the
question. Overall, however, the land reform has failed to
fulfill its main stated objective of establishing family
farms.
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Yet, land distribution is only one source of class
differentiation in the Valley. Other sources derive from the
position of, and relationships among, farm operators:
landowners, sharecroppers, workers. We have divided
landowners into three groups--owner-operators, commuters,
and absentees--based on the extent of their involvement in
land cultivation. Among them, commuters stood out as the
stratum with the highest access to capital and information,
hence the most capable of reinvesting. Sharecroppers have
been found to be largely illiterate, and, although they
share both costs and returns and some decision-making power
with landlords, the relationship between landlord and
sharecropper is an asymmetrical one. Because of the
smallness of their parcels and lack of access to credit
sources, they have not been able to lift themselves from
their dependent position. We have discussed workers in
relation to their method of remuneration, gender, and
origin. Wage labor exhibited steady growth, especially with
the influx of foreign workers beginning in the mid-1970s.
Female participation in the labor force seems to have risen,
and their wages, which used to be only half the male wage,
are now equal to that of foreign workers. Jordanian male
workers receive the highest pay, but their numbers are
small.
Finally, we have shown that the spheres of marketing and
credit both embody and reinforce the agrarian social
structure and have a bearing on surplus distribution.
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Marketing is carried out primarily through commission
agents. Formally, they auction the farmers' produce in
wholesale markets in exchange for a set fee. In reality,
they extract extra profit, especially from small farmers and
sharecroppers, through their vertical control of farm
operations and as suppliers of credit and inputs. Credit
provision was shown to enhance the position of big farmers
and commuters who obtained credit from formal sources,
mostly governmental and semi-governmental credit
organizations, at low interest rates. Small farmers and
sharecroppers, however, relied on informal creditors who
were often commission agents or big landowners.
Two conditions that played a crucial role in spurring
on-the-farm surplus investment have still to be discussed.
Chapter 3 includes examination of the first, infrastructural
investment in irrigation by the State, and Chapter 4 treats
the second, the export market.
ENDNOTES
1. The estimate is based on the areas partitioned and
settled during land settlement operations between 1933 and
1943 under the British Mandate, which involved the vast
majority of cultivated village lands. The total, according
to Konikoff (1946: 37) was 3,846,623 dunums, of which
2,200,243 were mushac and 1,646,623 mafruz. No figures are
available for tribal lands, which continually changed hands
as a result of intertribal warfare.
2. Jordan held a strategic geographic location within the
Middle East. It constituted a link between Egypt in the
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south and Iraq in the east, both of which were under British
rule. In the north, it bordered Syria, where Britain had to
maintain its pledge to France not to let Transjordan be used
as a base for nationalist forces striving to undermine
France in Syria. Furthermore, Britain sought to ensure that
its policy in Palestine was not to be jeopardized by an
unfavorable regime on its eastern frontier (Aruri, 1971;
Hourani, 1978).
3. CAbd Allah, who became the first king of Jordan in 1950,
was a member of the Hashemite family which originated in the
Hijaz in the Arabian Peninsula and led the Arab Revolt, in
collaboration with the British, against the Ottomans during
World War I. His first encounter with the British came when
he commanded a force of about 2,000 tribesmen from southern
Transjordan and threatened to march on Syria, fight the
French, and install himself as king. Instead, he struck a
deal with the British which served his ambition for a throne
as well as Britain's need for a local ally. The British
recognized him as an Emir, Prince of Transjordan, and
assisted him in erecting the state. In return, he accepted
their mandate over the country, set aside his former aims in
Syria, and otherwise served to further British imperial
interests in the region (see, for example, Aruri, 1971;
Hourani, 1978).
4. Among the opponents subdued, we find tribes like the
Idwan and Kura, and nationalist forces that sought to extend
aid to the Syrian resistance against the French occupation
(Aruri, 1971; Hourani, 1978).
5. Another example in the Jordan Valley was the Ghazawiyyah
tribe. Whereas the Idwan already exhibited a tendency to
settled agriculture, the Ghazawiyyah lacked both capital and
expertise, and finally their land passed into the hands of
speculators and merchants (Hourani, 1978: 22; Walpole 1948:
61).
6. The Idwan holdings are the only holdings in the Valley
that so far have not been parcelled out into smaller units
and brought up on par with the rest of the region.
7. Hershlag (1980: 267) calculated that the average peasant
spent about 64 per cent of his output on land lease, tax,
ploughing, and animal fodder. Only 36 per cent of his income
remained for consumption and purchasing other essentials.
8. About 10,000 tons of wheat and 4,000 tons of vegetables
were exported, mainly to Palestine (Idid.).
9. Unless otherwise stated, Jordan is used here to refer to
the East Bank of what constituted the Hashemite Kingdom of
Jordan between 1950 and 1967.
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10. Numerous plans have been proposed--usually by foreign
travellers, missionaries, officals, and occupiers--over the
last 150 years for the development of the Jordan Valley.
Among these were plans by: 1) John Lewis Burckhardt, an
Anglo-Swiss explorer, in 1812; 2) W.F. Lynch, a U.S. Navy
commander, in 1850; 3) Georges Franghia, Ottoman Director of
Public Works in Palestine, in 1913; 4) Cyril Q. Henriques,
commissioned by the British Mandate government, in 1928; and
5) Walter Clay Lowdermilk, commissioned by the U.S.
Department of Agriculture, in 1930.. Common to all recent
plans was the idea of constructing irrigation canals and
hydroelectric power generators by diverting the water from
the Jordan River tributaries and other small streams, as
well as from Lake Tiberias and Hulah. For more detailed
information on the history and specificities of these
schemes, see Khouri, 1981: 43-67.
11. See endnote 10.
12. The plan that was implicitly accepted by Jordan and
Israel was the Johnston Plan, but instead of both working
together on the development of the Valley, each worked
separately with the United States. For a diplomatic
chronology and details of the engineering aspects of the
Johnston Plan, see Kahhaleh, 1981: 21-28.
13. See Barnett, 1975, for treatment of the Gezira scheme.
14. In the study of the Royal Scientific Society (1974) by
Hazleton, another set of data from the Department of
Statistics (1961) survey reperesenting distribution of
landownership was used to evalute landownership
distribution. It did not, however, differentiate between the
two types of distribution, and mistakenly used the holding-
based distribution to indicate ownership distribution. There
are also statistics from a survey for the two banks of the
Jordan Valley by UNRWA, conducted in 1955. It does not serve
our purposes here as we are dealing only with the East Bank
(Ibid.).
15. No data on land distribution prior to land reform are
available for the 8 km or the proposed Dead Sea extension
zones. Assessment of the situation in both is offered in the
treatment of land reform.
16. For details of these laws, see Royal Scientific Society,
1974a; and Dajani et al, 1980. The laws were enacted in
1959, 1962, 1968, 1973, and 1977. They are recorded in the
relevant issues of the Jordan Official Gazette.
17. The decision seems to have been taken in accordance with
the World Bank Mission Recommendations (IBRD: 1957:108-114;
Hazleton, 1974:19-20).
121
18. The procedure of transferring landownership also
followed the World Bank recommendations; see endnote 17.
19. The land value was estimated at JD40 for Class I and II
and JD8 for Class IV (Ibid.).
20. Thus Fraenkel (1980), perhaps hinting at USAID's
displeasure with land reform, says:
"Foreign donors have been especially concerned that a
handful of powerful farmers will capture a disproportionate
share of the windfall benefits of the project. This concern
has persisted in part because the JVA (Jordan Valley
Authority) has administered the land reform program without
foreign assistance, and therefore its reporting on this
aspect of the project has been minimal."
21. The survey, for instance, found no parcels with an area
less than 19 dunums, contrary to all subsequent surveys and
what the present author observed in several locations in the
Valley. For this reason also, we exclude it from discussion
of other aspects of land reform.
22. Landownership concentration in the southern segment is
known to be high as it is in the southern section of the
Middle Ghor. Here, many merchants, other commuters, and the
shaykhs of the Idwan tribe own land. Not incidentally, these
are also the sections of the Valley where the new, capital
intensive technologies have spread most widely.
23. Dajani et al (1980: 58) divide them into resident and
non-resident. Our classification distinguishes two types of
non-residents, commuters and absentees, whose relation to
farming is decisively at variance.
24. Khouri (1981: 79) gives an example of a landowner, to
whom he gives the pseudonym Issam Kamal, who owned 20,000
dunums and arranged for his estate to be cultivated by
bedouin sharecroppers. They planted wheat and barley, and
took 80 per cent of the crop.
25. This is a barebone summary of complex arguments advanced
by the two authors which does not do them justice, but is
adequate for our purposes. It is worth mentioning here that
the two articles restrict their treatment to the question of
the internal dynamics of Palestine's economy. It would be of
interest, from a Dependency vantage point, if it were also
linked to the modes of incorporation of Palestine into the
World Economy.
26. The 1978 census covered a wider area than the 1961
census, so the comparison cannot be direct.
27. These numbers are based on graphs provided by the
census, and may not be exact.
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28. The first local company, for example, to sell drip
irrigation equipment was founded by a merchant, landowner,
and commission agent, Ibrahim al-Shaykh (see Chapter Three).
29. The amount was JD 5.912 million.
30. For instance, the farmers' representatives in 1974 were
Mamduh Salih al-Ghazawi, cAffash Sultan al-Idwan (both are
descendents of the tribes that were alloted large tracts of
land by the mandate government), cId al-Sharif, Hussein al-
Shahab, and Karim al-Majali (Agricultural Credit
Cooperation, ACC, Annual Report, 1974).
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CHAPTER 3
CHARACTERISTICS AND LOCAL IMPACT
OF THE TECHNOLOGICAL TRANSFORMATION
Two types of technological transformation took place in
Jordan Valley agriculture between 1960 and 1980. The first
was "off the farm", in the form of irrigation works, and the
second was "on the farm", comprised of technologies from
chemical fertilizers to plastic covers. The attributes and
impact of these technologies and their impact on the
agrarian economy are the subject matter of the current
chapter.
The ecological setting of the Valley in the context of
which the technologies operate is outlined in Section I. The
ecology is shown to be another condition that facilitated
the introduction of some of the technologies. Irrigation
projects, the-off-the-farm technology, are examined in
Section II. Because we are not interested in the irrigation
works in and of themselves, only a summary of them is
offered. In the rest of the section, we analyze their effect
on the expansion of irrigated areas, cropping patterns and
intensity, yield, and returns. A brief mention is also made
of Palestinian refugees in the region. On-the-farm
technologies are the subject of Section III. Traditional
agricultural practices are first described, including the
division of labor. Variations in labor utilization according
to holding size and the possibility of the existence of
disguised and seasonal unemployment are then discussed. This
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is followed by an examination of the spread of modern
cultivation material inputs in this traditional sector. The
remaining parts of the section are devoted to topics related
to drip irrigation and plastic covers. First the
technologies are described in broad terms. Second, their
impact on the division of labor, material and labor resource
use, yields, returns, and risk is analyzed in detail.
Throughout we draw comparisons and contrasts between drip
irrigation and plastic covers, on the one hand, and
traditional agriculture, on the other, as well as between
the new technologies themselves. Our concern is not
confined, however, to the "physical" impact of drip
irrigation and plastic covers, but extends to their social
impact as well. The social impact is evaluated in
conjunction with the analysis of the process of their
diffusion. We attempt to answer several related questions:
which groups of farmers have adopted the technologies? How
has the position of the sharecroppers been affected? How has
the proliferation of drip irrigation and plastic covers
affected income distribution? Technology is often not solely
responsible for effecting change. We attempt to be precise,
therefore, about the role of the "technological factor" when
other factors are present. Finally, the topics are treated,
implicitly or explicitly, in light of questions raised and
hypotheses advanced in the literature of agrarian studies,
in general, and the Green Revolution, in particular.
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SECTION I
The Ecological Setting
The Jordan Valley is a geological depression, 200-392
meters below sea level. The Jordan River, which originates
from Lake Tiberias (The Sea of Galilee) in the North and
meanders south ending in the Dead Sea, divides it into what
has come to be known as the East and West Jordan Valley. The
East Valley, the subject of the present work, runs 4 to 6
kilometers in width and 100 kilometers in length. The bulk
of arable land is found in the Ghor, a terrace sloping
slightly downward from the uplands in the east to the Katar,
bad lands, in the west. A relatively minor agricultural land
strip, known as the Zor, west of Katar, stretches along the
flood plain of the Jordan River (Department of Statistics,
1961; Khouri, 1981).
Investigations by the American firm, Harza Engineering
Company (1955, Vol. III,1) surveyed 942,843 dunums and
classed about 569,846 as arable. A later survey by NEEDCO
(1969, VOl.I: ii) of 854,350 dunums, put the area of arable
land at 450,170 dunums, 143,000 dunums of which would
require the bleaching of excess salt. Both water and soil
salinity pose problems for agriculture in the valley,
particularly in the south (Harza, 1955, Vol.III:37).
The Valley has a predominantly Mediterranean climate
because of the prevailing wind and low elevation. Summer is
hot and dry, with temperatures reaching up to 45c. The
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season is unsuitable for cultivation and severe for human
habitation. Winter, by contrast, is moderately cold and wet,
and frost occurs occasionally (Department of Statistics,
1961:141-150). The favorable winter weather gives the
Valley's agriculture what might be termed "seasonal
comparative advantage": competition from other areas is then
practically absent. The mild climate affords the region,
moreover, a long production time, from mid-October to mid-
May.
Precipitation is low. The Valley is a "rain-shadow"
(Ibid.:143). It receives some rain from the westerly wind,
but less than the uplands on either side because of the low
elevation of the region. The shadow is most pronounced in
the southern segment; rainfall there is meager. The average
annual rainfall plummets from 380 millimeters in the north
to 100 millimeters in the south. Precipitation is also
irregular: dry winters are not uncommon in some locations
(Ibid.:141-150). The rate of evaporation is high, as the sun
is often bright (Stetieh, 1978:15). The difference in
rainfall between north and south helps to explain the
earlier existence and development of agriculture in the
former segment. All in all, transformation of agriculture in
the Valley would have been seriously impeded had it relied
solely on rain water.
The region is endowed with other water sources. The
extent to which they have been harnessed and made the Valley
prosperous varied over historical periods. Although settled
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agriculture dates back to 10,000 B.C., it only flourisehd
intermittently during the Roman-Nabatean (63 B.C. - 324
A.D.), the Umayyad (630 - 750 A.D.), and the Mamluk (1187 -
1516 A.D.) eras (Khouri, 1981: 13-42). The scale, however,
was more modest than at present, irrigation water being then
drawn from side wadis, streams that are usually dry except
in the rainy season. Only after World War II did agriculture
begin to develop in the Valley after the years of decline
under late Ottoman rule (Chapter 2).
Even before the construction of the East Ghor Canal in
the 1960s (below), farmers were able to obtain irrigation
water from the flows of tributary streams and wadis through
diversion works built by the government. Water was also
pumped from the River Jordan and a small strip of 12,095
dunums in the Zor was irrigated (Harza, 1955, Vol. IV:2-7).
But pumps were small, and the distribution system was
inefficient, resulting in water wastage. Land was, in
addition, subject to perennial flooding. A third source of
water was a handful of water springs and artisian wells,
covering an area of about 1,960 dunums (Ibid.). The water
from the wells contained a high level of salinity and was
suitable only for the production of salt-tolerant crops.
Overall, the quality, quantity, and irregularity of water
supply made the cultivation of fruits and vegetables
difficult. Consequently, cereals covered 80 per cent of the
irrigated land (Ibid.).
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SECTION II
Irrigation Projects
Green Revolution studies often deal with on-the-farm
technology; they typically leave out irrigation schemes and
assume them exogenous. A dam or an irrigation canal can be,
however, a decisive element in making technological
improvements on the farm possible. The Green Revolution
itself has, in fact, taken place in irrigated regions
(Cleaver, 1973: 191-192; Chapter 4. fn. 6). Irrigation
projects involve, furthermore, a complex of economic,
political, and ecological issues. They commonly require
heavy public investment and thus divert scarce capital
resources from other agricultural areas. The construction
and maintenance of irrigation works, as well as the
distribution of water among farms, necessitate state
intervention in the rural economy. Although in the
contemporary world they do not have the same effect on the
nature of the state as they are claimed to have had in
ancient China or Egypt (e.g. Wittfogel, 1957), they
nevertheless strengthen the state's presence in the
countryside. Questions are often raised as well about the
impact of irrigation schemes on the ecology, such as
sedimentation and soil salinity. Some of the foregoing
topics are considered with regard to irrigation projects in
the Ghor.
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A series of irrigation works have been initiated and
completed in the region since the early 1960s, as part of
what is called Stage I irrigation projects. This stage
"encompasses all the irrigation projects that utilize the
free and unregulated flow of the side wadis between the
Yarmouk River and the Dead Sea; and the Jordan Valley
irrigation Project"1 (Dajani, 1980:193); Appendix 3.1 and
Figure 3.1). The central piece in the scheme is the East
Ghor Canal. It is scheduled to extend from the Yarmouk River
in the north to the Dead Sea in the south. Presently, it has
reached the village of Karameh. The total area irrigated at
present is estimated at 149,500 dunums. Only the effect of
the 70 kilometer segment, for which we have historical data,
is examined here. Conclusions regarding this segment should
be generally valid, however, for the other sections as well.
The changes brought about by the irrigation schemes to
be examined here are primarily economic, including areas,
patterns, and intensity of cropping and crop yields. Brief
mention is also made of the outcome of the attempt to
resettle Palestinian refugees (Chapter 2). State
intervention entailed by the irrigation projects is
discussed throughout the text.
Table 3.1 shows the distribution of cropped area by
source of irrigation water in 1960 and 1973. The former year
preceded the construction of the Canal, and the latter
witnessed the return to "normality" in the Valley in the
aftermath of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, when the region was
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Table 3.1
Distribution of Irrigated Area by Type and Source of Irrigation in the Jordan Valley,
Before and After the East Ghor Canal
Type and Source 1960(Before Canal) 1973 (After Canal)
of Irrigation area % area %
(dunums) (dunums)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Partial
Side wadis
and water springs 129,491 67.8 28,373 16.2
Rainfall 38,201 20.0 16,068 9.2
Total 167,642 87.8 44,441 25.2
Full
Artesian wells 459 .2 14,420 8.2
Jordan River (pumping) 19,682 10.3 1,509 .9
Yarmouk River 3,130 1.6 114,609 65.5
Total 23,271 12.1 130,538 74.6
Total Partial and Full 190,913 100.0 174,979 100.0
Sources: Column (1) from Department of Statistics (1961).
Column (3) from Department of Statistics (1973).
Note: The area in 1960 is greater than the area in 1973 because the 1960 census covered a
larger area than the 1973 census.
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engulfed by military clashes between Israel and Palestinian
guerrillas stationed there. The two censuses from which
figures are compiled covered different land areas. It is
preferable therefore to compare percentages rather than
absolute numbers.
The fully irrigated area expanded from 12.1 per cent to
74.6 per cent of total cultivated land between the two
dates, a 62.5 per cent increase. The proportion of land
irrigated from artesian wells multiplied, from 0.2 per cent
to 8.2 per cent, but the Canal was responsible for 88 per
cent of the total expansion. As new segments of the Canal
were completed, more land was brought under irrigation. By
1981, the 18 kilometer extension as well as other ancillary
projects were in operation (Appendix 3.1). They were to
irrigate 106,000 dunums. All in all, 225,740 dunums are
scheduled to receive irrigation water from these public
irrigation projects.
The distribution of irrigation water via the East Ghor
Canal may have ended the water monopoly held previously by
big landowners (Chapter Two). Table 3.2 relates the size of
holdings to the course of irrigation water. It suggests that
the medium holdings may be disproportionately favored by
irrigation water from the Canal. Of the land area of medium
holdings, 80 per cent was irrigated with water from the
project, compared to 56 per cent and 57 per cent of the
small and large holdings respectively. If the medium size
category includes a large proportion of the large holdings
Table 3.2
Holding Size and Source of Irrigation Water in the Jordan Valley, 1973
Source of Irrigation
Size of Total Canal Other Rainfed Uncultivated Total*
Holding Area sources
(dunum) (dunum) area area area area
(dun) % (dun) % (dun) % (dun) % %
<20 22,011 12,384 56 8,499 39 646 3 181 1 100.0
20-40 48,253 38,267 80 7,347 15 1,991 4 648 1 100.0
>40 111,569 63,958 57 28,456 26 13,431 12 5,725 1 100.0
Source: Department of Statistics (1973).
*Totals may not add due to rounding.
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that were divided among family members in order to hedge
land reform, then a bias toward the large holdings may
exist. But because the remaining large holdings seem to
obtain water from the Canal on an equal footing with the
small holdings, then in all likelihood the provision of
irrigation water does not favor one category over another.
By and large, the surveyed units--whether small, medium, or
large--seem to have access to one of the irrigation sources
or another. Only a small fraction of these are rainfed or
left fallow (Table 3.2).
The secure water supply facilitated a shift in the
cropping pattern. It is the practice in agricultural
economics to distinguish between cropped and cultivated
areas, with the former accounting for double cropping. The
ratio of cropped to cultivated area is known as the cropping
intensity, equal to, or larger than, one. A cropping
intensity of 1.1, for instance, indicates that 10.0 per cent
of the planted area is double cropped. Tables 3.3 and 3.4
illustrate the changes in this pattern between 1953 and 1977
for the three major types of crops grown in the Valley:
cereals, fruits, and vegetables. In 1953, cereals,
vegetables and fruits occupied 80.0 per cent, 14.4 per cent,
and 5.6 per cent, respectively, of the cropped area. The
corresponding 1977 percentages were 37.0, 72.0, and 15.0,
respectively. The trend in cropping arrangements has thus
favored the expansion of vegetable and fruit cultivation at
the expense of cereals. Vegetables ranked first in 1977,
fruits third but with a higher percentage than in 1953.
Table 3.3
Cropped and Cultivated Areas in the Jordan Valley, 1953-1977
Area in 1000 Dunums
Type of
Crops 1 953a 19 60a,b 19 65a 1973 1975 1977
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cereals 107.0 100.0 75.5 68.5 93.6 75.4
Vegetables 19.1 55.0 76.5 73.8 114.4 146.2
Fruits 7.5 5.0 12.0 22.1 25.7 30.7
Total
cropped 133.6 160.0 170.0 164.4 233.7 252.3
Total
cultivatedc n.a. 150.0 150.0 143.4 219.6 202.0
Sources: Column (1) from Baker and Harza Engineering Company (1955, vol.IV).
Columns (2),(3), and (4) from Hazleton (1974).
Columns (5) and (6) from Dajani, et al, (1980).
Notes: aColumns (1) through (4) include the Northern section of the Ghor only.
bWhile the 1960 census included 200,000 dunums, the figures for cropped area
(column 2) were adjusted proportionally to an estimated total cultivated area of
150,000 dunums.
cCultivated area excludes the area left fallow for one year or more.
Table 3.4
Cropping Intensity in the Jordan Valley, 1953-1977
Cropping Intensity (%)
Type of
Crops 1953 1960 1965 1973 1975 1977
Cereals 80.0 66.0 50.3 47.8 42.0 37.0
Vegetables 14.4 36.6 51.0 51.5 52.0 73.0
Fruits 5.6 3.4 12.0 15.4 12.0 15.0
All crops 1 00 .0a 107.0 113.0 114.7 106.0 125.0
Source: Computed from Table 3.3.
Note: aCropped area is assumed to be equal to cultivated area. The assumption is justified
on the grounds that cereals, which do not lend themselves to double cropping,
occupy 80 per cent of the area. The resulting underestimation of cropping intensity
should be slight.
Cropping Intensity = cropped area/cultivated area
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The transformation of the cropping regime has paralleled
the expansion of irrigation. True, change had already begun
before the building of the Canal, as evident from the 1953
and 1960 patterns. But both fruits and vegetables were
predominantly grown on irrigated land. The 1960 census staff
(Department of Statistics, 1961:176) found that in rainfed
segments, grains made up 94 per cent of the cropped land,
while vegetables only 3.3 per cent. In irrigated segments,
on the other hand, the proportions for cereals and
vegetables were 48.4 per cent and 40.7 per cent
respectively. The role of irrigation in the transformation
of cropping patterns can be seen clearly by the fact that
enlargement of the fruit area was possible only after the
Canal was built. It remained about the same between 1953 and
1960, but increased threefold by 1973.
Although irrigation facilitated the shift in the
cropping regime, the new demographic and tenurial conditions
were directly responsible for it. The Palestinian refugees
brought labor power needed for vegetable and fruit
cultivation, and many were skilled in farming. They also
brought a new system of production based on wage labor and
sharecropping whose production was geared for the market
(Chapter 2 and Conclusion). Growing vegetables is more
profitable than growing cereals. Already in 1960, a dunum of
tomatoes brought an average revenue of JD 9.8, whereas a
dunum of wheat only JD 1.6 (Department of Statistics,
1961:179). The government has, moreover, adopted a policy of
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price subsidy for wheat, which has kept its price low and
acted as a disincentive for wheat cultivation (Stetieh and
Smadi, 1974:18).
Cropping intensity, the ratio of cropped to cultivated
areas, seems to have risen only slightly and is subject to
yearly fluctuations (Tables 3.3 and 3.4). While in 1965 and
1973 cropping intensities of 113 per cent and 114.67 per
cent respectively were achieved, in 1975, a drought year, it
was only 106. The 1977 figure of 125 per cent probably
reflects the introduction of drip irrigation.
Irrigation works have, in brief, brought comparatively
large tracts of land under permanent irrigation, facilitated
the transformation of the cropping regime where vegetables
replaced cereals as the principal crop, and effected a
slight increase in cropping intensity.
In addition to expanding the irrigated area, increasing
the cropping intensity, and altering cropping patterns,
irrigation raised crop yields and farmers' incomes in
general. Yields of wheat, four vegetable crops--tomatoes,
eggplants, cucumbers, and squash--and citrus fruits are
shown in Table 3.5 for selected years between 1953 and 1975.
Wheat yields fluctuate greatly because the crop continues to
rely on rainfall (Chapter 4). Comparisons cannot be made for
citrus fruits because no information on their yields is
available prior to 1965. Vegetable productivity appears to
have tripled in the years following the construction of the
Canal: from a little over 500 kgs/dunum in 1953 and 1959-60
Table 3.5
Yields for Selected Vegetables, Wheat, and Citrus Fruits in the Jordan Valley,
1953-1975
Yields in kgs/dunum
Crop 1953 1960 1964/65 1965/66 1973 1975
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Wheat 91 49 211 108 154 108 11
Tomatoes 502 557 1,391 1,131 1,515 682 1,763
Eggplants 970 983 1,433 1,292 1,614 731 1,667
Cucumbers 194 353 577 319 705 474 1,429
Citrus n.a. n.a. 1,750 n.a. 165 843 1,000
Sources: Columns (1)
Column (1)
Column (2)
Column (3)
Column (4)
Column (5)
Column (6)
Column (7)
through (5) cited in Hazleton (1974).
from UNRWA (1953).
from Department of Statistics (1961).
from Awad (1967).
from NEDECO (1969).
from Awad (1967).
from Department of Statistics (1973).
from Dajani, et al. (1980).
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to 1,131 kgs/dunum in 1973 and 1,763 kgs/dunum in 1975. This
conclusion warrants some qualifications, however. First,
production figures are often unreliable, as is apparent from
the numbers for 1965/66 and 1966. Awad's survey gave higher
yield averages than the other study: he conducted his study
immediately after the Canal was finished, and there was
probably an eagerness to demonstrate the project's success
in order to encourage further funding. Second, 1959/60 was a
drought year and productivity fell as a result (Department
of Statistics, 1961). So it is difficult to tell with surety
by how much yields actually rose.
Irrigation bolstered output growth in two ways. First,
it supplied water volumes adequate for plant nourishment and
made it available on demand. Second, it encouraged the
adoption of chemical fertilizers and pesticides. Data to
support the latter claim for the period in question exist
only for the country as a whole. They suggest a general and
steady increase in the use of these outputs.2 But their
utilization has been dependent on the type of crops grown
and on water supply, Aresvik (1976:92) notes that: "The
patterns of fertilizer use reflects the distribution of
irrigated vegetable growing and the incidence of rainfall in
rainfed areas."
The growth of agricultural output as well as of
vegetable and fruit cultivation translated into an overall
growth of farmers' incomes. The level of increase is
difficult to measure. Table 3.6 illustrates changes in
Table 3.6
Net Income in Jordan Valley Agriculture Before and After the East Ghor Canal,
at Farm Gate Prices (Units in J.D.)
Income
Prices 1959/60 1964/65 1965/66
1. Current Prices 2.2 10.8 13.6
2. Constant pricesa 2.2 9.8 12.1
3. Index 100.0 445.0 550.0
Source: Row (1), Awad (1967).
Notes: aConstant prices are calculated from current prices in row 1, by assuming an
inflation rate of 2 per cent per annum. Mazur (1979) contains an excellent
discussion of inflation rates in Jordan during this period.
135
incomes after the Canal was built. By taking 1959/1960 as a
base year, the income/dunum, these figures would suggest,
rose by 4.45 times by 1964/1965 and by 5.5 times by
1965/1966. This represents about 100 per cent annual income
growth, an exaggerated rate in our opinion. It is not, to
begin with, proportional to growth of yields or output. For
instance, the growth of tomato yield, the highest of all
vegetables, reached only 45 per cent per annum (Table 3.5).
Even if the 100 per cent income growth, whose validity we
have just questioned, is accepted, the growth rate of yields
still amounts to less than half of the alleged growth rate
of income. Furthermore, the overall rise in income from
vegetables in Jordan was much less than this; only 17 per
cent annually (FAO, cited in Aresvik, 1976:70). The Valley's
rate should be greater than the national average, because
the Canal contributes about one-third of the growth in the
value added of Jordan's agriculture over the same period.
The most plausible estimate of income rises is probably that
of Sutcliffe (1973). In his survey of incomes of project and
nonproject farmers immediately after the first phase of the
Canal was completed (more below), he found that the incomes
of the former exceeded the latter by 30 per cent.
Finally, one of the main aims of the East Ghor Canal
project was to resettle Palestinian refugees who arrived in
the Valley after 1948 (Chapter Two). Sutcliffe (1973)
attempted to assess the success of this objective by
surveying the incomes and attitudes of farmers within and
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outside the project area. 3 His results indicated that 90 per
cent of the land in the project area was irrigated compared
to 35 per cent in the nonproject area (Ibid.:477).
"Acceptance of modern methods" was also more widespread
among the first group than among the second. Translated into
income, the difference in irrigation and use of modern
inputs meant a difference of 30 per cent in income levels in
favor of project farmers (Ibid.). But, despite the income
rise of project farmers, Sutcliffe concluded that the
objective of resettling Palestinian refugees had failed, for
the "concern with Palestine" was not reduced and the area
became a major base for Palestinian guerrillas soon after
the defeat of the Arab armies in the 1967 war. But to
explain this phenomenon on the basis of an insufficient rise
in income levels, as Sutcliffe did, is crudely economistic
and localistic. A proper understanding of the failure of
Palestinian refugee resettlement in the Valley must take
into account developments in the Palestinian question as a
whole, a subject beyond the scope of the present work.
SECTION III
On-the-Farm Technologies
The second type of technological transformation in the
Valley's agriculture consists of the introduction of drip
irrigation, in the mid-1970s, and plastic houses and tunnels
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shortly thereafter. The new technologies radically changed
the entire spectrum of agricultural practices from
irrigation to division of labor to input composition. They
also brought about a leap in productivity. Appreciation of
such changes requires that "traditional" agricultural
practices be spelled out at first. 4 Only vegetable
cultivation is discussed, because cereals were not affected
and no studies have been conducted on fruit production.
III.1 Traditional Agriculture (or Surface Irrigation with
Open Field Cultivation
The most distinctive feature of traditional agriculture
is that the irrigation furrows are laid out in a zig-zag,
winding fashion, dawalib, rather than in straight lines. The
zig-zag shape is thought to slow the water current,
preventing soil erosion and allowing adequate time for water
absorption. The furrows are spaced at 1.5 meters. Plants are
grown in the slope of the furrows, one half meter apart.
This makes for a plant density of 50,000 plants/dunum, which
is considered low (League of Arab States, 1974:112).
All operations, with the exception of ploughing and
occasionally spraying, are performed manually, for once the
zig-zag furrows are dug, machine movement is hampered. The
division of labor is indicated in Appendix 3.2. It is based
on a study by Tamari (1980:39) of the village of Zbeidat on
the West Jordan Valley. Variations may exist within the
region, but they do not significantly deviate from this
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regime. A close examination of task distribution reveals a
somewhat simple pattern of division of labor: (1) men
perform all tasks except weeding; (2) women perform all post
land-preparation tasks, except irrigation; (3) children
perform the technically simple and physically undemanding
tasks; and (4) only ploughing is mechanized and is done by
men.
III.1.1 Inputs of Traditional Agriculture
Agricultural inputs may be conveniently divided into two
types, labor and material. In economic terms, the relative
weights of inputs can be described by the technical
coefficients, i.e., input per unit area or output. Inputs
may be stated in physical or monetary values or both. Input
coefficients also provide a tool for comparing the resource
use of different technologies.
Our analysis of the input composition for traditional
agriculture and t,he impact of drip irrigation and plastic
covers on resource consumption in the Valley are based
principally on two Jordan University manuals (Stetieh, et
al, 1978; Stetieh and Musa, 1980). They constitute a seminal
and most systematic attempt to measure the parameters of the
production function.5 The authors, however, present their
results, as is often the case with Valley studies, as
averages of all farms. Their value is therefore limited when
it comes to distinguishing levels of resource allocation
among holdings of different sizes and tenure arrangements.
They do not, in addition, state any details of the social
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backgrounds of the surveyed subjects, nor do they suggest,
at least for traditional agriculture, to which strata of
farmers they apply. Other evidence must be used to overcome
these shortcomings. Table 3.7 details the input coefficients
for the production of tomatoes and cucumbers, the major
crops cultivated by the new technolgies, for which data
exist.
Traditional agriculture is labor intensive for both
crops: labor/material costs are equal to 1.15 and 1.6 for
tomatoes and cucumbers, respectively. Where women's wages
equal the men's, labor intensity would rise appreciably, for
women do the picking, a task which requires approximately
half of the total labor input. The figures in Table 3.7
represent average labor inputs. But labor utilization varies
with holding size, tenure type, and season. Labor use versus
holding size for the month of February, 1973 is indicated in
Table 3.8. The data suggest that the number of workers per
dunum decreases as the holding size increases. Farmers with
small holdings employed 4.4 times the amount of labor as
farmers with large holdings, and farmers with medium holding
2.9 times. The greater use of labor on smaller farms in the
Ghor conforms to the pattern observed in traditional
agriculture elsewhere (Griffin, 1972:31). It could be an
indication of different levels of technology between small
and large-sized farms or the existence of disguised
unemployment on the former. The census was conducted in
1973, before the introduction of drip-irrigation and
Table 3.7
Input Coefficients for Tomato and Cucumber Production
Using Traditional Cultivation Methods in the Jordan Valley, in Physical and Monetary Terms
(Monetary Costs are in JDs at Current Prices)
Input Tomatoes Cucumbers
Physical Amount Costs in JDsd Amount Costs in JDsu
units per dunum per dunum per tone per dunum per dunum per tona
Materials
1. Ploughing and
furrowing mach hrs. .8 1.1 .7 .8 1.1 1.2
2. Seeds and
seedlings kgs or # 1500.0 2.5 1.7 .5 6.3 7.3
3. Chemical
fertilizers
Superphosphate kgs 75.0 1.9 1.3 100.0 2.5 2.9
Amon. sulfate kgs 80.0 4.2 2.8 50.0 2.6 3.0
Compound ks 50.0 4.2 2.8 25.0 2.0 2.3
4. Manure m3  1.3 10.4 7.0 -- -- --
5. Water m 595.0 1.8 1.3 400.0 1.2 1.4
6. Chemical sprays kgs 1.6 1.7 1.1 1.0 1.5 1.7
7. Dusting
chemicals kgs 3.0 .4 .2 -- -- --
Total Materials -- 28.0 18.7 -- 17.2 19.9
Laborc
1. Zig-zag
furrowing labor hrs.b 4.0 1.6 1.1 4.0 1.6 1.9
Table 3.7(contd.)
Input Tomatoes Cucumbers
Physical Amount Costs in JDsu Amount Costs in JDsd
units per dunum per dunum per tona per dunum per dunum per ton
2. Planting labor hrs. 3.0 1.2 .8 3.0 1.2 1.4
3. Hoeing labor hrs. 15.0 6.0 4.0 20.0 8.0 9.3
4. Fertilizer
application labor hrs 4.0 1.6 1.1 4.0 1.6 1.9
5. Irrigation labor hrs. 13.0 5.2 3.5 6.0 2.4 2.8
6. Spraying labor hrs. 5.0 2.5 1.7 6.0 3.0 3.5
7. Dusting labor hrs. .5 .2 .1 -- -- --
8. Harvesting labor hrs. 35.0 14.0 9.3 25.0 10.0 11.6
Total labor 79.5 32 .3c 21.5 68.0 2 7 .8c 32.3
Total labor
and materials 60.3 49.7 45.1 52.3
Source: Stetieh, et al (1978).
Notes: aCosts per ton = costs per dunum/yield. The yield of tomatoes = 1.5 tons/dunum,
and of cucumbers = .86 tons/dunum.
b labor hour = 1 man hour = 2 woman hours, because the male wage is twice
the female wage. Women perfom sowing and harvesting, hence the actual physical
time expended on these tasks is double that in the table.
cThe wage per labor hour = JD.40 for all tasks, except for spraying which = JD.5.
dCosts exclude rent and tax.
Table 3.7(contd.)
mach hrs. = machine hours
kgs = kilograms
# = number
m= cubic meters
Amon. = Amonium
O)
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plastic-cover technologies, and so the possibility that
large farms utilized capital-intensive techniques can be
ruled out. As was indicated earlier, all tasks in
traditional agriculture are performed manually except for
ploughing. No ploughing, however, is done in February, a
rainy month. As for the possibility of the existence of
disguised unemployment on small farms, only a conjectural
answer can be given.
The month of February is a picking time when labor
demand reaches a peak (see below). So only if the smaller
units have higher yields can they be expected to employ more
labor than the larger units. The available evidence,
indirect and limited as it is, does not support this
possibility. From figures on gross revenues for different
size holdings in the 1959-1960 season (Department of
Statistics, 1961:107), we find that gross incomes from large
holdings vacillated around those from small and medium
holdings--themselves almost identical. The lack of gross
income differentiation among holdings varying in area
suggests a lack of disparity in their yields. Another factor
that must be considered in the question of disguised
unemployment on small farms is the actual labor time workers
on these holding expend as compared with workers on large
holdings. Small farms employ proportionately more family
labor than do large farms. Young and female family members,
who are included in the number of workers, usually work
fewer hours on the farm than hired laborers. The differences
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in labor time expended on large and small holdings,
therefore, is likely to be less than the difference in the
number of workers indicated in the census figures. There is
no information on the precise pattern of family-labor time
in the Valley, and the issue must be investigated further.
All that can be said here is that if disguised unemployment
is present at all on small farms, it is likely to be lower
than the level suggested by the difference in the number of
workers on both types of holdings.
The amount of agricultural labor undergoes seasonal
fluctuation also. There are two cropping seasons in the Ghor
over the calendar year, with harvests in the fall and
spring. Land preparation--ploughing, furrowing, manuring,
etc.--for the fall season is done between July and
September, depending on the type of crop and segment of the
Valley. Picking for the fall season can start as early as
October. Land preparation for the spring season, on the
other hand, is carried out between fall and early winter.
Harvesting may commence in February and last up to late
April or even into June for produce like melons. Thus,
demand for labor swings between two seasonal extremes,
summer and winter. In summer, temperatures go up to 40c, the
fields look all but deserted. The demand for labor is then
at its lowest. Whereas during the winter months, when both
fall season harvesting and land preparation for the spring
season coincide, labor demand reaches its peak. The number
of working days for agricultural labor is thus irregular.
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The 1959-60 census (Department of Statistics, 1961:101)
showed that about 87 per cent of the labor force worked over
half the year, 50 per cent over 250 days, and only 33 per
cent over 300 days. So while there may be disguised
unemployment during the peak season, there is seasonal
unemployment during off-peak periods.
Material inputs consist of machinery, both chemical and
manure fertilizers, irrigation water, pesticides, and
dusting chemicals. What is called traditional agriculture in
the Valley is, thus, part traditional and part modern. The
composition of material inputs is given in Table 3.8. Their
costs compare well with those reported by the 1973 census of
the Department of Statistics (Appendix 3.3). The costs
differ from one crop to another. Tomatoes incur higher
expenses per dunum than cucumbers because of manure
application. But when costs are compared per ton, rather
than per dunum, they become nearly equal, owing to yield
differences.
Most material inputs appear to be widely used in the
Valley's traditional agricultural sector. Historical data
which would enable us to characterize the process of
diffusion, an often disputed sociological question (Chapter
1), are nonexistent. There is only scattered evidence on the
extent of diffusion, which from a long-term economic view is
more relevant. Table 3.9 indicates that, already by 1960,
71.3 per cent of the survey's holdings reported renting
machinery, tractor-drawn ploughs or moldboards, for
Table 3.8
Average Number of Workers per Dunum b_ Type and Size of Holding in the Jordan Valley
February, 1973
Number of Workers per Dunum
Holding Size Hired Family Totall Family/hiredb IndexC
(dunum) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
<20 .183 .147 .33 .80 440
20-40 .150 .069 .22 .46 293
40-80 .104 .037 .14 .36 187
>80 .062 .014 .08 .23 100
Source: Columns (1) and (2), Department of Statistics (1973).
Notes: aColumn (3) = Column (1) + Column (2).
bColumn (4) = Column (2)/Column (1).
cColumn (5) is obtained by assuming the total number of workers per dunum for
holdings >80 dunums in column (3) as the base figure.
Table 3.9
Percentage of Holdings Reporting Use of Modern Material Inputs, 1960 and 1978
Material Input Percentage of Users
1960 1978
(1) (2)
Ploughing machinery (hire) 71.3 90.0
Chemical fertilizers 40.0 81.7
Manure 3.7 35.0
Pesticides 63.8 99.0
Seeds and seedlings, purchase 79.8 n.a.
Sources: Column (1) Department of Statistics (1961).
Column (2) Department of Statistics (1978), except for the figure on pesticides
which is taken from Hyslop (1979).
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ploughing. The remaining farms still used mule-drawn
moldboards. By 1978, however, 90 per cent of the questioned
farmers ploughed their land by machinery. Ploughing had
hence been all but mechanized. Chemical fertilizers, too,
have been widely disseminated. The proportion of holdings
using these materials doubled, from 40.0 per cent to 81.7
per cent, between 1960 and 1978. Manure application is less
prevalent than chemical fertilizers. Only 3.7 per cent of
the holdings made use of manure in 1960, and 35.0 per cent
in 1978. The lag in manure diffusion may be attribu ted to
the scarcity of animals, which has been partly offset in
recent yars, by the growth of the poultry industry (Mazur,
1979). Finally, insecticides are now universally applied. 7
The composition of material inputs depends on holding
size and tenure type. The existing information, shown in
Table 3.10, relates it to the types of tenure alone. The
data suggest that owner-operated farms incur larger material
expenditures than either sharecropped or rented farms. This
might be due to larger use of material inputs, as Sharab
(1975) implies, or to greater purchasing costs. It is likely
that renters may want to keep the production expenses to a
minimum because they are indifferent to land fertility once
their leases expire. Such reasoning is not applicable,
however, to many sharecropped farms where the owner cannot
be said to be indifferent to the status of his holdings. But
because many owners of sharecropped farms come from the
"commuter" class, they are perhaps able to buy inputs at
Table 3.10
Average Cost of Material Inputs per Dunum of Tomatoes
bty Type of Tenure in Traditional Jordan Valley Agriculture, 1973(units in J.D.s at current prices)
Input Type of Tenure
Owner Operated Sharecropped Cash Rental
Ploughing and Furrowing .8 .8 .7
Fertilizers 10.0 7.0 7.2
Water 1.1 .9 .9
Pesticides 3.1 2.8 2.5
Total 14.9 11.4 11.3
Source: Sharab (1975).
Note: Sharab gives figures separately for the Middle and Northern segments of the valley.
To obtain an average, his numbers were weighted according to the land areas surveyed
in each segment.
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lower costs than can owner operators. Physical quantities of
material inputs on sharecropped holdings hence are likely to
be equal to those on owner-operated farms.
Resource use of traditional agriculture is further
illuminated by comparing it with resource use of drip
irrigation and plastic covers. Other topics pertaining to
the traditional agricultural sector are also discussed below
in conjunction with the new technologies.
111.2 Drip Irrigation and Plastic Covers
A typical drip-irrigation system consists of two parts:
1) a network of plastic pipes and tubes of graduated sizes.
A fairly large in diameter pipe brings water to the edges of
the field. It supplies a series of main lines of smaller
diameters, which transport the water into the field without
discharging it onto the plants. Submains of still smaller
size carry it to the lateral lines or the drippers, from
which the water trickles down either through emitters or
tiny holes. 2) A control station, or head, consisting of
units to filter the water which might otherwise clog the
emitters, an injector for adding fertilizers or chemicals to
water, pressure regulators, water meters, and valves and
pumps for water flow control (Shoji, 1977:63). In drip
irrigation with open-field cultivation (i.e., without
plastic covers), plastic sheeting known as plastic mulch is
commonly laid over irrigation submains. Each sheet serves
two drippers, or two plant rows. Seeds or seedlings are
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inserted in holes through the sheets, arranged in a
staggered fashion to ensure sufficient spacing between
plants. Not all parts have the same life span. The drippers
and main and submain pipes have to be replaced once every
three years, while the head can last up to ten years.
Drip irrigation eliminates the need for zig-zagged
furrows. Furrows are laid out in straight lines instead, and
are opened by tractor-drawn moldboards. Chemical fertilizer
application is also mechanized. It is done by dissolving the
fertilizers in the irrigation water which carries them
through the pipe network to the plants.
Plastic covers in the Ghor are of two kinds, plastic
houses and plastic tunnels. Plastic houses, or green houses,
are half-cylindrical houses made of metal pipes and roofed
with one or two layers of white transparent plastic for
harnessing the "greenhouse effect." The houses come in
varying sizes, depending on the manufacturer. Their height
ranges form 3 to 8 meters, width from 7 to 9 meters, and
length from 54 to 60 meters. The most common type of houses
cover an area of 500 square meters, i.e., half a dunum.
Furrows are spaced at 80 to 100 centimeters, and plants,
which are usually staked, at 30 to 40 centimeters (Ministry
of Agriculture, 1982).
Plastic tunnels are smaller in size than plastic houses.
They are 50 to 70 centimeters wide and 50 centimeters high.
Their length is governed by the land configuration. The
tunnels are made of half-cylindrical frames of steel wire,
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anchored to the ground and covered with plastic sheets.
Because their small height does not permit work inside, they
are opened at spraying, weeding, and harvesting times, or
whenever the need arises. Both plastic houses and tunnels
may be combined with drip irrigation or surface irrigation
(Khouri, 1981:183).
111.2.1 Impact
Drip irrigation and plastic covers modified or entirely
transformed most aspects of the agricultural economy of the
Ghor. Presently, the focus is on their impact on the
division of labor, resource use, yields, returns, and risk.
Drip irrigation has altered some aspects of the division of
labor regime under traditional agriculture (Appendix 3.2).
Whereas only ploughing was mechanized in the traditional
methods, the list of mechanized tasks under drip irrigation
includes ploughing, furrowing, harrowing, manuring,
irrigation, and fertilizing. Land preparation tasks, with
the exception of installing the drippers and plastic mulch,
have, in other words, been mechanized. By contrast, except
for irrigation and fertilizing, the post land-preparation
tasks, such as transplanting, sowing, weeding, and hauling,
are still manually performed.
The sexual division of labor, except for men's
participation in picking, has continued essentially
unchanged. Land preparation is still a male job, albeit
mechanized. Mechnization had substantially reduced men's
physical effort, however. Women's tasks, on the other hand,
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have not been mechanized and consequently their physical
burden has not been made any lighter.
Labor and material input compositions (input
coefficients) for tomatoes under drip irrigation and
cucumbers under plastic houses and tunnels are summarized in
Tables 3.11 through 3.13. In addition to the resources used
in the traditional method, the new technologies tap new
materials in the form of the drip-irrigation and plastic-
cover systems themselves.
Material expenditures for a dunum of tomatoes under drip
irrigation are about 2.5 times more than in traditional
agriculture. The increase derives largely from the drip
system itself, and to a minor degree from greater use of
other inputs. The costs are even greater for plastic-covers
cultivation. But material costs for plastic houses with drip
irrigation top all others. A dunum of cucumbers grown under
plastic covers pays about 23 times to materials as does its
traditional counterpart. While most of the expenditures are
invested in the covers and drip-irrigation systems,
comparatively large sums go to the purchase of pesticides.
Material costs for the new technologies outrank those for
traditional agriculture when measured also per unit of
output, with ratios ranging from approximately unity in the
case of drip irrigation to 2.4 for plastic houses with drip
irrigation. Put otherwise, traditional agriculture appears
to be more efficient in the overall utilization of materials
than the plastic covers, and equally as efficient as drip
irrigation.
Table 3.11
Input Coefficients for Tomato Production
using Drip Irrigation in the Jordan Valley, _in Physical and Monetary Terms
(Monetary Costs are in JDs at Current Prices)
Input Physical Costs in JDsb
Units Amount per dunum per ton
per dunum
Materials
1. Ploughing and
furrowing n.a. 2.5 .7
2. Seeds and
seedlings n.a. 4.8 1.3
3. Chemical
fertilizers
Superphosphate n.a. 3.3 1.0
Amon. phosphate
or compound n.a. 1.2 .4
4. Manure n.a. 15.5 4.6
5. Waterc n.a.
6. Spraying and
dusting chemicals n.a. 10.5 3.1
7. Drip system n.a. 78 .5e 23.1
Total Materials 116.3 34.2
Labora
1. Replanting
and thinning labor hrs. 17.2 30.7 1.1
Table 3.1l(contd.)
Input Physical Costs in JDsb
Units Amount per dunum per ton
per dunum
2. Fertilizer
application labor hrs. 10.0 .7
3. Irrigation labor hrs. -- -- --
4. Spraying and
dusting labor hrs. 8.0 .6
5. Weeding
and hoeing labor hrs. 12.0 3.0 .9
6. Installing
drip and mulch labor hrs. 16.4 4.1 1.2
7. Harvesting labor hrs. 114.8 28.7 8.4
Total labor 178.4 44.6 13.1
Total labor
and materials 160.9 47.0
Source: Stetieh and Musa (1980).
Notes: aLabor costs are estimated on the basis of permanent labor receiving JD50/month,
working 26 days/month for 8 hours/day. The hourly wage is thus = JD .25.
bCosts do not include rent and tax.
cWater costs are negligible.
dCosts per ton = (costs per dunum/yield); yield = 3.4 tons/dunum.
eCosts of drip system are taken from Appendix 3.4.
labor hrs. = labor hours
Amon. = Amonium
Table 3.12
Input Coefficients of Cucumber Production Using Plastic Tunnels
with Surface and Drip Irrigation in the Jordan Valley, in Physical and Monetary Terms
(Monetary Costs are in JDs at Current Prices)
Input Drip Sur face b
Physical Amount Costs in JDsu Amount Costs in JDs
units per per per ton per per per ton
dunum dunum dunum dunum
Materials
1. Ploughing and
furrowing n.a. 2.5 1.1 n.a. 2.6 1.5
2. Seeds and
seedlings n.a. 9.8 4.5 n.a. 8.8 5.2
3. Chemical
fertilizers
Superphosphate n.a. 3.3 1.5 n.a. 4.7 2.8
Amon. phosphate
or compound n.a. 1.8 .8 n.a. 10.6 6.2
4. Manure n.a. 15.5 7.1 n.a. 18.9 11.1
5. Waterc n.a. n.a. n.a.
6. Spraying and
dusting n.a. 35.4 16.1 n.a. 20.5 12.1
7. Drip and/or
tunnele n.a. 137.3 62.4 n.a. 58.8 34.6
205.6 93.5 127.3 74.9Total Materials
Table 3.12(contd.)
Input Drip Surface b
Physical Amount Costs in JDs Amount Costs in JDs
units per per per ton per per per ton
dunum dunum dunum dunum
Labor a
1. Replanting
and thinning
2. Fertilizer
application
3. Irrigation
4. Spraying
and dusting
5. Weeding
6. Ventilation
7. Installing
drip
8. Installing
tunnel and
removal
9. Harvesting
Total labor
Total labor
and materials
labor hrs. 7.2
labor hrs.
labor hrs.
labor
labor
labor
hrs.
hrs.
hrs.
10.4
18.0
7.2
20.0
labor hrs. 16.4
labor hrs. 16.8
labor hrs. 76.4
172.4
170.5 100.4
1.8
2.6
4.5
1.8
5.0
4.1
4.2
19.1
43.1
.8
1.2
2.1
.8
2.3
1.9
1.9
8.7
19.6
8.0
14.0
21.6
12.0
16.0
15.6
20.8
64.8
172.8
2.0
3.5
5.4
3.0
4.0
3.9
5.2
16.2
43.2
1.2
2.1
3.2
1.8
2.4
2.3
3.1
4.5
25.4
248.7 113.1
Table 3.12(contd.)
Source: Stetieh and Musa (1980).
Notes: aLabor costs are estimated on the basis of permanent labor receiving JD50/month,
bworking 26 days/month for 8 hours/day. The hourly wage is thus = JD.25.Costs do not include rent and tax.cWater costs are negligible.
dCosts/ton = costs per dunum/yields; yields for drip = 2.2 tons/dunum, and for
surface = 1.7 tons/dunum.
eCosts of drip system and/or tunnels are taken from Appendix 3.4.
labor hrs. = labor hours
Amon. = Amonium
Table 3.13
Input Coefficients of Cucumber Production Using Plastic Houses
with Surface and Drip Irrigation in the Jordan Valley, in Physical and Monetary Terms,
1978-1979
(Monetary Costs are in JDs at Current Prices)
Input Drip Surface
Physical Amount Costs in JDs Amount Costs in JDs
units per per per ton per per per ton
dunum dunum dunum dunum
Mater ials
1. Ploughing and
furrowing n.a. 5.0 .6 n.a. 4.5 .8
2. Seeds and
seedlings n.a. 17.5 2.1 n.a. 17.0 2.8
3. Chemical
fertilizers
Superphosphate n.a. 3.1 .4 n.a. 1.5 .3
Amon. phosphate
or compound n.a. 14.9 1.8 n.a. 17.0 2.8
4. Manure n.a. 46.5 5.5 n.a. 50.0 8.3
5. Waterc n.a. -- -- n.a. 5.0 .8
6. Spraying and
dusting n.a. 100.7 11.8 n.a. 65.5 10.9
7. Houses and/or
drip n.a. 498.5 58.7 n.a. 420.0 70.0
Total Materials 686.2 80.7 -- 576.5 96.1
Table 3.13(contd.)
Input Drip Surface
Physical Amount Costs in JDs' Amount Costs in JDsl
units per per per ton per per per ton
dunum dunum dunum dunum
Labora
1. Sowing
and thinning
2. Fertilizer
application
3. Irrigation
4. Spraying
and dusting
5. Pruning and
trellising
6. Weeding
and hoeing
7. Ventilation
8. Installing
drip and house
9. Removal of
house
9. Harvesting
labor hrs. 18.0
labor hrs.
labor hrs.
1.2
labor hrs. 113.2
labor hrs. 109.2
labor hrs.
labor hrs.
labor hrs.
labor hrs.
labor hrs.
Total labor
Total labor
and materials
10.0
18.0
21.2
296.8
587.6
4.5
3.0
28.3
27.3
2.5
4.5
5.3
74.2
149.6
.5
.4
3.3
3.2
.3
.6
8.7
17.6
24.0
12.0
52.0
88.0
142.4
56.8
25.6
211.2
612.8
6.1
3.0
13.0
22.0
35.6
14.2
6.4
52.8
138.0
1.0
.5
2.2
3.7
5.9
2.4
1.1
8.8
23.0
714.5 119.1835.8 98.3
Table 3.13(contd.)
Source: Stetieh and Musa (1980).
Notes: aLabor costs are estimated on the basis of permanent labor receiving JD50/month,
bworking 26 days/month for 8 hours/day. The hourly wage is thus = JD.25.Costs do not include rent and tax.
cWater costs are negligible for drip irrigation.
dCosts/ton = costs per dunum/yields; yields for drip = 8.5 tons/dunum, and for
surface = 6 tons/dunum.
eCosts of houses and/or drip are taken from Appendix 3.4.
labor hrs. = labor hours
Amon. = Amonium
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In particular, the impact of the new technologies are
important for the use of two local resources, water and
land. A discussion of the implications for other materials
is given in Chapter 4. Drip irrigation in the Ghor is
reported to reduce water consumption by 40 to 50 per cent
per dunum of the volume consumed under traditional
practices10 (Ministry of Agriculture, 1982:21). It does so
by minimizing water losses due to evaporation and
percolation, because the furrows are covered by mulch, and
due to runoff because water is transported through pipes
rather than furrows (Shoji, 1977:65). When plastic covers
are used without drip irrigation, they probably raise water
consumption because the higher temperatures inside them
augment evaporation. No estimates, to our knowledge, have
been made of water intake under plastic covers. If
efficiency of water use is measured per unit of output, its
value multiplies under drip irrigation as well as under
plastic covers, thanks to their superior productivities.
These efficiency ranks are shown in Table 3.14.
The fact that water savings brought about by drip
irrigation is not felt in overall material expenditures
stems from the extremely low price of irrigation water,
which may not reflect its relative scarcity. Efficiency of
agricultural water consumption in an arid country like
Jordan is of paramount importance in technological-choice
decisions.
Table 3.14
Summary of Resource Use bj the Various Technologies in the Jordan Valley, 1978-1979
Technology Labor Material Water Land
Costs in JDs ~ Costs in JDs efficiency efficiency
per per ton per per ton rank' rank'
dunum dunum
Traditionalb,c 32.3 21.5 28.0 18.7 4 6
Drip irrigationb 44.6 13.1 116.3 34.2 1 5
Tunnels and
surface
irrigation 43.2 25.4 27.3 74.9 5 4
Tunnels and
drip
irrigation 43.1 19.6 205.6 93.6 2 3
Houses and
surface
irrigation 149.6 17.6 576.5 96.1 6 2
Houses and
drip
irrigation 138.0 23.0 686.2 80.7 3 1
Source: Tables 3.7 and 3.11, 3.12 and 3.13, and text.
Notes: aThe ranking of water and land efficiency is from highest to lowest: 1 is highest
befficiency and 6 is lowest.Traditional and drip technologies are for tomatoes, the rest are for cucumbers.
cThe costs for traditional agriculture are for 1976-1977.
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Drip irrigation and plastic covers surpass traditional
agriculture in land efficiency, measured by relative yields.
Tomato yields under drip irrigation are at least 3 times as
high as those of traditional agriculture, as shown in Table
3.15. For cucumbers under plastic covers, the ratio ranges
from 2 to 9 times. Like water efficiency, land efficiency in
Jordan, where cultivable land does not exceed 6 per cent of
the country's total area, is an important criterion in the
selection of agricultural technology.
A relevant feature of material inputs is their
divisibility. It is often argued in Green Revolution
literature that the more divisible the technology, the more
likely that farmers will adopt at least parts of the
"technological package" (Gotsch, 1974; Griffin, 1974). The
degree of material divisibility is determined by two
characteristics of the technology. First, the extent to
which materials can be used independent of each other and,
second, the existence of cost variation with land area
(i.e., whether economies of scale obtain).
The combination of plastic covers and drip irrigation is
not necessary, and they are adopted, as we have seen,
separately. Drip irrigation and plastic covers are thus
completely divisible from each other. But this is not the
case for the rest of the material inputs. The costs of the
drip irrigation system or plastic covers constitutes the
bulk of total material costs; considering the risks
involved, it is therefore unlikely that the farmer who
Table 3.15
Computation of Net Returns from Production of Cucumbers and Tomatoes
Using Different Technologies in the East Jordan Valley, 1977-19780
Item Cucumbers Tomatoes
Tradi- Plastic Plastic Tradi- Plastic Open Field
tional houses tunnels tional houses and drip
and drip and and drip
surface
Yield (tons/dunum)
Average price
(JD/ton)
Gross revenue
(JD/ton)
Production cost
(JD/ton)
Marketing costs
(JD/ton)
Total var. cost
(JD/ton)
Total var. cost
(JD/dun)
Net revenue
(JD/ton)
Net revenue
(JD/dun)
Investment
(JD/dun)
Payback period
(years)
9.0
120.0
103.0
61.3
25.1
86.4
74.3
33.6
28.7
2.0
205.0 230.0
1,845.0 460.0
49.6
31.2
99.1
33.0
80.8 132.1
727.2 264.1
124.2 97.9
1,117.8 195.9
1,998.0
1.5
100.0
152.0
45.8
23.0
68.8
104.6
31.2
47.4
86.7
10.0
150.0 120.0
1,500.0 540.0
46.7
23.8
70.5
38.6
24.5
63.1
704.3 284.2
79.5 56.9
795.7 255.8
1,998.0 280.0
2.5 1.1
4.5
1.8 .4
Table 3.15 (contd.)
Source: Cited in Dajani, et al. (1980) from an unpublished study by A. Stetieh and M.
Abbas.
Note: a Data pertain to the Middle segment of the Jordan Valley.
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adopts these technologies will forego, though he
theoretically could, the application of fertilizers, or
pesticides, or the double-ploughing of the field. A farmer's
decision to adopt drip-irrigation and/or plastic-cover
technologies hinges on his capacity to invest in this basic
equipment rather than on the attendant costs of other
materials. Practically, then, the new technologies are not
divisible from other materials applied to plants and soil.
As for economies of scale, it is possible that they
exist for plastic houses. Farmers who purchase plastic
houses in bulk may obtain them at discount prices. Moreover,
shipment and handling may cost less per unit for large than
for small quantities. We have not obtained this information.
We can, however, offer a rough estimate of economies of
scale for drip irrigation. Some parts of the drip system,
such as plastic mulch, can be divided at will according to
land area. The system as a whole, however, reaches its
maximum efficiency on farms of 50 dunums because the control
station can serve that large an area. It can be shown 11
that expenditures on drip-irrigation equipment for a 20-
dunum farm can exceed those on a 50-dunum farm by about 40
per cent. The economies of scale inherent in drip irrigation
are recognized in the new land reform laws, which stipulate
a minimum of 40 dunums for land units (Chapter 2). This
aspect of drip irrigation gives the technology a bias
against small farmers.
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The new technologies all utilize more labor/dunum than
traditional practices. Yet, in contrast to it, they are all
capital-intensive. Their capital-labor ratios range from
2.6, the lowest, for drip irrigation, to 4.6, the highest,
for plastic houses with drip irrigation. The greater demand
for labor, coupled with the inflow of foreign workers,
altered several features of the employment structure, which
have been delineated in Chapter 2. The changes may be
briefly restated as follows: (1) the wage-to-family-labor
ratio grew at a 4 per cent annual rate between 1975 and
1978; (2) the increase in wage labor came from two sources,
migrant workers and women; (3) women's and foreign workers'
pay rates have been made equal, but are less than local male
workers' pay rates; and (4) paid employment grew by 4 per
cent between 1975 and 1978.
The relative use of resources by the various
technologies per unit of land area and per unit of output
was summarized earlier in Table 3.14.
Evaluating the impact of agricultural modernization on
yields and attendant returns is essential for two reas-ons.
First, the decision of a farmer who produces for the market
to adopt a particular technology rests ultimately on the
extent to which he expects such a technology to raise his
output and profit. Second, because the diffusion of
technology is likely to be uneven in an agrarian setting
characterized by unequal control of resources and power
among its members, the technology itself becomes an added
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source of inequality. To illustrate how the new technologies
affected yields and returns in the Valley, two crops are
selected, tomatoes and cucumbers. The choice is dictated by
data availability and by the fact that the two crops occupy
the bulk of the area cultivated by drip irrigation and
plastic covers (Appendix 3.12). Two sets of data are
available for yields and returns (Table 3.15 and Appendix
3.5). Table 3.15 gives the results for 1977-78, and Appendix
3.5 for 1978-1979.
Some discrepancy exists between the two sets, and it is
difficult to judge which one is more accurate, partly
because the two studies were conducted by the same author.
The figures in both tables are, however, close enough to
each other, especially for yields, as orders of magnitude.
Discussion of yields as well as returns is based on Table
3.15. Because it contains figures for all the technologies
in a single year, it helps us avoid complications arising
from annual yield and price variations. The data show that
when tomatoes are produced by using drip irrigation, their
yield is triple that of production by the traditional
method. Moreover, the increase in tomato yields grown under
plastic covers with drip irrigation is 6.7 times that of
traditional agriculture. The rise in yields of cucumbers
under the new technologies parallels the rise in tomato
yields. Such growth figures are extraordinary, considering
the normally long periods required to effect even smaller
amounts of growth in agricultural productivity. They far
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exceed the growth of vegetable yields registered in the
Valley during the previous two decades, which witnessed the
supply of irrigation water and the use of fertilizers,
pesticides, and improved seed varieties. The yields of the
new technologies have not been reported to have experienced
any drop beyond the normal variations since their
introduction into the Ghor. There is some evidence that they
may actually not have realized their full potential. 12
The technical causes behind the greater yields of the
new technologies are many. Drip irrigation and plastic
mulch, for example, are said to (1) provide plants with
uniform amounts of irrigation water throughout the growth
period; (2) eliminate weeds and the necessity for weeding
which when done manually, as is the practice in traditional
agriculture, tends to sever plants' roots; (3) protect plant
roots from frost; (4) regulate fertilizer application by
making possible the dissolution of these chemicals in the
water stream; (5) enable farmers to double plant intensity
(number of plants per unit area; and (6) free labor time for
tending plants in other ways (al-Battikhi, 1977).
It is important at this point to distinguish between
gains in yields which are the product of the use of new
materials and those brought about by improvement in
cultivation techniques. To illustrate, the elimination of
weeds and protection against frost cannot be achieved
without plastic mulch. But increasing plant intensity,
although it happened concurrently with drip irrigation use,
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may be possible in traditional agriculture, as suggested by
experiments conducted by the Ministry of Agriculture in
Jordan (League of Arab States, 1974:117). The Ministry also
claims that present traditional agricultural productivity
could be doubled or even trebled by more efficient
cultivation practices (Aresvik, 1976:152-53; see also
Chapter 4). It cannot be expected, still, that yields of
traditional agriculture will match those of the new
technologies. But if the claims made by the Ministry of
Agriculture are true, it should be possible to raise overall
production substantially in the Ghor through improvement of
cultivation techniques in traditional agriculture rather
than through investing in modern technologies by some
farmers!
The net return or revenue actually received by a farmer,
is, when measured per unit of land area, a function of
yield, price, and production and marketing costs. 1 3 Yields
and costs of production as well as marketing costs have been
discussed. Only disparities in marketing costs and prices
are addressed here.
Marketing costs do not seem to exhibit a significant
divergence among the different technologies, although they
are slightly lower for traditional agriculture (Table 3.15).
But considering that drip irrigation and plastic covers have
been adopted, at least up to 1977-78, by big landowners, the
figures in the table may underestimate the relative costs
for traditional agriculture for reasons examined in Chapter
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2. It is difficult to ascertain the truth of this claim
because the social background of the surveyed farmers is not
known. Be that as it may, the gap in marketing costs between
the new technologies and traditional agriculture is small
compared to that of yields, prices, and production costs. So
errors introduced by marketing cost estimates should not
seriously prejudice magnitudes of net returns.
The price divergences shown in Table 3.15 favor the new
technologies. The average wholesale price for a ton of
tomatoes produced under plastic covers with drip irrigation
and with drip irrigation without covers were 1.5 and 1.2
times greater, respectively, than for a ton of tomatoes
produced by traditional agriculture. The gap in cucumber
prices is even wider. The price advantage of modern
technologies derives from two factors: the quality of crops
they produce and their harvest times. Drip irrigation and
plastic covers are said to produce better quality crops than
traditional agriculture (al-Battikhi, 1977). But studies
that go beyond this general propositon on the relationship
between crop quality and method of production, as well as
the effect that quality may have on price, have not been
made. They will remain difficult to conduct because produce
is not systematically graded in the Valley. The influence of
technology-related quality on price differentials cannot,
therefore, be specifically spelled out. The second factor
responsible for price uneveness, and for which some
estimates exist, is harvest time. Average wholesale prices
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over the twelve months of the year in the two main cities in
the country, Amman and Zarqa, are given for 1976 and 1977 in
Table 3.16. They are highest during the winter months, when
the seasonal comparative advantage of the Ghor can be
observed. While the region's farmers as a group benefit from
it, those who use drip irrigation and plastic covers stand
to profit most. Cucumber prices reach their peak in January,
and they are harvested during this month only when grown
under plastic covers or in the southernmost segment of the
Ghor. Tomato prices exhibit parallel tendencies.
Net returns per dunum of tomatoes grown under plastic
houses with drip irrigation were about 17 times greater than
net returns for tomatoes produced by traditional methods.
The comparable ratio for tomatoes grown under drip
irrigation without plastic covers is 5.4. Returns from
cucumbers show even wider divergence. Moreover, the internal
rates of return of capital investment for all the new
technologies exceeded 100 per cent (Appendix 3.5), an
extraordinary figure by any investment standards. The
payback period was short, ranging from half a year to two
and a half years. These highly favorable investment features
of drip irrigation and plastic covers go a considerable way
in explaining their rapid diffusion and attractiveness to
big landowners and urban investors (see below). A final
aspect of net returns is that plastic houses with drip
irrigation made cucumbers the most profitable vegetable
crop, a position traditionally held by tomatoes, so that
Table 3.16
Average Wholesale Prices of Tomatoes and Cucumbers
in the Central Markets of Amman, Irbid, and Zarga, 1976 and 1977
(Units: JDs/ton at current prices)
Crop 1976 1977
Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug.
Tomatoes 57 89 111 132 219 124 117 61 80 76 65
Cucumbers 94 143 217 355 269 272 180 165 153 100 132
Source: Cited in Stetieh, et al.(1978), from the Ministry of Agriculture, Amman Jordan.
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cucumbers are now the major crop produced under plastic
houses(Appendix 3.12).
Yields as well as returns are normally not stable, for
traditional as well as for modern agriculture. A farmer's
decision on what, and how, to produce thus entails an
element of risk taking. The question of risk has been
perenially raised and disputed in agrarian studies. The
dispute centers on whether or not, and to what extent, does
the risk factor inhibit the adoption of new technologies
(Griffin, 1974; Mellor, 1969; Roumasset, 1976; Scott, 1976).
Conclusions drawn by the various authors are grounded,
implicitly or explicitly, in their assessment of two
variables. First, the magnitude of risk associated with new
0
technolgy: whether or not and by how much it exceeds the
risk level already in existence. Second, the capacity of the
farmer to cope with the consequences of risk, which is
determined by his position in the social structure and by
the broader socio-ecoomic context. Both Mellor and Scott,
among others, argue that risk aversion is indeed an
inhibiting factor in the diffusion of modern technologies,
particularly in subsistence agriculture. Inhibition, in
Scott's view, derives from the unreliability of yields,
which for subsistence peasants entails either starvation or
rebellion to stave off starvation. Roumasset and Griffin, on
the other hand, do not find risk as presenting an obstacle
to innovation. The former, in a study of rice production in
the Philippines, concludes that for nitrogen fertilizers,
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"the expected goal of profit maximization and safety are not
in conflict..." (Roumasset, 1976:216). He accordingly states
that risk does not stand in the way of technological
adoption, especially if input recommendations take into
account the particular conditions of the group of farmers
(Ibid.). In a similar vein, Griffin, after arguing that the
peasants' social milieu offers them a margin within which
they can absorb risk consequences, concludes:
First, difference in risk aversion should not result in
one type of farmer being markedly more prone to innovate
than another. High risk will deter investment and
innovation in general, but it will not deter one group
more than another. Second, if given the same incentive,
all farmers are more or less equally eager to innovate,
differences in attitude toward risk cannot account for
increasing inequality in rural areas. If many peasants
fail to benefit from the process of technical change,
one should seek for the cause not in their attitudes,
but in their access to resources. (1974:66)
The foregoing claims and counterclaims on the risk
factor in peasant agriculture, while they provide some
valuable insights, also point out the complexities of
agricultural risk assessment. An inclusive and plausible
quantification of risk in Third World agriculture is
presently not feasible. Methodologically, the analyst faces
immense technical difficulties as is apparent from
Roumasset's analysis, which was conducted for a single input
and a set of extremely simplified assumptions. The data
required for such an enterprise are of an extremely
sophisticated nature and are probably unattainable in the
Third World context. In the first place, relationships
between crop yields and natural conditions as well as
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controlled inputs, in addition to deviations from these on
the farm, must be known (Roumasset, 1976:118-142). Besides,
because the farmer himself makes the decisions on adoption,
his perception of risk is of paramount importance: what does
he regard as an acceptable level of risk? What is the
increment of risk he is willing to assume for what increment
of expected profits? How does he estimate the risk
associated with technologies with which he has little
experience? Scott (1976:17,fnl3), who poses such questions,
states that each of them may be answered quantitatively only
for specific categories of peasants whose situation is
known. Information of this nature has yet to be collected in
the Valley's agriculture. Only qualitative statements on
various aspects of the risk factor can therefore be made.
The magnitude of risk is a function of both yield and
price fluctuations. Yields themselves are dependent on a
host of variables--weather inputs, plant diseases, and
management. Unfavorable weather conditions, such as low
rainfall or frost, have constituted a source of uncertainty
with respect to productivity of agriculture. The poor pre-
Canal harvest of 1959-60 was caused by low rainfall.
Irrigation works have minimized risk stemming from the
irregularity of rainfall, although they have not completely
eliminated it. Water supply can still be threatened in years
when shortage of rain water is acute, or when shortage
occurs over several consecutive years. Use of drip
irrigation should appreciably reduce this type of risk
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because it is more water efficient than other methods of
cultivation. Plastic houses and tunnels, on the other hand,
need more water than traditional agriculture to compensate
for the higher rates of water evaporation engendered by the
higher temperatures. And, unlike open-field cultivation,
they do not take advantage of rain water. Risk levels
attendant on lower volumes of rainfall are hence higher
under plastic covers than under open-field farming, and are
greatly reduced by the utilization of drip irrigatipn.
Frost, too, has presented a constant threat to crops in
traditional agriculture and, in some years, has damaged half
of them (Arevisk, 1974:164). Housing the plants in plastic
covers practically eliminates the possibility of their being
frostbitten as houses maintain temperatures that are 4c.
higher than the ambient (Ministry of Agriculture, 1982:52).
Even plastic mulch, customarily used with drip irrigation,
has proven effective against frost (al-Daqqaq, 1977). Risk
engendered by the irregularity of weather conditions can be
estimated with a reasonable degree of confidence. There are
weather stations in the area that monitor temperature and
rainfall. What is needed is the accumulation of time-series
figures on yields, under different methods of cultivation,
and correlating them with rainfall.
Yields can also be adversely affected by plant disease.
The possibility of plant disease is higher under plastic
covers than in open-field farming. Covers generate an
atmosphere of humidity and heat favorable to the growth of a
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plethora of fungi, seed worms, and cut worms. Chemical
sprays are consequently applied more intensively in plastic-
covers agriculture than in open-field farming (Tables 3.7
and 3.11 through 3.13). We are thus left with the paradox
that, when the "stakes" are higher, risk aversion encourages
instead of discourages utilization of additional inputs.
Risk that derives from weather and plant disease is
hence technology dependent. Traditional agriculture, while
more vulnerable to weather, is less prone to plant disease
than plastic-covers farming. It may be that drip-irrigation
with open-field farming offers the best combination of
weather and plant disease resistance. Overall, no serious
drop in productivity has been reported under plastic covers
or drip irrigation. On the contrary, yields, under these
methods as well as under traditional technologies, have not
yet achieved their potential.
The second source of risk obtains in the marketing
sphere, where crop prices are volatile. The question of
prices, especially as it relates to the export market, is
detailed in Chapter 4. Only a brief restatement of the major
points is offered here. The wholesale price index for
vegetables increased at a greater annual average rate than
for all goods. Yet it exhibited serious irregularity, as can
be seen in Table 4.3. It rose, for instance, by 35.7 per
cent in 1978 but fell by -15.7 per cent in the following
year. The price volatility arises principally from the gap
between supply and demand. Domestic demand is essentially
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stable; and its growth is commensurate with the combination
of income and population growth, which do not vacillate
appreciably from one year to the next. It is the export
market, centered in the countries of the Arab East, that has
recently become volatile. This market, which has provided
the main incentive for technological change and the
attendant growth, now poses a major threat to the process.
The causes of the export market instability are various:
political shifts in the region, attempts by importing states
to raise their own vegetable crops, the emergence of
effective competition from Turkish produce, and the lack of
quality control over the Valley's export crops. Estimation
of this kind of risk with so many unpredictable elements is
probably not possible.
Risk is not only technology and market related, but also
farmer related. Its magnitude and the capacity to bear its
consequences cannot be expected to be uniform across the
social structure. They depend on the operator's relationship
to land, assets, access to credit, and occupational
mobility. The relative level of risk and capability to bear
its consequences are examined for the three groups of farm
operators who make up the bulk of operators: owner-
operators, sharecroppers, and commuters. Cash renters form a
small minority of farm operators and are not considered
here.
Owner-operators do not share risk; they solely bear the
cost. They often own small and medium-sized parcels and
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therefore do not benefit from economies of scale.
Furthermore, because owner-operators are mostly illiterate,
they are likely to be at a disadvantage in managing the
modern technologies. All this does not, however, preclude
their adoption of new technologies. First, while owner-
operators individually run the risk of loss, they are the
sole recipients of benefits, which gives them the incentive
to "gamble." Second, because they utilize family labor,
their cash payments are largely limited to material inputs.
If we consider the opportunity cost of family labor,
however, this advantage is lost, particularly for male
laborers who may find alternative employment. Third, the
cost of living in the Ghor is less than in the urban
centers. And fourth, these farmers are likely to come from
extended families and can resort to borrowing from relatives
if they suffer financial losses. Wholesalers and commission
agents who buy or auction their produce may also provide
them with credit. Indebtedness might, of course, bring them
under the control of these creditors. Still, they have the
option of "exit"; they could rent their land and seek other
types of employment. In other words, although owner-
operators may incur relatively high risk, they, being
nonsubsistence peasants, do not face the starvation that
Scott takes as the determinant of a peasant's attitude of
preferring "to minimize the probability of having a disaster
rather than maximize his average returns" (1976:18). Owner-
operators in the Valley shifted from cultivating subsistence
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cereals to cultivating vegetable crops. According to Scott,
subsistence peasants apply the same safety-first principle
to switching from subsistence to cash crops as they do to
new cultivaltion techniques. Moreover, the universal spread
of modern inputs, such as chemical fertilizers and
pesticides, indicated earlier in theis chapter, suggests
that owner-operators have adopted these inputs.
Sharecroppers, unlike owner-operators, share the risk
with the landowners. They, in addition, take advantage of
economies of scale since, typically, landlords, who
sharecrop their farm, lease it to a number of tenants. Like
owner-operators, they utilize family labor and reside in the
Valley. Hence risk is probably lower among sharecroppers
than among owner-operators. And if they suffer financial
losses, they may receive credit from the landlords or
commission agents. Chronic indebtedness and dependence on
these creditors may ensue, of course. But they, too, may
exit from farming. The relatively lower level of risk among
sharecroppers helps explain why they do not represent an
obstacle to technological change in the Valley. As will be
shown shortly, the overwhelming majority of holdings
cultivated by drip irrigation are sharecropped.
Commuters commonly share risk with sharecroppers,
benefit from economies of scale, and have more access to
information about the technologies and farm management. They
also can diversify their crops, an asset not enjoyed by the
sharecroppers. The magnitude of risk might be the lowest
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among commuters. They, in addition, often have other sources
of income: they may run businesses or hold other jobs in the
cities. They also have access to formal credit sources.
Commuters, besides facing lower levels of risk than owner-
operators and sharecroppers, also cope better with financial
losses. They have been the principal group of adopters of
the new tecnologies.
To sum up, risk is a relative phenomenon, the level of
which varies among methods of production and groups of
farmers. It obtains in both production and exchange spheres.
In the production phase, weather conditions, plant disease,
management capabilities, and inputs are the variables that
determine the degree of risk. Modern technologies have not
been associated in the context of the Jordan Valley with any
marked overall fluctuations in yields. Risk in the
production sphere for these technologies can be said to be
minimal. The more serious risk obtains in the sphere of
marketing. The irregularities of the export market have
caused perennial price depressions. Finally, among farmer-
operators, commuters incur lower levels of risk than either
sharecroppers or owner-operators, and can cope better with
financial losses than do these two groups.
111.2.2 Diffusion
Diffusion refers here to the process of spread of new
agricultural technologies. The pace and extent of diffusion
and the distribution of agricultural technologies are
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determined by three variables: (1) farmers' access to
resources and knowledge, (2) tenurial arrangements, and (3)
characteristics of the technologies themselves (Cancian,
1977; Cheung, 1969; Freeman et al., 1982; Goss, 1976;
Gotsch, 1972; Griffin, 1974; Rogers and Shoemaker, 1971).
This is not to say that all these authors ascribe the same
importance to the three factors. Only in Gotsch and Griffin
are their effects on diffusion studied together. The rest
are more concerned with one dimension, such as Cancian who
is concerned with economic rank, Freeman et al. with social
power, and Cheung with tenure arrangements (see Chapter 1).
We analyze diffusion of drip irrigation and plastic covers
in light of the three factors.
The basic idea underlying drip irrigation can be traced
to experiments in Germany in the 1860s. Farmers laid clay
pipes with open points below the soil surface to combine
irrigation and drainage as the water table fell and rose
during the year (Shoji, 1977:62). But it was only in the
1960s, a hundred years later, that drip-irrigation systems,
in the form described above, were developed and manufactured
on a commercial scale (Ibid.:63). The technology was first
introduced into the Valley in 1975, a relatively fast
transfer rate if we consider that in the same year only
133,717 acres were drip irrigated world-wide (Ibid.:67).
Covered or protected agriculture is a much older idea
and practice than drip irrigation. Muijzenberg (1980:10)
traces it back to antiquity when "out of season grapes,"
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which were "raised in rooms with transparent material," were
to be found "at the tables of the rich". The first plastic
house in the Ghor was brought in by the Ministry of
Agriculture in 1968 for experimentation (Khouri, 1981:180).
Commercially, however, the first plastic house was put into
use in 1972 (Ibid.:181; Barham, 1982).
The progression of the adoption of drip irrigation and
plastic covers between 1975 and 1982 is illustrated in Table
3.17. The 1975-1976 season was chosen because it was the
season when drip irrigation was introduced;- plastic houses
were few. To calculate the rate of growth in the area
covered by the new technologies, the year 1978-1979, when
the rate began to smooth out, can be used as a benchmark.
The area under plastic houses multiplied by 4.7 times over
the four-year interval, which represents an annual growth
rate of 120 per cent. The area irrigated by the drip method
grew at a comparable rate of 100 to 120 per cent per annum
over the same time span. The use of plastic tunnels seems to
have stagnated and remained in 1981-1982 the same as it was
in 1978-1979, which is why we put less accent on them than
on either drip irrigation or plastic houses. The tunnels
have probably proved to be difficult to operate, since they
have to be continually removed in order to facilitate task
performance. Overall, the area cropped under the three
technologies amounted to about 50,000 to 60,000 dunums in
1981-1982, out of a total vegetable area of 124,225 dunums
(Department of Statistics: 1971-1981). Constraints on future
diffusion are identified later in the present chapter.
Table 3.17
Areas Under Drip Irrigation and Plastic Houses and Tunnels in the Jordan Valley,
1975-1981
(units in dunums)
Year Plastic Houses Plastic Tunnels Drip Irrigation
1. 1975-76 n.a. n.a. 400
2. 1976-77 n.a. n.a. 2,400
3. 1977-78 n.a. n.a. 8,400
4. 1978-79 741 6,015 10,283
5. 1979-80 1,548 6,814 n.a.
6. 1980-81 2,055 7,269 n.a.
7. 1981-82 3,473 6,291 40,000-50,000
Sources: Jordan Valley Farmers Association (JVFA) (1980), except row 4, Stetieh and Musa
(1980), and row 7, column (3), Attiyah (1982).
Notes: The JVFA listed figures from different sources, including itself; we selected the
lower figure in each case.
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Until at least 1978-1979, the season to which most of
the following discussion applies, the adopters of drip
irrigation appear to have been big landowners. The first ten
landlords to install the new system between 1975 and 1978
averaged 840 dunums each (Appendix 3.6; see also this
appendix for the story of the introduction of drip
irrigation into the Valley). As shown in Table 3.18, the
average area fell to 154 dunums in 1978-1979. It must be
pointed out, however, that the figures in pertain to
holdings, not ownerships, and may not reveal the actual
average area per adopter. Our interview with Attiyah (1982)
suggests that they were probably three times as much.
Furthermore, as shown in Table 3.19, diffusion of drip
irrigation has been widest in the southern and middle
sections of the Ghor, where concentration of landownership
is highest, and where the commuter stratum of farmers is
most widely represented. In subsequent years, middle farmers
have begun to adopt the new technologies, but the rate and
extent of the adoption have yet to be studied.1 5
The preceding figures leave no doubt that larger farmers
with access to land and capital were faster to adopt drip
irrigation than other groups; furthermore, there is no
evidence that the technology has proliferated among small
farmers. This is consistent with our earlier observation
that drip irrigation, with its high capital intensity and
economies of scale, is biased against small farmers.
Furthermore, our results do not lend support to Cancian's
Table 3.18
Average Area Under Different Technologies in the Jordan Valley, 1978-1979
Plastic Housesa Plastic Tunnelsb Drip Irrigation
(1) (2) (3)
Area (dunum) 741 6,015 10,283
No. of Holdings 92 114 67
Average Area
(dunum) 8 53 154
Source: Stetieh and Musa.
Notes: a Column (1) includes houses with surface and drip irrigation.
bColumn (2) includes tunnels with surface and drip irrigation.
Table 3.19
Geographic Distribution of Drip Irrigation and Plastic Covers Technologies
in the Jordan Valley, 1978-1979
Technology North Middle South Total Area
Area' % Area' % AreaU % (dunums)
(dunums) (dunums) (dunums)
1. Plastic Housesa 102 13.8 522 70.5 116 15.7 741
2. Plastic
Tunnelsb 22 .0 346 5.7 5,647 93.9 6,015
3. Drip
Irrigation 196 1.9 4,209 40.9 5,878 57.2 10,283
Source: Stetieh and Musa (1981).
Notes: aRow 1 includes houses with both drip and surface irrigation.bRow 2 includes tunnels with both drip and surface irrigation.
cAreas include both those of fruits and vegetables.
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hypothesis, discussed in Chapter 1, that in the early stages
of the introduction of a new technology, i.e., when
uncertainty is high, upper middle farmers are likely to be
less innovative than middle framers. Between 1975 and 1978,
no middle farmers in the Valley adopted drip irrigation. And
it is not clear from the information we have whether or not
upper middle peasants adopted the technology. Thus the most
that can be said in favor of Cancian's hypothesis is that
upper middle peasants are as innovative, or more aptly,
noninnovative as middle farmers.
Plastic houses were also first introduced into the
Valley by big landowners (Appendix 3.6). In the first few
years they had to be directly imported by the users
themselves, which, in addition to their phenomenal capital
costs, confined their accessibility to this particular
group. The area under plastic houses averaged 8.1 dunums on
each holding in 1978-1979, i.e., each holding had 16 houses
on the average. But because plastic-houses technology is
divisible, in the sense that a house can serve an area as
small as one-half dunum, it has attracted another group of
investors: professionals who reside in cities. Of plastic
house adopters in 1981-1982, 56 per cent were urban
dwellers, and 40 per cent were college educated, their ages
ranging between 30 and 49 years of age (Barham, 1984; Table
3.20 ). The divisibility feature works, moreover, to the
advantage of other farmer groups. Thus, in the North where
land-ownership concentration is milder than in the South,
Table 3.20
Characteristics of Owners of Plastic Houses in the Jordan Valley, 1981-1982
Attribute Percentage of Ownersa
Owner Operator 72
City Resident 56
Education:
(a) High School 10
(b) College 40
Source: Barham (1984).
Note: aThese results are based on a sample survey of 102 holdings, with a total of 2,173
houses, or an average of 21.3 houses each.
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the percentage of adopters of plastic houses climbed from
13.8 per cent in 1978-1979 to 25 per cent in 1981-82, as
shown in Table 3.19. But because drip irrigation is little
spread in the North, plastic houses are often surface
irrigated.
The second factor, besides access to finance and
information, often cited as influencing technological
innovation and change is sharecropping. The implications of
sharecropping for technological change in agriculture have
preoccupied agricultural political economy from Adam Smith
to the Green Revolution. More specifically, the question is
raised as to whether sharecropping constitutes an
economically inefficient system which impedes technological
innovation in agriculture. The prevalent theroretical view
has traditionally answered in the affirmative (Cheung, 1969;
Griffin, 1974). Cheung, in a comprehensive treatment of the
problem as it appeared in the writings of classical and
neoclassical economists, refutes the inefficiency model. His
own model hinges on the assumption of contract flexibility
on the respective shares of landowners and sharecroppers
under unrestrained private property rights (Cheung,
1969:19). He postulates that the landowner will adjust the
sharing terms in such a way as to make his rent equivalent
to his income from either hiring wage labor or from cash
rent, subject to the constraint of competition. 16 The
mathematical solution of Cheung's model is presented in
Appendix 3.7. On similar grounds, Mabro and Griffin
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(Griffin, 1974:82-91) refute a thesis put forward by Bhaduri
(1973) for sharecropping in India's West Bengal, which holds
that the system is indeed an impediment to technical
change. 17
In the Jordan Valley, sharecropped holdings made up 93
per cent and 91 per cent of holdings using drip irrigation
and plastic tunnels respectively in 1978-1979, as shown in
Table 3.21. Sharing terms are somewhat altered to
accommodate the imperatives of profit under the new
technology. In traditional agriculture, the prevailing form
of sharing is the fifty-fifty type (Chapter 2; Table 3.22).
The tenant provides labor in exchange for land and water,
pays half of the rest of the material inputs cost, and
receives half of the net returns. The fifty-fifty
arrangement largely holds under drip irrigation, except for
the shares in the drip system's expenses. In 89 per cent of
the cases surveyed (Table 3.22), the sharecropper paid JD20
per dunum, the equivalent of 7 per cent of initial capital
costs for the drip system (Table 3.15), or 25 per cent of
annual capital depreciation (Table 3.11). If the
sharecropper cultivates 10 dunums on the average, his
returns will amount to JD790, which is above the JD600
annual average wage rate. The sharecropper must, of course,
be willing to assume the risk of higher income over the more
secure, but lower, wage payment. The willingness to take the
risk may be buttressed by the better social status that
sharecropping has over wage labor. The flexibility of
Table 3.21
Area Distribution of Various Technologies by Type of Tenure in the Jordan Valley,
1978-1979
Technology Owner Operated~ Cash Rental Sharecropped
area % of area % of area % of
(dunum) total (dunum) total (dunum) total
area area area
1. Plastic Housesa 444 60 156 21 142 19
2. Plastic Tunnelsb 347 6 172 4 5,496 91
3. Drip Irrigation
(Vegetables) 589 7 -- -- 7,925 93
4. Drip Irrigation
(Fruits) 1274 72 -- -- 495 28
Source: Stetieh and Musa (1980).
Notes: a Row 1 includes houses with both surface and drip irrigation.
Row 2 includes tunnels with both surface and drip irrigation.
Percentages may not add due to rounding.
Table 3.22
Shares of Sharecroppers in Costs and Returns of Vegetable Production
by Traditional Agriculture and Drip Irrigation in the Jordan Valley, 1978-1979
Cultivation Sharecropper's Share (%)
Method Land and Labor Other Drip Returns
Water Inputs Systema
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Traditionalb 0 100 50 -- 50
Drip b
irrigation 0 100 50 pays 50
JD 20
Source: Stetieh and Musa (1980).
Notes: aJD 20 in column (4) is the equivalent of 7 per cent of initial capital costs or
25 per cent of capital depreciation.
bThese results apply to 89 per cent of the surveyed holdings, the remainder, 11 per
cent, have mixed sharing arrangements.
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altering contract terms is facilitated in the Valley by the
freewheeling sharecropping regime. The contracts are mostly
oral, and leases are short term, usually annual.
The adoption pattern and share contracts differ under
plastic houses cultivation. As shown in Table 3.12, owner
operation is the predominant form of tenure, covering 60 per
cent of the cases, followed by cash rent, 21 per cent, and
then sharecropping, 19 per cent. This is the reverse of the
drip-irrigation adoption pattern where sharecropped holdings
held sway. The excessive capital costs are prohibitive for
most sharecroppers. The potentially lucrative returns may,
moreover, lure landlords into opting not to share them with
tenants. Finally, the inflow of foreign labor has enabled
landlords to hire permanent labor at lesser costs than
hiring sharecroppers. The cash renters' situation is similar
to that of the owner-operator. The only difference is that
instead of owning the land, they require secure leases. The
leases need not, however, be long term because of the short
payback period of the plastic houses.
When plastic houses are shared with tenants, various
sharing terms are contracted, as illustrated in Tables 3.23
and 3.24. The overall tendency in these contracts is to
lower the sharecropper's contribution in inputs,
particularly in the houses themselves, and to proportionally
reduce their returns. Such a tendency is less marked in the
combination of plastic houses and drip irrigation. These are
often located in the southern and middle segments of the
Table 3.23
Shares of Sharecroppers in Costs and Returns of Vegetable Production
Using Plastic Houses with Drip Irrigation in the Jordan Valley, 1978-1979
Shares Type Labor Other Plastic Drip Returns % of Total
Inputs Houses System Cases
1 50 50 50 50 50 59.6
2 40 40 40 JD20 40 21.4
3 50 50 50 50 50 19.6
Total 100.0a
Source: Stetieh and Musa (1980).
Note: aPercentages do not add due to rounding.
Table 3.24
Shares of Sharecroppers in Costs and Returns of Vegetable Production
Using Plastic Houses and Surface Irrigation in the Jordan Valley, 1978-1979
Shares type Labor Other Plastic Returns % of Cases
Inputs houses
1 30 30 0 30 43.7
2 30 30 30 30 38.1
3a 100 30 0 30 6.6
Total 88.4b
Source: Stetieh and Musa(1980)
Notes: aIn shares type 3, the sharecropper contributes only 30 per cent of harvesting
labor time, and 100 per cent for the rest of the tasks.
bThe remainder of the cases, 11.6 per cent (column 5), have other types of
sharing arrangements which differ only slightly from the above.
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Valley, where drip irrigation is more widespread than in the
north. The sharecroppers in this instance are likely to
come, not from the traditional pool, but from amongst
professionals.
In conclusion, sharecropping has not impeded
technological innovation in Jordan Valley agriculture.
Landlords follow one of two courses in order not to let this
form of tenure stand in the way of profit making. One is
that they devise new sharing terms that take into account
the costs of the technology and the sharecroppers'
resources. Another is that they exclude the sharecroppers
altogether, as is prevalent in plastic-houses technology,
and hire permanent wage workers instead.
The impact of drip-irrigation and plastic-covers
diffusion on sharecropping has been implicitly made at
several points in the text. It may be briefly restated as
follows. In the dase of plastic houses, sharecroppers are
excluded for the most part from sharing in the technology.
When they are not excluded, their contribution to capital
costs is reduced. Those who are included are likely to come
from a new pool of sharecroppers, city professionals. Fikry
(quoted in Frankel, 1980:43) states that:
A new breed of sharecroppers and cash rent tenants are
already appearing in the Valley. They may not
necessarily form a new social class, but rather a new
professional class. They are the few agricultural
engineers who, though still working as government
bureaucrats behind desks in Amman, are now apparently
working the land themselves in their free time.
But because the area cultivated under plastic houses is
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limited (Table 3.17), and likely to remain so, the effect of
this technology on the sharecropping system as a whole
cannot be too serious.
In drip irrigation, on the other hand, sharecropped
holdings constitute the overwhelming majority of holdings
utilizing the technology. Sharecroppers have become more of
suppliers of labor and less of capital. This alteration has
a double-edged effect on their position. For one thing, they
receive higher incomes than if the fifty-fifty
sharecroppping form held across the board. But their
relative power vis-a-vis the landlords may be compromised:
Financing all investments and operating costs is the
main responsibility of the landowner, even in cases
where the sharecropper shares investment costs. This
strengthened the landowner's position in deciding what
crops to produce, and when and how to market them.
(Stetieh and Musa, 1980:14)
It would be mistaken, in our opinion, to ascribe these
changes to technology alone. The inflow of foreign labor has
been instrumental in weakening the position of the
sharecroppers. Indeed, it may be argued that without foreign
labor their position might have been strengthened. The new
technologies, though capital intensive, require more
absolute labor input than traditional agriculture. With the
limited pool of workers in the Valley, the wage rate would
have had to jump. In such a situation the shares of the
sharecropper would have risen accordingly. As it stands, the
greater demand for labor by the new technologies was offset
by the arrival of foreign labor, and the sharecropping
regime has changed in favor of the landlords.
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Further proliferation of drip irrigation and plastic
covers will be constrained by several factors. Small farmers
in particular are not likely to invest in the technologies,
their costs being as high as they are, under the present
credit system which is biased against them. Small holdings
constitute 20 to 30 per cent, if not more, of the total land
area, which is not an insignificant proportion. Because land
sales are legally banned, only the spread of cash rent or
government subsidies to small farmers may overcome this
constraint. The volatility of the export market and the
associated price fluctuations (Chapter 4) is another
constraint. Unless new markets are found or crops are more
diversified, both of which are difficult to accomplish, the
risk of financial loss will seriously impede further
expansion of the technologies. Most affected will be the
small and medium farmers whose capacity to sustain losses is
more limited than bigger landowners or other urban
investors. The third constraint is ecological. The northern
segment of the Valley has a colder winter climate than the
southern and middle segments, and is less suitable for
winter vegetables under open farming. It can be expected
that the rate of drip-irrigation diffusion will continue to
be lower in the North than in the other two segments. The
climatic constraint, on the other hand, is not as serious
for plastic houses. The area they may cover, however, is
likely to be limited because of other factors.
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The last type of impact to be considered relates to the
crucial issue of income distribution. In traditional
agriculture, income distribution is a function of land
distribution, relations of production, type of crops, and
the quality of land. The uneven diffusion of drip irrigation
and plastic covers has added a significant source of income
differentiation. Data for the many variables that would
enable us to map the distribution of agricultural income in
the Valley on a percentile basis are either completely
missing or incomplete, particularly on landownership. The
problems that afflict the existing information, referred to
throughout the text, acquire, in addition, a cumulative
character because of their simultaneous effect on the
distribution of income. We are therefore only able to
delineate the range of incomes of various social categories
and to point out the extent to which they have benefited
from the modern technologies. Although income distribution
is correlated with social structure as a proxy variable,
reference to incomes across social strata is made when
necessary.
Account is taken only of income on areas planted in
vegetables, the predominant crop and the central concern of
the dissertation. The exclusion of fruits and cereals is
likely to underestimate the level of inequality, for fruit
cultivation is capital intensive and may be presumed to be
primarily the domain of big farmers and commuters, and
incomes from cereals are often irregular and small compared
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with vegetables. Income distribution estimates are made for
1978-1979, for which other aspects of the technologies'
impact have been assessed.
The first aspect of agricultural production to be
considered here is labor. The only group for which cash
income is discussed is wage workers; family laborers'
incomes are subsumed under owner-operators' and
sharecroppers'. The comparative impact of drip irrigation
and plastic covers on labor's income can be measured by the
value of the increment according to the group relative to
the return to capital. Labor costs for a dunum of tomatoes
under drip irrigation exceeded those under traditional
agriculture by JD12.3 compared with JD168.4 for net
revenues. The share of labor thus amounted to only 3.8 per
cent of the rise in net returns. The similar share of labor
income from cultivation of cucumbers under plastic houses
was 8 per cent. The proportions would be much less where the
value of capital is added to net returns. The small value of
the increment means that wage workers gained relatively
little from the manifold rise of revenues.
As discussed in Chapter 2, wage laborers are not a
uniform stratum, and are differentiated along lines of
gender and origin (local and foreign). Female and foreign
workers are paid similar wages, which average JD50/month.
The majority of the approximately 3000 expatriate workers
are permanently employed and accordingly earn JD600
annually, on the average. Most of these laborers support
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their families in the country of origin. If the average
number of family members per worker is assumed to be five,
the annual per capita income would be JD120. The average per
capita income for Jordan in 1978 was JD253 (Department of
Statistics, 1978b). The per capita income of expatriate
workers is hence equal to 47 per cent of Jordan's average.
The total number of females employed in agriculture in
the area covered by the 1978 census was 4,938, which
included permanent, temporary, and occasional workers.
Converted to permanent employees equivalent, the number
decreases to only 2,180. The average annual wage for a
female laborer would then equal JD265. Most women who worked
in agriculture came from poor families and were single or
widowed (Dajani, 1980:153). They support, on the average
three children, so that the income per capita in these
households is JD88, well below the national average.
Jordanian male workers earn slightly higher incomes than
their female or foreign counterparts. The participation of
Jordanian male farm laborers who work for wage has dwindled
in recent years. Migration to cities or abroad and the
influx of foreign laborers are behind such a trend. Their
wages were between JD75 to JD90 per month, or approximately
JD1000 for an annual average (Dajani, 1980:125). Assuming
the number of household members to be 5.2, the average per
capita income would amount to JD192, or about three-quarters
of the national average.
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The average incomes of sharecroppers in 1977-78 are
summarized in Table 3.25. Sharecroppers in traditional
agriculture earn between JD120-200 per capita annually.
These are similar to foreign wage workers and are 50 to 80
per cent of the average income in Jordan. It is interesting
to note that the average income of sharecroppers cultivating
with drip irrigation is JD210, less than the national
average. Drip irrigation, which has the highest potential
for expansion and which most often includes sharecroppers,
fails thus to bring their incomes to a par with the rest of
the country. The incomes of sharecroppers on farms using
plastic houses with drip irrigation should be higher, but
because sharecroppers are largely excluded from this
technology their income levels are not significant for the
overall picture of income distribution.
The agricultural income of landlords varies with the
area of land they own, the tenure arrangement prevailing,
and the technology used for cultivation. A summary of these
are given in Tables 3.26 and 3.27 for the various
technologies and the corresponding prevalent form of tenure.
For example, drip irrigation is predominant on sharecropped
farms, so income figures are offered for this type of tenure
only. Small farmers earn about JD190 per capita annually,
less than the national average. Dajani (1980:126), however,
estimates that about 15 per cent of landowning farmers make
only about JD150 per capita annual income. If we assume
middle farmers' holdings to be between 20 and 40 dunums,
Table 3.25
Average Incomes of Sharecroppers in the Jordan Valley in 1977-1978
(JDs at current prices)
Type of agriculture Average area Income/dunuma Income/capitab
(dunum) (JD) (JD)
(1) (2) (3)
Traditional 15-25 40 120-200
Drip irrigation 7 150 210
Sources: Tables 3.15, 3.7, and 3.11.
Notes: aColumn (2) is obtained by adding the net returns from Table 3.15 to labor costs
and dividing by 2. Estimates are based on tomato production.
bColumn 3 = column (1) x column (2)/5, where 5 is the average number of family
members (see Appendix 2.1).
Table 3.26
Incomes of Owner-Operator Landlords in the Jordan Valley in 1977-1978
(JDs at current prices)
Type of agriculture Area Income/dunum Income/capitaa
(dunum) (JD) (JD)
(1) (2) (3)
Traditional agriculture
Small owner 20 47.4 189
Medium owner 40 47.4 379
Plastic houses 8 795.7 6,445
Sources: Area for plastic houses Table 3.8; column (2) Table 3.15.
Notes: aIncome/capita is obtained as in Table 3.25.bEstimates are based on tomato production.
Table 3.27
Average Incomes of Landowners on Sharecropped Farms the Jordan Valley, 1977-1978
(JDs at current prices)
Type of agriculture Average area Income/dunum Income/capitaa
(dunum) (JD) (JD)
(1) (2) (3)
Traditional agrriculture
Medium owners 40 40 320
Drip irrigation 154 150 4,605
Sources: Area for drip irrigation Table 3.8; column (2) similar to column (2) in
Table 3.25.
Notes: aIncome/capita is obtained as in Table 3.25.bEstimates are based on tomato production.
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their incomes would range from JD190 to JD380, an average of
JD285. This group of landowners is probably the largest
numerically. If this is so, then most landowners in the
valley earn incomes greater than the country's average. The
highest incomes were realized by landowners who farmed with
plastic houses, JD6,445 per capita, about 25 times the
national average. The earnings of those landowners using
drip irrigation who sharecropped their land averaged about
JD4,605 per capita, or 18 times the national average. Owners
of plastic houses and drip irrigation formed a minority of
landowners. It can be said, then, that in Jordan Valley
agriculture the uneven diffusion of technology has fostered
the wealth of a small group of landowners.
Summary
We have just analyzed the characteristics and local
effects of technologies constituting what we referred to as
the technological transformation of the Valley's
agriculture. These included the off-the-farm technology of
irrigation projects, and the on-the-farm technologies,
including fertilizers, pesticides, machinery, and most
significantly, drip irrigation and plastic covers.
Irrigation projects, whose centerpiece was the East Ghor
Canal, were found to have substantially expanded the
irrigated land area. They also radically altered the
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cropping regime into one dominated by vegetables instead of
cereals. By providing secure water, the irrigation works
moreover encouraged the use of fertilizers, pesticides, and
improved seed varieties. As a result, traditional
agriculture became part-traditional and part-modern. The
political objective of resettling Palestinian refugees,
which originally prompted the undertaking of the projects,
proved to be less than a success.
Traditional agriculture was all but completely
transformed by the introduction of drip irrigation and
plastic covers in the Valley. The two are separate kinds of
technology and were used separately or combined. Drip
irrigation, because it requires straight instead of zig-zag
furrows as in traditional agriculture, made possible the
mechanization of many farming operations, such as the
opening of the furrows themselves and irrigation, thereby
easing the considerable physical exertion by males these
tasks demanded. The sexual division of labor stayed
essentially intact. Drip irrigation changed, in addition,
the pattern of resource use. It increased the overall level
of material inputs and brought with it new materials, such
as plastic mulch and irrigation pipes and tubes. The
technology was found to be capital intensive, but to require
more absolute labor than traditional technology. It had
favorable effects on water savings and land-use intensity,
two important criteria in technological-choice decisions in
a country like Jordan where water and arable land are in
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short supply. Because of the changes it introduced into
cultivation practices, drip irrigation raised yields and
revenues, and lowered the risk of serious drop in yields
caused by climatic factors. The social impact of drip
irrigation was evaluated in association with the question of
diffusion. Empirical evidence suggestd that big farmers were
the first as well as the principal adopters of the
technology. And contrary to the traditional thesis and its
modern variations on the inefficiency of sharecropping, this
tenure arrangement did not constitute an obstacle to the
proliferation of the technology. All but a handful of
holdings adopting drip irrigation in 1978-1979 were actually
sharecropped. Rather than let tenure terms stand in the way
of their profit making, landowners bent them to raise their
revenues. Sharecroppers thus became more providers of labor
and less of capital, a shift that entailed the weakening of
their position. It was contended that landlords were enabled
to do so because of the influx of foreign workers.
Plastic houses had a more profound effect on agriculture
than drip irrigation. Their capital intensity, labor
employment, yields, and returns all surpass those of drip
irrigation. When they are not combined with drip irrigation,
their water consumption exceeds even that of traditional
agriculture. Their extraordinary profitability, short
payback periods on investment, and divisibility all rendered
plastic houses attractive to some urban professionals as
well as wealthy farmers. Plastic houses affected
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sharecropping differently from drip irrigation. The most
common type of land tenure associated with them was owner
operation followed by cash rent. Sharecroppers were excluded
for the most part from the technology. Finally, it was shown
by a rough mapping of income distribution that the biggest
beneficiaries of drip irrigation and plastic houses were big
landholders. The income increment that accrued to labor was
miniscule compared to that of capital. The average
agricultural income of the majority of laborers,
sharecroppers, and small landowners was less, sometimes
significantly, than the national average.
ENDNOTES
1. Stage II refers to the project that will utilize the
regulated flow of the Yarmouk River by building the Maqarin
Dam (Dajani, 1980:193).
2. The sale of nitrogenic fertilizers in Jordan, for
example, climbed from 1,675 metric tons in 1958 to 6,517
metric tons in 1966, and phosphatic fertilizers from 339
metric tons to 1,255 metric tons (Aresvik, 1976:93).
3. The survey included 102 project farmers and a "control
group" of 177 non-project farmers.
4. "Traditional" is not an entirely accurate term, since
modern inputs, such as chemical fertilizers and pesticides
are widely employed. We use it both for convenience and to
be consistent with other writing on the Valley.
5. The first manual by Stetieh, et al (1978) was prepared
for traditional agriculture. The authors followed up farm
operation for two consecutive years, 1975-1977. They asked
some farmers to keep a diary of tasks and costs all year
round. Others were paid frequent visits at 7 to 10 day
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intervals by extension agents. The study thus attempted to
overcome answer improvisation, characteristic of single-
visit surveys. Because of time constraints, their sample was
necessarily small; it included 43 farmers only, or less than
one per cent of the Ghor's farmers (Ibid.:ll-12).
The second study (Stetieh and Musa, 1980) was conducted
in the following year, 1978-1979, on farms using drip
irrigation and/or plastic houses and tunnels. It hence
enables us to assess the impact of these technologies on
resource use and other questions. The short time which
separates the two surveys renders them close to a controlled
experiment, because changes in variables other than
technology ought to have been minimal.
6. This is the time when the 1973 census by the Department
of Statistics was taken.
7. The problems encountered in the use of chemicals are
discussed in Chapter 4.
8. This is the value at constant prices. An annual inflation
rate of 15 per cent ia assumed (Mazar, 1979, in Chapter
Four). The same rate is assumed throughout this section.
9. The combination of heat and humidity render plastic
covers fertile grounds for the proliferation of plant
disease (Ministry of Agriculture, 1982).
10. In the experiments conducted by the Minis ry of
Agriculture, a dunum of omatoes needed 522 m of irrigation
water, compared to 900 m under surface irrigation.
11. This is obtained by assuming a) mulch, drippers and
submains are all divisible, b) main pipes and control
stations indivisible, and c) the purchase price of main and
submain pipes of JD 40.0 is divided equally between them.
Because the purchase price in Appendix 3.4 is computed from
the costs of a 50 dunum farm, the optimum size for the
control station, the purchase price for a 20 dunum farm is:
(1350 + 20) 50/20 + (80 + 25) = JD 492.5
Ratio of costs of 20 dunum farm/50 dunum farm:
492.5/280 = 1.39
12. Based on results from demonstration plots set up by
USAID in Jordan, the director of the project told Khouri
(1981:187) that by the use of drip irrigation, appropriate
seed varieties and a "full bed mulch" system, in addition to
improving other cultivation techniqes, it was possible to
increase tomato production by five times the present
average.
13. Net returns per unit area = yield per ton x price per
ton (gross return) - production and marketing costs per unit
area.
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14. The superior quality of crops produced by modern
technology is attributed to several reasons. First, water is
applied uniformly and frequently during the growing period.
Second, plant growth is not interrupted during winter
because of higher temperatures secured by plastic covering.
And third, damage to crops is less frequent especially when
plants are staked (al-Battikhi, 1977).
15. al-Battikhi (1982), a partner in a company selling drip
irrigation equipment, told us that among their clients in
1981 were two farmers who owned a single unit each, and four
others who owned between two and four units.
16. The constraint of competition means here that the
sharecropper will not be remunerated less than his market
wage were he to be a worker.
17. It is curious as to why they do not mention Cheung's
work in their treatment, which preceded theirs and which is
cited in another context in Griffin's book. See also Tamari
(1981) for a detailed discussion of Bhaduri's thesis and
Griffin and Mabro's refutation.
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CHAPTER 4
THE IMPACT OF THE TECHNOLOGICAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE
VALLEY AGRICULTURE ON JORDAN'S ECONOMIC DEPENDENCE
Jordan's is a heavily dependent economy. An important
criterion in assessing the technological transformation of
the Valley's agriculture, therefore, is the extent to, and
the manner in, which it affects the dependence of the
national economy. The premise here is that investment in
Ghor agriculture is sufficiently large as to have a
perceptible impact on this dependence. The present chapter
is devoted to this topic. It is organized as follows.
In section I we elaborate and modify a classification
outline proposed by M. Ougaard which enables us to measure
an economy's dependence. Because the elements of the outline
are central to the discussion throughout the chapter, a
brief mention of them is given presently. According to the
outline, dependence of a given economy can be measured by
the strength of its reproduction structure: how well its
various sectors are linked, and how capable the economy is
of producing its consumer, intermediate, and capital goods,
as well as of generating its own technology. Imports and
exports--their levels and commodity and geographic
concentrations--are but the external reflections of the
strength of the reproductive structure. Because only
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collective, rather than individual, self-reliance is
realistically feasible for small countries, trade with
regional partners is not considered a dependent
relationship, but a contribution to collective self-
reliance. Whatever dependence the country may incur from its
trade transactions with the region is second-order
dependence, deriving from the region's dependence. In
section II we assess the level and modes of Jordan's
economic dependence in the 1970s. This is done by assessing
the strength of the country's economic structure as stated
above. Two aspects of Jordan's foreign trade are noted: one
is the concentration of imports in center economies, a
dependent relationship; the other is the concentration of
exports in the Arab region, a contribution to the region's
collective self-reliance. Then, in section III, we spell
out, by the use of several economic indicators,
agriculture's vital position in the economy. Agricultural
policies that favor the Valley's agriculture and neglect the
rainfed sector, which comprises the majority of arable land
in the country, are also pointed out. These are relevant to
understanding the success and failure of Ghor agriculture in
reducing some aspects of dependence. Finally, the impact of
the agricultural transformation in the Ghor on Jordan's
economic dependence is detailed in section IV. We argue that
the introduction of drip irrigation and plastic covers has
exacerbated the import problem, contributed to regional food
self-reliance, produced minimum backward and forward
linkages, and had some technological spillover effects.
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Section I
A Classification Outline
Dependency writers at first visualized the world as
consisting of center and periphery. They saw the former as
synonomous with development and the latter with
underdevelopment. Soon it became apparent that the
periphery, with which the Dependency perspective was
concerned, was not a monolith. Distinctions had to be drawn
between a Brazilian and a Guatemalan economy. Accordingly,
some Dependency authors like Frank have begun to use the
concept of semi-periphery, borrowed from Immanuel
Wallerstein. But neither Frank nor Wallerstein offer
criteria according to which classifications can be made.
Most recently Ougaard has proposed a classification outline
which divides the periphery into a three-tier hierarchy
according to level of dependence (Ougaard, 1983).1 Many of
the ideas in Ougaard's outline have also been suggested,
albeit in a less formal fashion, by Senghaas (1977; 1981).
Ougaard's outline revises and modifies S. Amin's notion of
societal reproduction structures, i.e., the structures by
means of which a given society reproduces itself. He divides
them into physical and social structures. Our treatment here
is confined to the physical aspect.
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To begin with, Ougaard differentiates among three kinds
of goods required for societal reproduction: (1) consumer
goods (e.g., clothing), (2) means of production for consumer
goods (e.g., cotton), and (3) means of production for the
means of production (e.g., fertilizers). He then assigns
different weights, which he refers to as "levels of
reproduction-strategic importance," to each of the goods. He
ranks type (3) as having the highest weight, followed by
type (2) and then type (1). Implicit in this assumption is
that a country that produces the third category of goods
will find it easier to produce the other two.
In addition to the weight he assigns to the specific
type of good, he regards the weight itself to be conditioned
by the linkages engendered in the economy as a result of the
production of the good. For example, the assembly of
computer components destined entirely for export does not
bring the economy in question into a higher reproduction
level, for such production lacks intersectoral linkages.
What Ougaard is saying is that when significant
production exists at all levels, in which internal linkages
are stronger than their external counterparts, then the
economy can be said to have achieved a viable state of
"autocenteredness." Such an economy could participate in the
international division of labor on grounds of relative
equality. These requirements of autocenteredness are similar
to what Senghaas refers to as the "Economic Foundations of
Viable Economies" (Senghaas, 1981:280).
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As a corollary, Ougaard states that an economy's imports
reflect the level of the reproductive importance of its
production processes. An economy which possesses only
consumer goods industry, for example, is dependent on the
import of the means of production used to produce it.
Imports thus constitute a most salient measure of the lack
of an economy's self-centeredness. But since imports have to
be paid for, exports become a significant measure of
dependence as well.
Accordingly, Ougaard classifies peripheral countries
into a hierarchy of three types, P-1, P-2, and P-3. P-1 type
countries are integrated into the world economy through the
sphere of circulation, as importers of consumer goods. In
order to pay their import bill, they must export primary
materials and/or receive foreign aid. The dependence of P-1
economies is highest. P-2 type countries, on the other hand,
produce the bulk of their consumer goods, and they are said
to be at the beginning of an "intravert accumulation"
process. The least dependent of peripheral countries, P-3,
produce most of their consumer goods and the means to
produce them. It follows that a country that produces
significant proportions of the three classes of goods, with
strong linkages among various sectors, is no longer
peripheral.
As it stands, Ougaard's outline may be subject to
criticism on several grounds. It is possible, first, to
dispute his weighting preference if the interest is in
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planning a long-term development strategy: where must a
country begin, from the means of production of the means of
production to consumer goods, or vice versa? Second, an
economy may produce given portions of the two or three
classes of goods at the same time, in which case it becomes
difficult to place it unequivocally in a particular position
within the hierarchy. But this problem is inherent in any
typology and is insurmountable.
In order to make the outline more comprehensive and
compatible with accounting practices of national statistics
data, several modifications and clarifications are in order.
First, the division of goods in the manner Ougaard suggests,
if our interpretation of what they signify is correct, does
not correspond to the conventional division of goods into
consumer, intermediate, and capital goods employed in
national account statistics. Whereas consumer and
intermediate goods match his first two categories, capital
goods do not always correspond to the means of production
for the means of production. Fertilizers, which are normally
treated as intermediates in cotton production, are means of
production for means of production in his classification. In
other words, his third category includes both intermediates
and capital goods.
Second, the reproduction structure in contemporary
economies is not exhausted by the production of these goods.
A second feature, namely technology, must be included in the
structure. In the Dependency perspective, the centrality of
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technology was most clearly, if perhaps extremely,
enunciated by Dos Santos when he identified technological
dependence as the new, contemporary form of dependence (Dos
Santos, 1971: 228). Later on, Dependency authors have taken
it to be one element in the overall pattern of dependence.
This is the sense in which it is viewed here.
Technology must be treated independently of capital
goods, for although it was earlier assumed by some
economists, such as Kaldor, to be "embodied" in those goods,
it is recognized today that technology involves human skills
and knowledge, new products, etc. (e.g. Kindleberger, 1969;
Stewart, 1978). Furthermore, technological change itself is
no longer brought forth by the direct producers, but has
become the function of specialized institutions, at once
allied to the production process and science. The production
process may thus be transplanted to a country without the
technology, in which case it must turn to external sources
to ensure its reproduction. In the Arab context, Zahlan
points out "the disproportionately great ease with which
capital goods are acquired and the slowness and scale with
which educational, engineering firms and research
institutions required to support the activity emerge"
(1978:17).
An economy's reproduction structure may thus be modified
to consist of : (1) the production of (i) consumer goods,
(ii) intermediate goods, and (iii) capital goods; and (2)
technology.
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Third, the outline leaves open the spatial definition of
the economy. The wide array of requirements in modern
production processes, from raw materials to advanced
technology, economies of scale, and sufficiently large
markets render it unrealistic to expect that each individual
country, especially a small-sized country, can achieve self-
reliance. Collective, rather than individual, self-reliance
may hence be possible in the periphery. Analysis of an
economy's dependence must then discern whether it is being
integrated into a larger regional entity. If this is the
case, trade or other economic links with other states in the
region are to be looked upon as horizontally integrative or
counter-dependence activities. Still, during the transition
from dependence to collective self-reliance, states within
the region are likely to maintain substantial economic links
with the core. And it can be tentatively hypothesized that
the dependence of each state's economy will consist of two
components: one we term first-order dependence, and is
measured by the direct links with the center; and the other
is second-order dependence, deriving from, and measured by,
the region's dependence.
To sum up, Ougaard's outline, after being somewhat
modified, ranks the dependence of an economy according to:
(1) whether or not, and to what extent, the economy produces
consumer, intermediate, and captal goods, as well as
generates its own technology; (2) the level and composition
of its (i) imports which are but reflections of (1) and are
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the most salient feature of dependence, and (ii) exports,
whose earnings are needed to pay for imports; and (3) the
degree to which it (the economy) is internally articulated,
as measured by its forward and backward linkages.
Furthermore, imports and exports with regional trading
partners must be seen as integrative, counter-dependence
activities. Whatever dependence they may involve the country
in is second order, deriving from the region's dependence,
as opposed to its first order or direct dependence on the
center.
Section II
Jordan's Economy: An Overview of Dependence
The preceding outline is used to rank the dependence of
Jordan's economy as follows. First, we determine how much
the economy produces of its own requirements of consumer,
intermediate, and capital goods. This is conveniently done
by taking imports as a proxy variable and calculating their
share in the supply of these goods. And since Jordan has
virtually no capital goods industry, the categories of
capital and intermediate goods are collapsed into a single
category, called intermediates. Imports in Jordan are
financed by export earnings, remittances, and foreign aid
and grants. Although remittances and foreign aid and grants
are critical to the economy, they are hardly affected by the
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Ghor's agricultural transformation. The focus will therefore
be on exports, and only a brief reference is made to the
other links. The second aspect of the reproduction
structure, technology, does not lend itself handily, if at
all, to quantification, and a detailed treatment of it for
the national economy would take us beyond the intention of
the current work. It is therefore examined in the last
section on the accumulation of technology as it relates to
technological transformation in the Valley's agriculture.
Second, we estimate the backward and forward linkages
from the input-output tables provided by Dar al-Handasah
Consultants (1981). In order to apprecitae their magnitudes,
we compare them to their counterparts in some developed
economies.
Third, we consider Jordan to be a unit within a regional
economy, primarily Arab, with which Jordan has extensive
economic linkages, and secondarily Middle Eastern. This is
not the place to discuss whether or not the Arab region
possesses the necessary elements for collective self-
reliance. Arab, and increasingly non-Arab, economists have
made the case that it is possible to build a viable joint
Arab economy (e.g. Abdalla, 1983; Albioni, 1979; Ibrahimi,
1981; Guecioueur, 1983). The interfutures study of the
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
recently stated, referring to the Arab region, that "An
abundance and diversity of resources, together with cultural
homogeneity, open large possibilities for interregional
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cooperation which could be a basic determinant for the
region's future (Abdalla, 1983:54).
We begin our evaluation of Jordan's dependence with
imports. A first aspect of the significance of imports in a
country's economy is their relative volume. In Jordan, the
absolute value of imports has steadily risen. Over the ten-
year period, 1970 to 1980, for instance, the import bill for
goods and services has climbed ten-fold, or at an average
growth rate of 100 per cent per annum, as shown in Table
4.1. This phenomenal growth was the result of a burgeoning
national income during that decade as Jordan benefited
indirectly from oil revenues. It reflects, in addition, the
high inflation rate in the world economy, which affected
Jordan in two ways: as an importer of oil and of industrial
goods. Thus one estimate indicates that the country's terms
of trade fell by 15 per cent between 1970 and 1977 (World
Bank, 1983:28). In relative terms, the value of imports
averaged 100.4 per cent of the GDP over the years 1970-1981,
as can be seen in Table 4.2. This is an extraordinarily high
level of imports by any standards.
A second aspect in evaluating the role of imports in the
economy is to examine their shares in the supply of consumer
and intermediate goods. Our conclusions are based on data
taken from Jordan's 1979 input-output tables (Dar al-
Handasah Consultants, 1981). For convenience, the consumer
products are first collapsed into two categories,
agriculture and food processing, and manufactured goods.
Table 4.1
GDP, Imports, and Exports of Jordan, 1971-1980
(in millions of JDs)
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
Item
1. Imports 97 118 136 196 301 430 543 606 825 962
2. Exports 30 40 56 81 121 183 228 266 341 470
3. GDP (at
market
prices) 186 207 218 247 321 430 525 650 767 998
of Statistics (1981b).
Note: GDP = Gross Domestic Product
Sources: Rows (1) and (2) World Bank (1983), and row (3) Department
Table 4.2
Degrees of Reliance on Imports and Exports in Jordan
(Average 1970-1981)
Sector's share of GDP (%) Columns Ratio of GDP (%) Col.6/ Col.8/
Agricul- Mining Manufac- GDI 1+2+3+4 Importa- Exportsa Col.5 Col.5
ture turing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
9.8 4.3 13.4 35.7 63.2 100.4 43.3 1.6 .70
Source: World Bank (1983).
Notes: aThe import and export values include Non Factor Services (N.S.F.).
GDI = Gross Domestic Investment.
GDP = Gross Domestic Product.
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Then, the corresponding values of household and government
consumption and imports as well as their ratios are
computed. The results, shown in Table 4.3, indicate that the
ratios of imports to household consumption are: 49 per cent
for agriculture and food-processing commodities, over 100
per cent for manufactured goods and 78 per cent on the
average. These figures do not take into account government
imports. As indicated in Table 4.4, the government imports
91 per cent of its consumption requirements. If government
imports are included, the average share of imports in
consumer commodities for the national economy rises from 78
per cent to 80 per cent. Put differently, Jordan produces
only a small fraction, one-fifth, of its consumer goods.
Likewise, we can determine the significance of imports
in the provision of intermediate goods. The Dar al-Handasah
(1981) input-output tables give two separate matrices for
intermediate domestic and import flows, which greatly
facilitates our task. The procedure-and results are
illustrated in Table 4.5. In agriculture and manufacturing,
the two sectors of the economy where the greatest potential
for economic growth and differentiation lie, imports
constitute 70 per cent and 310 per cent of domestic inputs
by value, respectively. Put differently, imports make up 41
per cent of the total value of intermediate inputs in
agriculture and food processing, and 76 per cent in
manufacturing. Even in the infrastructural sectors, imports
comprise 42 per cent of total intermediates. Overall, we
Table 4.3
Ratios of Imports to Household Consumption
for Agricultural and Food and Manufactured Products in Jordan, 1979
(Values in thousands of JDs at current purchaser's prices)
Product Household Imports (Imports/Household)xlOO
Consumptiona
Agriculture and foodb 200,949 99,369 49
Manufacturedc 217,054 226,486 104
Total 418,003 325,855 78
Source: Dar al-Handasah Consultants (1981), main input/output table
Notes: alousehold consumption includes tourism.
bAgriculture and food include agriculture, grain mill products, bakery products,
confectionary and other processed food, and beverages (sectors 1,4, 5, 6, 7,
and 9).
cManufactured products include textiles, wearing apparel, leather and footwear,
wood and cork and furniture, paper, printing and publishing, industrial and other
chemicals, petroleum refinery, rubber and plastics, pottery and glass, cement,
lime and plaster, other non-metal mineral products, basic metal industries,
fabricated metal products, non-electrical machinery (sectors 11 through 25).
Table 4.4
Government Consumption and Imports of Agriculture and Food and Manufactured Products
in Jordan, 1979
(Values in thousands of JDs at current purchaser's prices)
Products Consumption Direct Importsa
Agriculture
and foodb 43,146 39,336
Manufacturedb 28,684 26,151
Total 71,830 65,487
Source: Dar al-Handasah (1981), main input/output table.
Notes: aValues are calculated by multiplying the ratio of direct government imports to its
total consumption, and assuming the ratio to be uniform for all sectors. This
ratio = 96,830/106,197 = .91.
bAgricultural and food and manufactured products include the same list as in
Table 4.3.
Table 4.5
Domestic and Imported Intermediate Inputs in Jordan, 1979
(Values in thousands of JDs at current purchasers' prices)
Sector Domestic Imports col.2/col.1 col.2/cols.l+2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Agriculture and
food processinga 68,148 48,430 .70 .41
Mining b 3,380 1,196 .35 .26
Manufacturing 34,439 106,848 3.10 .76
Infrastructurec 171,426 125,591 .73 .42
Totald 277,393 282,066 1.02 .50
Source: Dar al-Handasah Consultants (1981), Tables Al.3 and Al.4.
Notes: aAgriculture and food processing include items in Table 4.3, Note b, in addition
to prepared animal food and tobacco (sectors 8 and 10).
bManufacturing includes items in Table 4.3, note-c, in addition to electrical and
transport equipment and miscellaneous manufactured goods (sectors 26 and 27).
cInfrastructure includes electricity, water supply, construction, distribution,
transport and communications, finance and business services, health and
education, and other services (sectors 28 through 36).
dThe present table covers all the economic sectors of Jordan's economy.
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find that the provision of intermediates is split equally
between imports and domestic supply in 1979.
The high import bill is partly compensated for by
exports. The value of exports, like that of imports, has
steadily risen. In the last decade, exports grew 15.8 times,
which represents an average growth rate of 158 per cent per
annum, shown earlier in Table 4.1. But although the growth
rate of exports exceeded that of imports by 58 per cent, the
value of exports, even at their peak in 1980, amounted to
only half of the value of imports. As a ratio of GDP,
however, the export level is high, averaging between 30 and
47 per cent over the 1971-1980 ten year period.
Furthermore, the structure of exports reveals them to be
dominated by primary commodities. In 1976, for example, the
share of primary products in total exports was 79 per cent,
shown in Table 4.6. Manufactured products, which are chiefly
food processing and light manufactured goods, contributed
only 21 per cent to the total sum of exports. As has already
been mentioned, Jordan's reliance on exporting raw, nonoil
materials resulted in the deterioration of its terms of
trade.
So far we have considered international linkages of
Jordan's economy. The second category necessary for
assessing a country's dependence/self-reliance is linkages
among the domestic economic sectors. These can also be
determined from the input-output tables (Dar al-Handasah
Consultants, 1981). First, a cursory look at the tables
Table 4.6
Structure of Merchandise Exports in Jordan, 1976
Fuels, Other primary Textiles Machinery and Other
minerals commodities transport manufactures
and metals equipment
Share as
percentage of
total exports 41 38 4 1 16
Source: World Bank (1979).
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shows them to be sparsely filled. To illustrate, in the
domestic flows matrix (1981:Table Al.3), the average number
of zero entries is 21, out of a total of 35 entries, in each
column. This is a preliminary suggestion of a low level of
internal economic integration. The conclusion can be further
substantiated by examining the values of forward and
backward linkages.
The forward linkages for all industries except
infrastructure and services are illustrated in Table 4.7.
They are calculated from the total flows matrix (1981:Main
Table). Mathematically, the forward linkage of an industry =
the sum of output it sells to other industries/its total
output. As such, forward linkages serve to divide industries
between producer and final demand industries. As can be seen
from Table 4.7, they are quite small in over half of the
industries, with less than one-quarter of these industries'
products used as intermediates. And of these, some are
extremely low, particularly for food, tobacco, and beverage
industries. Although forward linkages for these industries
can be expected to be low, they are still much smaller than
in developed countries. Chenery (1958) estimated that the
forward linkages for processed food in Italy (1950), the
United States (1947), and Japan(1951) averaged 14 per cent.
The corresponding value for Jordan, on the other hand, is
less then 4 per cent. Furthermore, the small magnitudes of
this type of linkage for manufactures such as non-electric
machinery and electric and transport equipment suggest that
Table 4.7
Forward Linkages and Domestic Demand Multipliers
for Jordan's Economy, 1979
Industry Forward Linkagea Multiplierb
1. Agriculture 45.0 1.3
2. Fertilizer mineral mining 0.1 1.1
3. Other mining and crude oil 92.8 1.2
4. Grain mill products 48.0 1.6
5. Bakery products 0.1 1.4
6. Confectionary 2.3 1.5
7. Other food manufacture 3.9 1.7
8. Prepared animal food 93.5 1.7
9. Beverages 0.1 1.3
10. Tobacco 0.1 1.5
11. Textile manufacture 42.4 1.3
12. Wearing apparel 0.2 1.1
13. Leather and footwear 14.9 1.5
14. Wood, cork and furniture 12.5 1.4
15. Paper and paper products 45.7 1.2
16. Printing and publishing 21.6 1.2
17. Industrial and other chemicals 48.0 1.3
18. Petroleum refinery 60.7 1.1
19. Rubber and plastic 44.9 1.3
20. Pottery and glass 67.2 1.5
21. Cement, lims and plaster 96.5 1.3
22. Other mineral products 89.0 1.5
23. Basic metal industries 92.0 1.3
24. Fabricated metal products 35.7 1.2
Table 4.7 (contd.)
Industry Forward Linkagea Multiplierb
25. Machinery (non-electric) 2.5 1.2
26. Electric and
transportation equipment 9.8 1.1
27. Other manufacture 0.0 1.0
Source: Dar al-Handasah Consultants (1981), Main Input-output Table, and Table A1.5
Notes: aValues are calculated from the formula: forward linkage = sum of output sold
by an industry to all other industries/its total output.
bValues are taken from the inverse matrix of domestic flows.
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they are either only final stage assembly products or are
more in the nature of crafts. The forward linkages for
agriuclture and textiles are, on the other hand, in the
median range. But again, they are appreciably less than
those found by Chenery for the three industrialized
countries. Only in a few cases the forward linkages are
large, like prepared animal food and basic metal industries
that cannot be used as consumer goods. Overall, only a small
fraction, 30 per cent, of Jordan's gross domestic production
is processed before going to final demand. Still more
revealing of how well the economy is interlaced are the
backward linkages.
There are two types of backward linkages. The first are
based on direct input coefficients only, and the second on
both direct and indirect coefficients. The latter are
referred to as final demand multipliers and are more refined
than the former because they account also for indirect
inputs. Only the multipliers are therefore discussed here.
The domestic demand multipliers for all industries except
infrastructure and services are listed in Table 4.7 also.
They are taken from the inverse matrix of domestic flows
(Dar al-Handasah Consultants, 1981: Table Al.3). An
industry's multiplier measures the total amount that all
industries must produce, including the industry itself, to
meet the direct and indirect requirements generated by one
unit of final demand for its product. To illustrate, the
domestic demand multiplier for agriculture in Jordan is 1.7.
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This means that in order to fulfill a unit of final demand
for agricultural products, all industries, including
agriculture itself, must produce 1.7 units. Furthermore the
inverse matrix indicates that of the 1.7 units, 1.1 units
must be produced by agriculture, and the rest, 0.6 units, by
all other industries from which agriculture purchases its
inputs directly or indirectly. As can be seen from Table
4.7, the multipliers are fairly low, ranging between 1.1 and
1.7. Multipliers in developed economies, on the other hand,
usually exceed two.
The relatively small multipliers of Jordan's economy may
be attributed to two sources. One is the leakage from the
economic system resulting from high imports. The other is
that Jordan's production processes are still at an
elementary stage and inputs are not as diversified as in
developed eocomies. Another way to state this is to say that
the division of labor in Jordan is not as differentiated as
in industrialized countries. A most obvious example is
agriculture. As will be pointed out shortly, the
agricultural sector in Jordan consumes meager amounts of
chemical fertilizers or pesticides, whereas these inputs are
extensively utilized in, say, Japanese or United States
agriculture. Even the greater multipliers observed in
agriculture-based manufactures are not manifestations of the
diversity of inputs. Thus of the 1.7 multiplier for prepared
animal food, 0.3 units come from distribution and 0.2 from
agriculture.
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So far we have seen that Jordan's economy: (1) imports
80 per cent of its consumer products and half of its
intermediate goods, (2) exports less than half of the value
of its imports, with exports consisting of primary and light
manufactured commodities, and (3) has fairly weak forward
and backward linkages. Were it to be considered as a
separate unit, Jordan's economy would have to be classified
as a P-1 economy, with the highest level of dependence. This
conclusion must, however, be qualified by placing it in the
context of its regional, namely Arab, economy. In this
connection we examine how far Jordan is economically
integrated in the region, as well as with the core, by
looking principally into the directions of its foreign trade
flows. We also need a bird's eye view of the dependence of
Arab economies in order to appreciate what we have termed
earlier Jordan's second-order dependence.
The geographic distribution of Jordan's imports and
exports between 1976 and 1980 is illustrated in Table 4.8.
Imports exhibited a stable pattern as to their origin during
this five-year time span. They averaged 38 per cent of total
imports from the European Economic Community (EEC), and 16
per cent from the U.S., Canada, and Japan, combined. This
puts Jordan's imports from core states at 54 per cent of its
total imports. By contrast, Jordan's imports coming from
Arab countries made up only one-fifth of the total. A
pertinent question regarding import dependence is how
important is the fact that they are not concentrated 2 in a
Table 4.8
Geographic Distribution of Jordan's Imports and Exports, 1976-1980
Item Percentage of Total
Average 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
Imports from
Arab World 18 18 16 18 19 21
U.S. and Canada 10 9 15 8 8 9
EEC 38 38 36 38 38 38
Japan 6 6 6 7 6 7
East Europe 6 5 7 8 6 4
Other 22 24 20 21 23 21
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Exports to
Arab World 60 48 60 66 67 61
U.S. and Canada 2 2 2 2 2 2
EEC 0 0 0 0 0 1
Japan 0 0 0 0 0 0
East Europe 6 10 5 5 3 6
Turkey and India 14 14 13 17 15 13
Other 18 26 20 10 13 17
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Sources: Department of Statistics (1981b);
(1983).
Note: EEC = European Economic Community.
United Nations Yearbook of Trade Statistics
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single core trading partner. Senghaas (1977:161-162) argues
that the loosening up of partner concentration and
diversifying trade among various metropoles instead of one
major metropole can no longer be taken today as indication
of reduced dependence. What matters more in his opinion is
how much a peripheral nation imports of its capital goods
and technology from the center. This is also in line with
Ougaard's assignment of higher weight to capital goods. It
seem to us that Senghaas' opinion is generally valid under
normal trading conditions. Under certain circumstances,
however, such as when a peripheral country is subject to
economic boycott by a metropolitan power, diversity of
center trading might prove to be essential for its eocomic
well being, for the center is not a political or economic
monolith. Jordan imports the majority of its manufactured
consumer and capital goods as well as its technology from
the core, and those imports constitute over 70 per cent of
its imports of these goods (World Bank, 1983). Jordan's
direct, first-order dependence on imports is hence high.
Table 4.8 reveals a stable pattern of export
destination, too. The tendency with respect to trading
partners here is, however, at variance with imports. The
biggest customer of Jordan's exports was the Arab region,
receiving an average of 60 per cent of total exports.
Furthermore, two other Third World countries, India and
Turkey, were the largest recepients of exports from Jordan:
between them they purchased 18 per cent of total exports. By
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contrast, Jordan exported pratically no commodities to
center states where its imports were concentrated. Jordan's
trade with the core is, in other words, a one-way flow of
center merchandise to Jordan. But it must be added here that
Jordan's exports to the Arab region are not without their
problems, as will become evident when we discuss Jordan
Valley produce exports.
Exports are not the only economic link Jordan has with
the Arab region, and they may not be the most crucial.
Jordan has received substantial sums of money capital in the
form of remittances by Jordanians employed in, and aid and
grants from, several Arab countries. From 1976 to 1980,
remittances averaged JD218 millions annually or about 270
per cent of the average value of Jordanian merchandise
exports (National Planning Council, 1980:7-8). There was,
however, a counterflow of remittances from Jordan to other
Arab states, mainly Syria and Egypt, transferred by their
nationals working in Jordan. But the "balance of
remittances" ran considerably in Jordan's favor. The number
of Jordanians working in Arab states - 216,000 by 1979 -
exceeded by eight times the number of Arab employees in
Jordan - 26,000 in the same year. In addition, the former
were mainly skilled labor and professionals, in contrast to
the latter who were mostly employed as cheap labor, as we
have seen in Jordan Valley agriculture.
Arab financial aid became the principle source of
external aid in the 1970s. Between 1976 and 1980, the
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unrequited grants represented 19 per cent , on the average,
of Jordan's Gross National Product (GNP) and the loans,
often long-term and with low interest rates, about 7 per
cent (National Planning Council, 1980; Nyrop, 1976). These
links - exports, remittances, and. financial aid - constitute
a type of "horizontal integration" within the Arab region.
And inasmuch as they relieve Jordan from relying on
metropolitan markets and financial aid, they reduce Jordan's
dependence. Were the Arab region itself not dependent, the
analysis would stop here. This is not the case, however.
Arab economic dependence is a complex topic. It is
sufficient for our purposes here to highlight its most
salient feature. The principal form of this dependence was
manifested in the 1970s in foreign trade, whereby the Arab
economy exchanged oil for food, a variety of manufactured
goods, and technology. By focusing on trade, our conclusion
is likely to understate the level of Arab dependence.
The fraction of imports to GDP for the six major Arab
states - Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and
Syria - between 1970 and 1981 averaged one-third (Elmusa,
1985). This is several times greater than the fractions for
countries like the United States and Japan whose imports/GDP
over the same period were 8.3 per cent and 12.8 per cent,
reSpectively, on the average (World Bank, 1983). And,
according to estimates made by S. Amin for 18 Arab economies
for different years between 1972 and 1976, the Arab region
imported, on the average, one-third of its foodstuffs, three
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quarters of its manufactured consumer products, and
practically all of its capital goods (Amin, 1982). We canof
course expect the Arab economies to import manufactured and
capital goods as they seek to industrialize, but these are
enormous proportions. Indeed, Amin, in the same study, found
that imports played a more prominent role in the Arab
economy than in any other Third World region:
The contribution of imports to consumption and
investment in the Arab world is [was] twice as
important as in Black Africa, three times more
important than in Latin America and the Caribbean,
[and] 3.3 times more important than in South East
Asia. (S. Amin, 1982:51)
As for exports, their ratios to GDP for the same six
Arab states, between 1972 and 1976, ranged from 18 per cent
to 69 per cent. Oil and other minerals were the most
significant exports. Even in diversified eocomies, such as
Algeria's and Iraq's, oil constituted 93.0 and 98.4 per cent
of their exports, respectively, in the 1970s (Owen, 1981:7).
Only in a few cases, like Jordan and Egypt, did the share of
primary materials in exports fall during that period.
In addition, inter-Arab trade was miniscule compared to
Arab trade with the core. In 1977, for example, trade among
Arab states represented only 5.1 per cent of their entire
trade (Ibrahim, 1981:6). Whereas in 1978, 69 per cent of
Arab exports were sold to the U.S., Western Europe, and
Japan, and 74 per cent of Arab imports originated in these
nations. The large share of the Arab market in Jordanian
exports thus turns out to be the exception, not the rule, of
Arab export patterns. Hence on the basis of the volume,
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composition, and geographic distribution of the Arab
region's foreign trade, we can tentatively classify the
region as falling between P-1 and P-2 types of economies,
i.e.$ between the highest two levels of dependence in
Ougaard's outline.
In brief, Jordan's dependence consists of two
components. One is first-order dependence, manifested in the
weakness of the economic linkages, and the imports - their
substantial magnitude, composition, and concentration in the
metropoles. The other is second-order dependence, deriving
from the dependence of the Arab region with which Jordan has
extensive economic ties. Both types of dependence can be
classified as falling between P-1 and P-2 categories in
Ougaard's hierarchy. Yet while the two components of
Jordan's dependence are quantitatively similar,
qualitatively they are different. The second order component
contains a process of regional integration which, if it
continued and involved more states in the region and more
aspects of their economies, could make a regional
autocentered economy a possibility.
Section III
The Position of Agriculture within the National Economy
Agriculture in Jordan is bifurcated into irrigated and
rainfed sectors. For a variety of reasons 3 , investments and
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productivity have been disproportionately skewed in favor of
the former, most of which is located in the Jordan Valley.
As a result, irrigated agriculture has become the principal
exporter and importer of the agricultural sector. It is
therefore useful to point out the gap between the two
sectors. Knowledge of this gap is also necessary when we
evaluate below the success and failure of the Valley's
agriculture in supplying food items for domestic
consumption. The duality may best be appreciated through
some comparative statistics. A 1977 estimate puts the total
area of arable land in Jordan at five million dunums, or
less than 6 per cent of the country's total area of 91
million dunums (Nyrop, 1980:120). Of these, only 660,000
dunums are irrigable (Ibid.). In that same year, however,
only 2.63 million dunums were under cultivation, i.e., less
than half of the arable land, out of which 360,000 dunums,
or 14 per cent, received irrigation water(Ibid.). Yet
despite the preponderance of rainfed agricultural areas,
little effort, governmental or private, has gone into their
development. No new crops or better quality seeds have been
introduced, and only meager amounts of fertilizers and
insecticides are applied on a small portion of the land
(Mazur, 1979:157-58; Smadi and Stetieh, 1974). Mechanical
equipment, such as tractors and combine harvesters, have
been utilized, but their chief impact may have been the
reduction of labor inputs (Mazur, 1979:158). The bias is
immediately apparent in investment allocations, shown in
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Table 4.9. A dunum of irrigated land was to receive a total
of JD248.4 from government outlays between 1972 and 1980,
compared with only JD9.5 for rainfed. In other words, 26
times as much capital was designated for an irrigated as
opposed to a rainfed dunum. The gap in investment becomes
even wider if we account for the fact that in the private
sector, outlays, which exceeded that of the government by 50
per cent in the 1976-80 Five-Year Plan, went primarily into
the Jordan Valley (National Planning Council, 1980:6).4 The
Jordan Valley, which contains the majority of irrigated
agricultural land, had received most of the development and
investment effort.
The inevitable consequence of these policies has been
the continuation of the historical retardation of rainfed
agriculture, and a growing disparity in productivity between
it and the irrigated sector. Output in rainfed areas remains
hostage to rainfall fluctuations and other weather
conditions. As time-series indices in Table 4.10 for the
productivity of three main non-irrigated crops--wheat,
barley, and lentils--illustrate, yield irregularity can be
extreme. The yield index ranged between 12 and 112 for
wheat, 12 and 100 for barley, and 30 to 129 for lentils.
The stagnation of rainfed agriculture and the growth of
the irrigated are finally reflected in the weight of the
Ghor's agricultural output compared to the rest of Jordan,
given in Table 4.11. Between 1973 and 1979, the Valley
produced about 10 per cent of the country's field crops,
Table 4.9
Planned Government Expenditures in Irrigated and Rainfed Agriculture _in Jordan
during the Development Plans, 1972-1976 and 1976-1980
(Values at current prices)
Agricultural 1972-1975 1976-1980 1972-1980
sector total per total per average per dunum
dunum dunum
(1000JDs) (JD) (1000JDs) (JD) (JD)
Irrigated 15,098.0 41.9 74,325.0 2,065.0 248.0
Rainfed 7,425.0 3.1 15,270.0 6.4 9.5
Irrigated/rainfed 2.0 13.5 4.9 320.0 26.1
Sources: Amiri (1981) and Nyrop (1980).
Note: Expenditures per dunum = total expenditures/cultivated area. The cultivated area is
taken as that of 1977. During that year, the rainfed area was equal to 2.37 million
dunums and the irrigated area .36 million dunums, of which .27 million dunums were
in the Jordan Valley (Nyrop, 1980:120).
Table 4.10
Indices of Yields for Principal Grains and Legumes in Jordan, 1967-1975
(1967 = 100)
Crop 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975
Wheat 100 50 112 28 79 109 21 114 49
Barley 100 25 69 12 46 52 10 57 21
Lentils 100 45 80 30 95 74 19 129 33
Source: Mazur (1979).
Table 4.11
Jordan Valley Production as Percentage of Total Production in Jordan Agriculture
for Field Crops, Fruits, and Vegetables
(by weight)
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 Average
Field crops 13.6 5.8 13.6 16.8 7.4 10.8 7.8 10.8
Fruits 36.2 34.1 54.4 47.9 56.5 46.1 48.2 46.0
Vegetables 70.7 54.5 66.4 77.1 68.7 77.9 80.8 70.9
Source: Jordan Valley Authority (1980, no.1).
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over 46 per cent of its fruits, and 71 per cent of its
vegetables.
The position of the agricultural sector in Jordan's
economy may be described by its share in key economic
variables and spheres: GDP, exports, imports, labor force,
investments, and its linkages with other sectors.
As discussed in Chapter I, agriculture used to be
Jordan's economic mainstay. Its share in the GDP, however,
has steadily fallen over time, from 20.0 per cent in 1964-65
to 14.5 per cent in 1971-72, and to 8.2 per cent in 1979-80.
Thus, in terms of its monetary value, the importance of
agricultural production has been sharply reduced. Part of
the reason for the sharp drop may be ascribed to the
increasing differentiation of the economy as well as the
output of other sectors, but it is also a manifestation of
the stagnation of the agricultural sector itself. In fact,
the rate of growth in the value of agricultural production
over the 1971-1980 period was -4.6 per cent 5 as shown in
Table 4.12.
The weakened status of agriculture is further evidenced
by the decline of its employment share. The proportion of
labor working in agriculture to the total labor force fell
from 34.0 per cent in 1970 to 21.2 per cent in 1974-75, and
to only 14.0 per cent in 1980 (Mazur, 1979:109; National
Planning Council, 1981:293; Snobar and Arabiat, 1986:160).
The absolute number of agricultural laborers dropped as
well, from 75,000 in 1974-75 to 63,000 in 1980.
Table 4.12
Share of Agriculture in GDP in Jordan at Factor Costs
(Value in millions of JDs at current prices)
1964-65 1971-72 1979-80
(1) (2) (3)
Value 34.1 25.3 52.0
Ratio of GDP (%) 24.0 14.5 8.2
Sources: Columns (1) and (2) Mazur (1979); column (3) National Planning Council (1981).
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There is no historical record for the backward and
forward linkages, however. We must rely therefore on the
single-year values given earlier in Table 4.7. The value of
the forward linkage is 45, in the median range compared to
the rest of the industries. It indicates that agricultural
production is evenly split between intermediate and final
demand goods. This is a more balanced split than in the rest
of the economy where only 30 per cent of the total output is
processed. The multiplier's value for agriculture equals
1.3, somewhat less than the median range compared to the
rest of the industries. The fact that it is not greater
stems from the meager amounts of modern inputs used by the
sector as well as the large proportion of imports in
agricultural inputs. The fact that the agricultural sector
has to import large proportions of its inputs is more of a
reflection on an industry that fails to provide the sector
with its requirements, than on agriculture itself.
The level of external linkages for the agricultural
sector can be found in its imports and exports. Like for
other sectors of the economy, the volume of imported inputs
in agriculture is substantial. The sector imports almost all
of its intermediate and capital inputs, such as fertilizers,
pesticides, and machinery. Thus, in 1979, the fraction of
imported inputs to domestic inputs amounted to 58 per cent. 6
It is 8 per cent greater than the average fraction of
imports in the intermediates for all sectors. Agriculture is
hence slightly more import-dependent than the ec o'lmy as a
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whole. The value of agricultural exports are largely offset
by the value of agricultural imports. The ratio of
agricultural exports to total Jordanian commodity exports
averaged 43.9 per cent in 1971-1972, and 27.3 per cent in
1979-1980 (Central Bank of Jordan, 1980: Table 25). This is
an indication of the rising importance of manufacturing
exports, as pointed out earlier, rather than the fall in the
absolute value of agricultural exports. Yet, inspite of the
decline in its share in total exports, agriculture remains
an important source of forign earnings in an economy heavily
reliant on imports. Like most of Jordan's exports, those of
agriculture go to Arab markets, conrtributing thus to Arab
food self-reliance.
In short, agriculture has gradually lost its once
dominant position in the economy, as evidenced by the
decline of its share in GDP, national employment, and
exports. It is, moreover, slightly more import-dependent
than the rest of the economy. Nevertheless, in the trade,
service-based economy of Jordan, agriculture is still of
strategic importance to the future development of the
economy. In addition, by exporting its produce to Arab
states, Jordanian agiculture aids in the oft-stated Arab
goal of food self-reliance. It is therefore of value to
appraise the implications that the transformation of its
hitherto most dynamic branch, the agriculture of the Jordan
Valley, holds for the rest of the economy.
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Section IV
Linkages of the Valley's Agriculture
The current and final section delineates the extent to,
and the manner in, which the technological transformation in
the Valley affects Jordan's export and import positions, the
domestic provision of consumer goods (food), intermediate
inputs, and the accumulation of technology. We start with
exports, because imports are tied to the other topics.
Exports of Ghor produce have continually expanded,
providing additional and, until recently, a vital stimulant
to the region's agricultural growth. The values of these
exports can only be conjectured; Jordan's national accounts
list nation-wide export figures without reference to origin.
For the estimates given in Table 4.13, we assumed that the
Valley's exports of fruits and vegetables are proportional
to the share of its output of the country's produce9 .
Accordingly, Ghor exports have accounted for 40 to 53 per
cent of total agricultural exports between 1971 and 1980, or
10 to 23 per cent of Jordan's exports over the same time
span.
In absolute terms, the value of exports has registered
steady gains. The average growth rate was equal to 43 per
cent at constant prices over the preceding decade. 1 0 It is
obvious, however, that a doubling of the region's exports
has occurred bwtween 1973 and 1974, which coincides with the
Table 4.13
Jordan Valley Exports and National Exports of Jordan, 1971-1980
(Values in JD millions at current prices)
Year Category of Exports
National Valley
Agricul- All goods Fruits Vege- col.3+ col.5/ col.5/
ture tables col.4 col.1 col.2
(%) (%)
(1) (2) (3)a (4 )b (5) (6) (7)
1971 4.1 8.8 .5 1.5 2.0 49 23
1972 5.2 12.6 .7 1.8 2.5 48 20
1973 5.5 14.0 .8 1.8 2.6 47 19
1974 10.4 39.4 2.0 3.5 5.5 53 14
1975 11.2 40.1 2.3 5.2 46 13
1976 17.6 49.6 4.2 3.8 8.0 45 16
1977 21.9 60.3 4.8 4.8 9.6 44 16
1978 18.0 64.1 3.0 5.8 8.8 49 14
1979 25.0 82.6 3.1 8.5 11.6 46 14
1980 24.1 120.1 3.6 8.1 11.7 40 10
Source: Central Bank of Jordan.
Notes: aValues in column (3) are obtained by
by .46, which is the average ratio of
groduction, given in Table 4.10.
Values in column (4) are obtained by
by .71, which is the average value of
country vegetable production, given in Table 4.10.
multiplying Jordan's total
Valley fruit production to
exports of fruit
country fruit
multiplying Jordan's total export of fruits
the Valley vegetable production to total
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increase in oil prices. The sudden jump was caused by a rise
in demand for the Valley's crops in neighboring Arab
countries which have been the traditional export market for
the Valley's produce, the attendant price rise, and the
larger quantities of exports. Jordan's vegetable exports
thus jumped from 88,335 tons in 1973 to 146,366 tons in 1974
(Salim, 1982:30). If we recall that drip irrigation and
plasticulture were brought into the Valley in the middle of
the decade, the role of the Arab market factor in inducing
technological innovation in the Valley becomes apparent.
This was not a mere coincidence. In the following years, the
propagation of the technologies was predicated upon the
existence of a market outlet outside the country. Domestic
consumption could not keep pace with output. Tomato
production, by way of example, rose from 67 metric tons in
1975 to 110 metric tons in 1979, i.e., at an annual rate of
over 10 per cent (Appendix 3.11). The growth rate in
domestic consumption only slightly exceeded 2 per cent in
the interim1l, which means that the volume of tomato
production above and beyond local consumption grew at a 7.9
per cent annual rate during the second half of the 1970s. It
was imperative, therefore, for the further diffusion of the
technologies that the surplus output be sold abroad.
Overall, Jordan exported, on the average, 57 per cent of its
tomato production between 1975 and 1979 (Appendix 4.1).
The Valley's produce is trucked to neighboring Arab
countries, including Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and
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other Gulf states. Syria has been by far the largest
customer. The large number of clients would normally
safeguard exports from sudden or sharp fluctuation: the
market would be characterized as being a seller's rather
than a buyer's market. Yet a host of factors--economic,
political, and marketing--have converged, to make the export
market uncertain.
Political instability in the Middle East constitutes one
such factor. The civil war in Lebanon and the Israeli
invasion of that country and its aftermath have led to the
complete closure of the Lebanese market to Jordan's produce
since 1981. The protracted war between Iran and Iraq has
diminished the latter's imports of the Valley's fruits and
vegetables, as Iraq has imposed stringent economic measures
to finance the war effort. Moreover, political disputes
among Arab states are often transferred to their ecomomic
relations. Syria, at the height of tension in its relations
with Jordan in 1981, would purchase the Valley's crops only
at fixed, below-market prices. To avoid a crisis among
farmers in the region, the Jordanian government was
compelled to buy the vegetables at a higher price, as a
subsidy (al-Ra'i, 1982, October).
The second factor that has affected the Valley's export
market adversely is the policy of encouraging domestic food
production in some of the importing states. To illustrate,
Saudi Arabia has been able to raise its vegetable self-
sufficiency from 3 per cent in 1977 to 20 per cent in 1979
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(al-Zira'ah wa al-tanmiyah, vol.II no.3, 1983:79). Likewise,
the cultivation of salad vegetables in the United Arab
Emirates in now sufficient to fulfill local demand for
several months of the year (Zoubeir, 1982:11). And while
this is not objectionable in principle, it does serve to
underscore what Owen calls the "partial and unorganized"
nature of Arab integration in thei970s, as well as the lack
of policy coordination among the area's governments.
Third, it appears that Turkish produce has begun to take
over markets that were traditionally monopolized by Jordan.
Thus, in 1979, Jordan supplied 57 per cent of Saudi Arabia's
imported tomatoes and Turkey only 1.3 per cent (Bryant,
1983:70). By 1981, Jordan's share had plummeted to 19 per
cent, while Turkey's soared to 58 per cent (Ibid.). Part of
the loss was compensated for by the larger volume of Saudi
vegetable imports that year (Ibid.), making the net loss 25
per cent over the span of two years. Jordan is still the
leading exporter of fresh vegetables to Kuwait, but even
here Turkey, which had not sold vegetables there before
1976, had, by 1982, captured 18 per cent of the Kuwaiti
market (Ibid.). The reasons offered for the effectiveness of
Turkish competition include the lower prices of that
country's crops stemming in part from lower agricultural
wages, and their superior quality (Ibid.; Kamhawi, 1984:?).
The Valley's produce is not graded. Instead, boxes are
topped by one or two good quality rows, tiwjihah, followed
by inferior fruits, a practice which seems to have impaired
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the credibility of Ghor produce. The entry of Turkish
produce into Arab markets may be an indication that a
process of regional Middle Eastern integration involving
non-Arab states is underway. Yet once more the disruption it
caused in the Valley's exports illustrates the absence of
agricultural policy coordination among the participants.
So, the export market, which proved to be an invaluable
incentive to the technological modernization of the Valley's
agriculture, looms now as the most serious problem facing
this process. Probably not all farmers are equally affected,
although this is difficult to document. The big farmers, who
sometimes are also the commission agents and/or wholesalers,
are likely to have better access to the export markets than
the other groups of farmers. Bryant (1983:70) cites the case
of a big farmer who exports modest quantities of vegetables
to Europe, having made his own contacts. Although this is a
unique case, it may illustrate the capabilities of the
larger farmers.
Several conclusions can be drawn from the experience of
Valley produce exports. One is that market volatility stems
from factors pertinent to the region rather than from
Jordan's second-order dependence. This does not mean that
the latter feature is potentially insignificant. For it
could, say in the case of a sharp drop in oil prices, reduce
the demand for Jordan's fruits and vegetables in the
regional market, and thus exacerbate the export problem.
Another conclusion is that inasmuch as exports are destined
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for Arab states, they do aid in achieving collective Arab
self-reliance and integration. But the lack of coordination
among the area's governments on agricultural policy disrupts
the market for Ghor products. The effects of such
disruptions are not very different from traditional
dependency situations, as they threaten the country's
balance of payments and farmers' incomes, especially those
of the lower strata.
Next we consider the impact of technological
transformation in the Valley's agriculture on. the supply of
consumer food items, on the purchase and supply of
intermediate goods, and on imports. Food is essentially the
only consumer good that Jordan Valley agriculture provides.
It has been mentioned above that the growth in the Valley's
vegetable and fruit output has outstripped domestic demand.
This does not mean, however, that Jordan no longer imports
food items; not all types of fruits and vegetables consumed
in the country are grown in the Valley (apples are an
example), nor is the region's production sustained all year
round. The imports of produce have, in fact, risen
substantially and steadily as shown in Table 4.14. In value
terms, imports have grown at a 32 per cent annual rate,
measured at constant prices. 12
The failure to meet national demand fully must be
principally ascribed to the failure to improve rainfed
agriculture and the devoting of scarce capital resources to
the Valley. It may be argued that the Ghor compensates for
Table 4.14
Imports and Exports of Fruits, Vegetables, and Wheat in Jordan, 1971-1980
(Values in JD millions at current prices)
Year Fruits and vegetablesa Wheat bImports Exports col.2-col.1 Imports
1971 4.1 3,1 -1 3.7
1972 5.2 4.1 -1.1 6.1
1973 1.8 4.2 2.4 7.0
1974 6.8 9.2 2.4 7.1
1975 11.5 9.6 -1.9 6.8
1976 15.9 14.5 -1.4 14.8
1977 15.7 17.1 1.4 13.9
1978 16.7 14.8 -1.9 14.6
1979 21.4 18.8 -2.6 19.6
1980 22.7 19.2 -3.5 23.0
Source: Central Bank of Jordan (1984).
Notes: aImports and exports of fruits and vegetables
bWheat imports include flour.
include nuts.
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the rising imports by its own exports. This is a valid but
incomplete argument. As indicated in Table 4.12, the growth
of the Valley's exports has indeed kept the trade deficit
from these two items at an insignificant level. Instead of
this round-about course of exporting to cover the costs of
importing, however, it would seem to us simpler and probably
more efficient to satisfy domestic demand directly from
domestic production, or, in short, to follow a strategy of
import substitution. This point becomes even more cogent if
we take into account the problems confronting exports.
The stress on the development of the Valley at the
expense of rainfed areas has also meant that imports of
other types of crops cultivated in the latter have risen.
The most important example is wheat, the population's main
food staple. As shown in Table 4.14, wheat imports and their
growth rates are comparable to those of fruits and
vegetables. The question of increasing wheat output is
clearly more complicated than the devoting of investments to
irrigated agriculture (Smadi and Stetieh, 1974:50-66), but
the dearth of capital outlays is a central factor.
For some crops, like potatoes, the Valley's output has
lagged behind demand. In fact, potato production in the Ghor
had declined by the end of the 1970s (Appendix 3.11).
Meanwhile, the consumption of potatoes had increased from an
average of 23.4 metric tons annually to 36.4 between the
first and second halves of the last decade (Zeitun, 1982:).
It may be true that from an individual farmer's point of
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view, the cultivation of potatoes is less profitable than
tomatoes. Individual profitability thus may conflict with
the often-stated government objective of reducing dependency
on food imports.
Food availability to consumers must be gauged, in
addition to its physical presence, by the price at which
they purchase it. Table 4.15 shows the changes in the price
index for fruits and vegetables, of which the Valley is the
principal supplier, and for all goods in the 1976-80 five-
year span. Overall, the indices for fruits and vegetables
have grown, despite their considerable irregularity, at the
rate of 12.6 per cent and 13.3 per cent over this period.
Both rates are higher than the corresponding growth rate of
per capita income of 9.1 per cent, discussed in Section III.
If these figures are trustworthy, the average consumer's
purchasing power of fruits and vegetables may have declined.
Furthermore, the rates of price changes for the two items
were both more than the 11.1 per cent average for all goods.
This has several implications. It indicates, on the one
hand, that the domestic terms of trade have tended to favor
agriculture, a gain for Jordan Valley farmers. Consumers, on
the other hand, have come out as net losers, particularly
those in the lower-income brackets who expend greater
proportions of their budgets on food.
Overall, then, the imports of fruits and vegetables have
risen over the last decade, in part due to the failure to
develop rainfed agriculture and the allotment of capital
Table 4.15
Price Index and Changes for all Goods, Fruits, and Vegetables in Jordan, 1976-1980
(1975 = 100
Year Index - Index Change
All Fruits Vege- All Fruits Vege-
goods tables goods tables
1976 111.5 115.7 126.2 11.5 15.7 26.2
1977 127.7 138.5 143.2 14.6 19.7 13.5
1978 136.6 162.5 194.6 7.0 17.3 35.7
1979 156.0 165.4 165.2 14.2 1.8 -15.1
1980 173.0 179.4 176.5 10.9 8.4 6.5
Average 11.6 12.6 13.3
Source: Department of Statistics (1981b).
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expenditures primarily to the Jordan Valley. Ghor exports,
however, have kept the trade deficit of the two crops
minimal. Furthermore, their price rise has been generally
advantageous to farmers, not to consumers, especially for
lower-income groups.
Material inputs and their coefficients under the
traditional as well as new technologies have been enumerated
in Chapter 3. In order to weigh the impact of each method of
production on imports and domestic supplies, the material
costs are broken down into two categories: domestic and
imports. Gross values for the entire Valley are then
determined by multiplying the relevant coefficient by land
area. Because of the data availibility constraints we have
encountered in Chapter 3, we base our conclusions on
estimates for two crops only, tomatoes (under traditional
and drip irrigation), and cucumbers (under plastic houses
and tunnels with drip irrigation).
The input coefficients given in the preceding chapter
are total costs the farmer pays, that is, costs at
purchaser's prices. To obtain imports and domestic costs at
a national level, they must be converted to producer's
prices. The producer's price is calculated as a ratio of
the purchaser's price for the entire agricultural sector
from the input-output tables (see Appendix 4.2). This ratio,
which equals 40 per cent, is then assumed to be uniform for
all inputs. The assumption may not be accurate, but it can
be justified on the grounds that the margins for
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transportation, distribution, etc. do not vary greatly among
different materials: all are traded through the same
channels and are tax-exempt. The only exceptions may be
water and plastic houses. Water costs, however, make up only
an insignificant fraction of total costs, and the resulting
margin of error can be ignored. Plastic houses, on the other
hand, present a different case. Their costs are greater than
all other materials combined, and because most of them have
been imported by adopters, their producer's/purchaser's
ratio is likely to be more than 40 per cent. Import
estimates for plastic-housing technologies are hence
underestimated.
Inputs are broken down between domestic and imports as
follows. Manure and water are locally produced, and their
costs for all the four methods are assigned to the domestic
category. Machinery, chemical fertilizers, pesticides, and
dusting chemicals, on the other hand, are imported. The seed
costs for traditional agriculture are split as 20 per cent
domestic and 80 per cent imported, on the grounds that the
majority of farmers purchase their seeds. In the case of
drip irrigation and plastic covers, seeds are considered
entirely imported. Because they constitute a small fraction
of total production costs, users would be expected to
purchase imported seed rather than risk using their own.
Plastic houses and tunnels are also imported. The drip
system is more complicated and our division of costs between
domestic and imports should be taken as conjectural: it is
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based upon two interviews, one with a drip system
distributor (Attiyah, 1981), and the other with the co-owner
of a factory which manufactures drip system parts (al-
Battikhi, 1981). First, the control station is imported.
Second, the main and submain pipes and drippers are divided
equally between imports and domestic. Both interviewees
concurred that about three-fourths of these parts were being
produced in Jordan. But because the materials used in their
production are imported, a 50-50 breakdown is plausible. A
similar procedure is followed in the case of the fourth
component, plastic mulch, which is made in Jordan from
imported raw materials. Accordingly, the mulch costs are
split on a 75 to 25 per cent basis between domestic and
imports respectively.
The numerical results are summarized in Table 4.16
through 4.19. They are complemented by two additional
tables: Table 4.20 provides a comparative imports/domestic
index for the four technologies, and Table 4.21 gives the
sum total of domestic and imported inputs for the cropped
area in the Ghor in the 1978-1979 season. Several
observations can be made from the tables regarding the
impact of the different technologies on imports.
Cultivation by the traditional method and by drip
irrigation without plastic covers have the lowest
import/domestic index values, 100 each. They are followed,
in ascending order, by plastic tunnels with drip irrigation,
258, then plastic houses with drip irrigation, 666. Thus it
Table 4.16
Input Coefficients (costs/dunum) by Origin for Tomato Production
under Traditional Methods in the Jordan Valley, 1976-1977
(Units in JD millions at current prices)
Material input Purchaser's Producer's pricea
Price
(Total cost) Total cost Domestic Imports
Machinery 1.05 .42 -- .42
Seeds and
seedlings 2.50 1.00 .20 .80
Chemical
fertilizers 10.20 4.08 -- 4.08
Manure 10.40 4.16 4.16 --
Water 1.80 .72 .72 --
Sprays and
dusting
materials 2.06 .82 -- .82
Totalb 28.00 11.20 5.10 6.10
Source: Table 3.7.
Notes: a Producer's
bTotals may
price = .4 x purchaser's price (Appendix 4.2).
not add due to rounding.
Table 4.17
Input Coefficients (costs/dunum) by Origin for Tomato Production
using Drip Irrigation in the Jordan Valley, 1978-1979
(Units in JD, millions at current prices)
Material input Purchaser's Producer's Pricea
price
Total cost Total cost Domestic Imports
Machinery 2.50 1.0 -- 1.00
Seeds and
seedlings 4.75 1.9 -- 1.90
Chemical
fertilizers 4.50 1.5 -- 1.80
Manure 15.50 6.2 6.90 --
Water -- -- 
-- 
--
Sprays and
dusting
materials 10.50 4.2 -- 4.20
Drip system
Control station 13.50 5.4 -- 5.40
Main and
submain pipes 13.33 5.3 2.65 2.65
Drippers 26.67 10.7 5.35 5.35
Plastic mulch 25.00 10.0 7.50 2.50
Totalb 116.30 46.5 21.70 24.80
Table 4.17 (contd.)
Source: Table 3.11
Note: aProducer's price = .4 x purchaser's price (Appendix 4.2).bTotals may not add due to rounding.
Table 4.18
Input Coefficients (costs/dunum) by Origin for Cucumber Production
Using Plastic Tunnels and Drip Irrigation in the Jordan Valley, 1978-79
(Units in J.D. at current prices)
Material Input Purchaser's Producer's pricea
price
Total cost Total cost Domestic Imports
Machinery 2.5 1.00 -- 1.00
Seeds and
seedlings 9.8 3.92 -- 3.92
Chemical
fertilizers 5.1 2.04 -- 2.04
Manure 15.5 6.20 6.2 --
Water -- -- -- --
Sprays and dust-
ing materials 35.4 14.16 -- 14.16
Drip system 78.5 31.4 14.0 17.40
Plastic tunnel
system 58.8 23.53 -- 23.53
Totalb 205.6 82.30 20.2 62.10
Source: Table 3.12
Notes: aProducer's price = .4 x purchaser's price (Appendix 4.2).bTotal may not add due to rounding.
Table 4.19
Input Coefficients (costs/dunum) by Origin for Cucumber Production
Using Plastic Houses and Drip Irrigation in the Jordan Valley, 1978-79
(Units in J.D. at current prices)
Material Input Purchaser's Producer's price a
price
Total cost Total cost Domestic Imports
Machinery 5.0 2.0 -- 2.0
Seeds and
seedlings 17.5 7.0 -- 7.0
Chemical
fertilizers 18.0 7.2 -- 7.2
Manure 46.5 18.6 18.6 --
Water -- -- -- --
Sprays and dust-
ing materials 100.7 40.3 -- 40.3
Drip system 78.5 31.4 14.0 17.4
Plastic housing
system 420.0 168.0 -- 168.0
Totalb 686.2 274.5 32.6 241.9
Source: Table 3.13.
Notes: aProducer's price =bTotals may not add
.4 x purchaser's price (Appendix 4.2).
due to rounding.
Table 4.20
Summary of Imported and Domestic Input Coefficients (costs/dunum)
and Their Respective Ratio and Indices for Different Cultivation Techniques
in the Jordan Valley, 1976-1979
(Values in J.D. at producer's current prices)
Technology Domestic Imports Imports/ Index
Domestic
Traditional 5.1 6.1 1.2 109
Drip irrigation 21.7 24.8 1.1 100
Plastic tunnels
and drip
irrigation 20.2 62.1 3.1 258
Plastic houses
and drip
irrigation 32.6 241.9 7.4 666
Sources: Tables 4.14 through 4.17.
Table 4.21
Gross Material Imports for Vegetable Production Using Different Technologies
in the Jordan Valley, 1978-1979
(Values at current prices)
Method of cultivation Area Imports/Dunum Total Imports
(dunum) (JD) (JD millions)
(1) (2) (3)
1. Traditional 1 53,23 4a 7 .93b 1.22
2. Drip irrigation 8,514 24.80 .21
3. Plastic tunnels and
drip irrigation 6,015 62.10 .38
4. Plastic houses and
drip irrigation 741 24.90 .18
Total 1.99
Sources: Column (1) Table 3 except for row (1), see note below.
Column (2) Table 4.18.
Notes: aThe area for traditional agriculture is obtained by subtracting the area
planted by vegetables in 1978-1979, which is equal to 168,500 (Dajani, 1980:104),
from the sum of areas cultivated by the other three technologies in the present
table.
bThe figure 7.93 is obtained after adjusting the value of imports for traditional
agriculture, 6.1, by the annual inflation rate of 15 per cent used throughout the
text for the 1970s.
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can be said that the more sophisticated and capital
intensive the technology is, the more it intensifies import
linkages. In general, also, the import/domestic ratios for
Jordan Valley agriculture compare favorably with the 50 per
cent ratio for the entire economy's intermediates.
Another way to appreciate the significance of these
intermediate imports is to compare them with the Valley's
agricultural exports. Only vegetables are accounted for,
because inputs for fruit cultivation are not available.
Also, in computing the value of total imports, all
vegetables grown under traditional methods are assumed to
have input, and hence import, values similar to those of
tomatoes. This assumption actually overestimates these
values (Stetieh, et al, 1978). Thus estimated, the total
import bill for vegetable intermediates in 1978-1979
amounted to JD2.0 millions, given in Table 4.21. By
comparison, exports in the same season averaged JD5.3
million. The trade balance, in other words, showed a JD3.3
million net surplus. A single year's results may not, of
course, represent a general pattern. We may expect, however,
that the imports of intermediates would be even higher with
further dissemination of drip-irrigation and plastic-covers
technologies.
In contrast to imports, domestically produced inputs are
few and confined to relatively simple materials--water,
manure, and drip-irrigation parts1 3 , as shown in Tables 4.16
to 4.21. Here also each technology differs in its share of
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domestic inputs. As shown in Table 4.21, drip irrigation
with open-field cultivation has the highest proportion of
these inputs relative to its total cost than either of the
three other cultivation methods. Even in absolute terms, the
value of its local material is greater than that of the
plastic tunnels. Plastic covers, like many high capital cost
goods, have failed to generate any perceptible linkages with
the rest of the economy.
For a complete account of linkages, we would also
estimate their multiplier effect throughout the economy. The
increase in manure consumption, for instance, serves as a
further incentive for the expansion of poultry and livestock
"industries," thus indirectly stimulating food production.
The domestic manufacturing of drip-irrigation components,
moreover, buttresses the technological capability of the
country as discussed below.14
The forward linkages have also been of minor importance,
perhaps even more so than the backward linkages. To our
knowledge, only one food-processing plant has been
established to absorb some of the rise in output. It is a
tomato-paste factory of about 2,500 metric ton production
capacity (al-Ra'i, 1984:). It takes approximately 15,000
metric tons of tomato fruits to produce this quantity, or
5,000 to 7,000 dunums of tomatoes at an average yield of two
to three tons.
To summarize, the imported proportions of intermediate
goods in Jordan Valley agriculture exceed those in the rest
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of the economy. They are by far greater for the more
sophisticated and capital intensive plastic-cover
technologies. Domestic linkages for these technologies, on
the other hand, are relatively much smaller than for either
traditional or drip irrigation-without-covers cultivation
methods. Finally, the growth of pr.oduction has not prompted
the generation of any significant forward linkages.
The final domestic linkage pertains to the production of
technology. Technology is the second aspect, the production
level of which has significant bearing on the capacity of a
country's economy to reproduce itself from within. But the
spillover effects of technology transfer, that is, their
effect on technology accumulation as discussed below, have
been little investigated by Dependency or other writers
(Soete, 1981:181). As a result, there is a dearth of
theoretical concepts and methods for measuring such effects.
Recently, Stewart (1979:39) has suggested the notion of
the "accumulation of technological capacity" to describe the
process of learning through the importation of technology.
She divides the process into three stages: (1) the ability
to make independent technological choices, (2) the
adaptation of, and improvement upon, existing technologies,
and (3) the generation of endogenous technologies. Ruttan
(1975) identifies three phases of technology transfer, (1)
material, (2) design, and (3) capacity. Material transfer is
the equivalent of "turn key" plants in industrial
technology; design transfer refers to the adaptation of
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imported technology to suit local ecological conditions and
tasks; and capacity transfer signifies innovation and
invention.
The only difference between these two schemes is that
Stewart omits the stage of material transfer, while Ruttan
leaves out the making of independent technological choices.
But neither of them focus on a more basic phase, namely the
learning how to employ the imported technology properly if
not optimally. This is precisely the problem most likely to
be encountered in many Third World agricultural settings. A
more inclusive description of the process of technological
capacity accumulation would hence include the following
phases: (1) material transfer, (2) proper or optimal
utilization, (3) making independent technological choices,
(4) adaptation and design, and (5) innovation and invention.
The degree of technology accumulation, the term we use as
shorthand for accumulation of technological capacity, in a
country can then be identified by the phase it has attained.
A country that has reached stage (5) of innovation and
invention has a higher degree of technology accumulation
than a country that is still at stage (4) of adaptation and
design. These stages, it must be noted, are neither
completely discrete nor do they automatically or inevitably
occur. They can, however, be employed as a scale for gauging
the extent of a country's absorption of imported technology,
or accumulation of technology. They do not lend themselves,
moreover, to easy description or quantification. Their
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realization is predicated on many factors: institutional,
educational, regulatory, etc. (Ruttan, 1975; Stewart, 1981).
In the rest of the section, we specify the stages of
technology accumulation realized by the various
technologies. We also single out for detailed treatment two
activities thought to be decisive in technology
accumulation, agricultural research and development (R&D)
and extension.
We first consider the contribution of irrigation
projects. The projects have been described in Chapter 3 and
are summarized in Appendices 3.1 and 4.3. The first feature
of these projects to notice is that all consultants as well
as contractors were foreign firms. Over a 20-year period, no
Jordanian company evolved that possessed the capability to
implement either type of scheme. The projects are thus akin
to turn-key industrial projects, delivered ready made for
use, or the equivalent of the material-transfer phase in the
foregoing classification. Whatever skills have been imparted
to domestic engineers, technicians, and workers have not
been translated into the next stage of design transfer.
Measuring the value of such skills falls beyond the scope of
this appraisal. They are difficult to gauge, in any case,
because much of the work was subcontracted. But it can be
presumed that such skills were diffused in the construction
industry and perhaps in other sectors of the economy. The
level of technological accumulation insofar as building
irrigation works is concerned has therefore been minor.
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The issues associated with the contributions of on-the-
farm technologies to technology accumulation are more
complex. Seeds, chemical fertilizers, and pesticides are all
imported. The accumulation of technology is then confined to
the first two phases of material transfer and skills gained
in their application. Evidence indicates that despite the
long acquaintance with these materials, they are still
inappropriately handled by the majority of the Ghor's
farmers and agricultural laborers. Hyslop (1979) finds in a
sample surveyl5 that fertilizer application included a great
deal of waste. He estimates that superphosphate and amonium
sulfate were added in double the recommended amounts of
nitrogen. He also is of the opinion that manure, which is
locally produced, is economically inefficient for it
supplies only 1 per cent of the primary nurtrients compared
with its higher proportion of material costs.16
The problems associated with pesticide usage are more
serious. In the same survey, Hyslop notes that although
fungicides are frequently applied by almost all farmers
interviewed, the high incidence of fungus was easily
discernable in the Ghor. He concludes that the Valley's
farmers are not highly skilled in handling pesticides. The
Ministry of Agriculture (1974), too, recognizes that farmers
do not often select the appropriate chemical for pest
control, and that wrong methods and timing of spraying are
widespread. The Ministry estimates that 15 to 20 per cent of
the crop is damaged annually by the misuse of these
chemicals (al-Ra'i, 27/12/1984).
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Pesticides bring with them other hazards also, such as
residues in food, human poisoning during spraying, and
environmental damage (Bull, 1982). These problems have been
little attended to in Jordan, either in research or policy.
Yet, considering the unregulated pesticides market, the
hazard must be serious. It is common to see men in the
Valley spraying chemicals without using masks or other
protective devices. Studies in other Third World countries
suggest a high ratio of pesticide poisoning 18 (Bull,
1981:37-38). We were unable to find any information on the
question in Jordan's statistics. We can expect, however,
that poisoning accidents and deaths have occurred, and that
in all likelihood workers and poor farmers who cannot afford
to hire labor were the main victims.
As discussed in Chapter 3, drip irrigation is not a
complicated technology and does not require specialized
operational skills. It does not seem to have required any
major design modification to suit the environmental
conditions in the Valley. There have been no complaints by
farmers or in published reports about serious handling
problems, either.
Plastic houses and tunnels, on the other hand, represent
a technological jump over the traditional cultivation
methods. An array of specialized skills and operations are
needed for proper functioning. They include soil
sterilization, trellising, temperature and humidity control,
and intensive pesticide application (Ministry of
231
Agriculture, 1982). That explains in part, why many of the
plastic house adopters are educated farmers, urban
professionals, and agricultural engineers. A pool of
agricultural "high-tech" skills can therefore be expected to
emerge, although it will be limited to a small section of
the Valley's farming population.
Beyond the farm, drip-irrigation equipment, as has been
stated before, is now produced in Jordan, whereas plastic
covers are not. Some drip-irrigation components are easier
to make than plastic covers, and they have a wider market
because they are less durable (Appendix 3.4). Take plastic
mulch as an example. This material does not need refined
specifications or high quality control, and it is replaced
annually. Whereas plastic needed for the houses must meet
special standards to calibrate solar heating and lighting
properly, it also lasts for ten years. The plant that makes
plastic mulch and that supplies 80 per cent of Jordan's
consumption may have reached the equivalent of the "design"
stage, according to its owner (al-Fajr al-Iqtisadi,
1982:30). The factory imports raw materials and makes its
own specifications. Thus drip irrigation, while not adding
significant technological skills on the farm, does help
elevate the level of technology accumulation in industry. By
contrast, plastic-covers technology has not yet had
spillover effects in industry, but it enhances specialized
skills on the farm.
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The more advanced phases of the accumulation of
technology adaptation, innovation, and invention are now
found outside the farm, in the research and development
(R&D) domain. The development of the High Yielding Varieties
(HYVs) of rice and wheat, the Green Revolution's primary
ingredient, is one outstanding example. Several yardsticks
are used to gauge a country's research capabilities. The two
most common are: the number of scientists and technicians
engaged in research, and the expenditures allocated for
research. A host of ratios relating these to population and
GNP are derived therefrom and utilized in international
comparisons (e.g., UNCTAD, 1976). Yet ultimately, the real
measure of the value of research programs lie in their
output of scientific and technological knowledge.
Before focusing on Jordan's agricultural research, it is
useful to review some of the findings of a recent and
pioneering study (Saket, 1978) of Jordan's overall R&D
enterprise and problems.
One virtue of the study is that it relates R&D
priorities to the structure of the economy, an aspect that
is little attended to in writings of R&D. As shown in Table
4.22, Saket et al. find that research in the social sciences
and humanities, whether measured in terms of number of
staff, accomplished tasks, or publications in journals, tops
R&D activities. The dominance of this branch of research
must be attributed to the service-oriented economy of the
country. Another way in which the relationship between
Table 4.22
Indication of R & D by Science Field in Jordan, 1976
Field Number of FTE R & D tasks Articles in
R & D - finished by professional
personnel end of 1976 journals (1976)
(% of total) (% of total) (% of total)
Natural sciences 17.5 12.9 18.8
Medical sciences 3.3 9.6 4.2
Engineering 20.2 8.4 9.9
Agriculture 20.6 9.6 14.6
Social sciences and
humanities 38.3 59.6 42.7
Other 9.9
Totala 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Saket et al (1978).
Notes: aTotals may not add up due to rounding.
FTE = Full-Time Equivalent.
R&D = Research and Development.
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economic structure and research is manifested can be seen in
the distribution of research activities among the economic
sectors. Here Saket et al. indicate that the bulk of
research expenditures, 93.2 per cent, are allocated by the
service and higher education sectors rather than the
production sector. The latter produces mainly import-
substitution goods, which rely on imported technology. This
contrasts sharply with developed countries. In the United
States and West Germany, for example, the production sectors
bear 68.8 and 60.2 per cent, respectively, of R&D outlays
(Ibid.:61).
The survey does not include time-series data which would
enable us to trace the evolution of the country's research
capabilities. There is no doubt, however, that R&D
activities have grown considerably over time. Virtually no
research institutions existed when the country became
independent. Yet, since then, several bodies for conducting
R&D, including two national universities, the Royal
Scientific Society, the Department of Research and Extension
(Ministry of Agriculture), Natural Resource Authorities, and
the Department of Statistics, which employ the majority of
qualified researchers were established (Ibid.:16).
The status of R&D in Jordan can perhaps be appreciated
by comparing it to other countries. First, the number of
scientists and engineers per 10,000 population was 1.03 for
Jordan in 1976, 0.5 for Kenya in 1972, 16.1 for West Germany
in 1973, and 34.2 for Japan in 1974 (Ibid.:62). Second,
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expenditures on R&D per capita were: $3.1 for Jordan in
1976, $1.23 for Kenya in 1971, $120.1 for West Germany in
1973, and $144.5 for the United Sattes in 1973 (Ibid.:58).
These indicators suggest that Jordan's R&D conditions are
comparable to Third World countries, and inferior to those
in the center. Hence, while R&D may have advanced, it
remains relatively backward. It is also confronted by many
problems, among them the shortage of labor power, equipment
and finances, and mismanagement such as the lack of
supervision and clarity of research aims (Ibid.:54).
Agricultural research exhibits some of the overall R&D
characteristics. Its position, as illustrated by several
indicators, shown in Table 4.22, reflects agriculture's
position within the economy. The sector's R&D accounted for
20.6 per cent of the total full-time equivalent (FTE) number
of researchers, 9.6 per cent of R&D tasks, and 14.6 per cent
of articles in professional journals. Probably the most
suggestive is the first indicator, because others may
fluctuate from year to year (Ibid.). According to this
indicator, agricultural R&D occupies second place after the
social sciences and humanities. Such priority accorded to
agriculture is compatible with its position as the most
important production sector after mining. Furthermore, as
the most dominant historically, agriculture received
consideration early on in research priorities. As early as
1951, three years after independence, an agricultural
research station was founded in the village of Deir Allah in
235
the Jordan Valley. Like Jordan's R&D in general,
agricultural research is also conducted within the service
and educational sectors, mainly at Jordan University and the
Ministry of Agriculture (al-Faqih, 1980).
The nature of R&D in agriculture may be gleaned from
inspecting the list of written articles and finished
experiments of member of the Faculty of Agriculture at
Jordan University enumerated by al-Faqih (1980). It must be
pointed out at the outset that assessment of quality,
significance, or the degree of relevance of these works is
beyond the competence of the present author. A few
observations relevant to our purposes, however, can be made.
In the first place, of over 180 projects, more than 70,
or 40 per cent, are directly related to vegetables. The
majority of these were conducted in the Jordan Valley where
the Faculty of Agriculture was granted a 1,200 dunum farm.
Moreover, modern technologies, and plastic houses in
particular, despite their recent entry on the farming scene,
claim at least one-third of vegetable research articles. The
use of modern inputs on the farm has thus induced the
undertaking of scientific research. It must be noted, on the
other hand, that this represents a bias in research
activities in favor of irrigated agriculture and plastic
houses, not unlike the bias referred to in investment
allocations.
In the second place, R&D projects appear to be
concentrated on plant disease control, improvement of crops
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and yields, soil problems, and socio-economic appraisal.
They are thus of the applied and experimental, not of the
fundamental, type. Only one out of 17 agricultural R&D
projects completed by the end of 1976, for instance, was
classified as fundamental (Saket, 1978:41). In terms of the
phases of technology transfer and accumulation, R&D is
essentially adaptive and seeks to achieve proper or optimal
effectiveness of imported technology. Invention and
innovation, such as the development of locally bred seed
varieties or methods of plant disease control, are probably
beyond the present capabilities of the research
institutions.
It is obvious then that the level of technological
accumulation in the R&D field is higher than that on the
farm. Macro studies of technological accumulation therefore
may overestimate its levels: they measure what exists in
"theory", not in practice. The gap between technological
capabilities in the R&D institutions and the farm stems from
widespread illiteracy and a low degree of educational
attainment among farmers and farm laborers as well as from
deficiencies in extension and services.
The channels through which extension services are
rendered may be divided into two types: informal, among
farmers themselves, and formal, by the private sector and
the government.
Transmission of information on agricultural practices
among farmers is difficult to gauge. In a questionaire to a
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sample of 200 farmers in two villages in the Valley, 100 in
each, Gammoh (1981:107) found that 18 of them in one village
obtained technical advice from neighboring farmers, and only
9 in the other village did so. His finding probably
underestimates the degree of exchange among farmers, since
he considers only direct requests for information and
overlooks learning by observation or through the mobility of
workers and sharecroppers.
The private sector's role in extension is minimal,
restricted as it is to offering advice to farmers upon the
sale of materials (Aresvik, 1976:237). Such advice may not
always be well informed or accurate, and may be colored at
times by the desire to sell the product. Salesmen have been
most active in the promotion and marketing of drip
irrigation systems by facilitating credit arrangements and
acquainting farmers with the system's operations (Attiyyah,
1982).
Extension has hence remained primarily in the
government's domain. In this type of extension, technical
advice is relayed to farmers by visiting agents, and by
farmers themselves seeking it from agents. Forums held in
villages, a daily radio program, and occasional pamphlets
are additional means of extension services (e.g., Ministry
of Agriculture, 1979).
A consensus exists that government extension service is
seriously inadequate (al-Faqih, 1980; Aresvik, 1976; Gammoh,
1981; National Planning Council, 1980). Numerical
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inadequacy, insufficient training, and multiple tasks of
extension personnel are cited as characterizing the service.
A single extension agent may be responsible for providing
advice in 7 to 16 villages (Aresvik, 1976:235). In the
Jordan Valley, the number drops to 5 (Dajani, 1980b:246-
249). The available agents possess only intermediate
qualification. In some villages school teachers provide
information they receive from the Ministry of Education,
which may not tally with what the Ministry of Agriculture
recommends (Aresvik, 1876:235). Extension agents are,
moreover, assigned to other tasks, such as collection of
statistics, some financial matters, administrative work, and
writing of reports about their areas (Ibid.) The result, as
Gammoh (1981) concludes, is that extension advice is
infrequent, technically inadequate, and not done in the
field.
Summary
The purpose of this chapter was to appraise the manner
in, and the extent to, which the technological
transformation of the Valley's agriculture
accentuated/attentuated the region's and the country's
dependence. To do this systematically, we employed a
modified classification outline proposed by Ougaard for
assessing a society's dependence. The outline is grounded in
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the notion of societal reproduction structure. According to
it, a society's level of dependence, looked at in physical
terms, is to be found, first of all, in its capacity to
reproduce three levels of goods: consumer, intermediate, and
capital. We suggested that in the contemporary world, a
second aspect, namely technology, must be added. Second, the
level of dependence is to be found not only in the capacity
to produce these goods and generate technology, but also in
the degree to which the production sectors are linked to
each other. Because the complexity of today's production
processes render collective, rather than individual, self-
reliance a realistic alternative to dependence, we analyzed
Jordan's dependence in the context of its regional,
primarily Arab, context. It was hypothesized that in the
transition betwen dependence and collective self-reliance,
dependence of states within a region is made up of two
components, first and second order dependence.
We were concerned with country-level implications of
modernizing the Valley's agriculture, and therefore first
sought to gauge the strength of the physical reproduction
structures of the national economy. It was found that
Jordan's economy was essentially a service, mercantile type,
with weak backward and forward linkages and an extraordinary
degree of reliance on imports and exports. The imports were
concentrated in the metropoles whereas exports were
concentrated in the Arab region and Asian Third World
countries. The Arab region itself was shown to be heavily
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dependent. We inferred that the two components of Jordan's
dependence, the first and second order, fell between P-1 and
P-2 in Ougaard's hierarchy. To this we added the proviso
that the second order component contained a process of
regional integration which, if it continued and involved
more states in the region and wider aspects of their
economies, could make collective self-reliance in the region
possible.
The relative position of agriculture within the national
economy was then described by its share in GDP, exports,
imports, employment, and its linkages with other sectors. It
was seen that the sector's importance has declined over
time, partly due to the stagnation of the rainfed areas, and
partly because of the increased differentiation of the
economy. Even so, agriculture still remained the chief
"productive" sector after mining, and a vital source of ex-
ports. In 1979-1980, for instance, agricultural exports
comprised over one-quarter of the conntry's total exports.
Within the agricultural sector, the Valley's agriculture was
shown to be the most dynamic and strategic branch, whether
in terms of investments or comparative output.
The impact of the proliferation of modern inputs on
external linkages was measured by their effects on exports
and imports. The steady growth of agricultural output
deriving from the technologies led to a steady growth in
exports. The export market, centered in the countries of the
Arab East, has, for several reasons, become unstable. We
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argued that the increase of exports was two-edged: insofar
as it fosters Arab integration, it can be thought of as a
"counter-dependency" measure, but insofar as the export
market is volatile and not guaranteed, its impact on the
country's trade and the Valley's farmer is akin to dependent
trade. Dependence on imports was accentuated, thanks to the
greater requirements of material inputs by the new
technologies, particularly plastic houses. The trade balance
between Ghor exports and imports suffered continually a net
deficit. The import bill for plastic houses was found to be
far greater than for drip irrigation, measured per unit of
area.
The internal linkages generated by the new technologies
were assessed in terms of their supply of consumer food
items, supply and purchase of intermediate goods, and
contribution to the accumulation of technology. The supply
of food was uneven: larger quantities were made available of
some crops and smaller quantities of others. Moreover, the
rise in the price index of vegetables was greater than for
other goods, making them less available for segments of the
population in the lower income brackets. The supply of
intermediate goods was confined to providing tomatoes to the
small tomato paste factory which was established in the Ghor
to absorb some of the surplus produce. The backward linkages
consisted of the manufacturing of drip irrigation parts,
enhancement of the poultry industry through the purchase of
larger quantities of manure, and the emergence of supporting
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services. Drip irrigation was shown to have contributed more
to internal linkages than plastic houses.
The contribution of modern methods to the accumulation
of technology was analyzed at the farm and national levels.
The existing evidence suggested that the accumulation of
technology was confined to the phase of material transfer,
poor usage of materials being common. Nationally, merchants
import materials from many countries, and, in the case of
drip irrigation, they began to buy parts rather than the
more costly whole systems, which indicated that an
independent choice decision was achieved. The agricultural
R&D is limited to experiments on the proper optimal
application of material; innovation is lacking. The
introduction of the modern technologies to the Valley, in
short, accentuated the country's dependence on imports and
exports, but was not devoid of internal spillover effects.
Endnotes
1. Ougaard attributes the ideas in his article to the work
done by several researchers, John Martinussen being the
chief contributor, at the Institute of Political Science,
University of Aarhus, Denmmark. We refer to "Ougaard's
schema" for convenience.
2. Our measure of import concentration indicated by the
ratio of imports originating from one country or a group of
countries to total imports is very crude. It is sufficient
for our purposes, however, since most imports obviously
originate in the center. For less clear cut cases or for
making international comparisons, a superior measure of
import concentration often used by economists is the one
proposed by A. Hirschman. It is given by the formula:
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where
C= import concentration
N= value of imports from country, or group of countries
X.= total imports
= 1 to n
Y1= number of countries from which imports are bought
The formula is used to measure export and commodity
concentration as well, by substituting the analogous terms
(Taylor, 1972:347).
3. See, for example, Mazur (1979:157-175) and Smadi and
Stetieh (1974). The bias in favor of irrigated agriculture
has not been peculiar to Jordan. The Green Revolution in
Asia and Mexico has also been confined to irrigated regions
(Cleaver, 1973). John Gurley suggests that such preference
falls in line with the capitalist development ideology of
"building the best" dictated by the principle of efficiency
(Ibid. : 191).
4. In absolute terms, investment was equal to JD 55.7
million at 1976 current prices, Sixty per cent of these came
from the private sector (National Planning Council, 1980:6).
5. At current prices, the average rate of growth = 11.4 per
cent (Table 4.7). The inflation rate during the same period
ranged from 10 to 20 per cent (Mazur, 1979:100). Hence, at
an average inflation rate of 15 per cent, the growth rate of
agricultural production = 4.6 per cent.
6. This is obtained form Dar al-Handasah, 1981, Tables Al.3
and Al.4. Total intermediate imported flows = JD 11.62
million; domestic flows = JD 20.11 million.
7. We were unable to find figures for actual investments in
this period.
8. Wheat normally takes 60 per cent of the cropped area,
followed by barley which is planted in drier zones (Mazur,
1979:158).
9. The assumption most likely underestimates the region's
exports as can be seen from the quarterly export figures.
The bulk of exporting takes place during the first two
quarters, which coincides with the Ghor's harvest time
(Central Bank of Jordan, 1984:Table 22).
10. This figure is obtained from Table 4.11 by averaging the
values for 1971-1972 and 1979-1980, and dividing the
difference by 10. Inflation is assumed to be 15 per cent
annually.
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11. Growth rate of demand = (E x I) + P where E = Income
elasticity of demand; I = Rate of growth of GNP per capita;
P = Rate of population growth. Numerically, E = .2 per cent
(Arevisk, 1976:157); I = 9.1 per cent (World Bank, 1983),
and P = .3 per cent.
12. This number is calculated from Table 4.12 averaging the
values between 1971-1972 and 1979-1980 and dividing the
difference by 10 years. The annual rate of inflation is
assumed to be 15 per cent.
13. Water consumption has been discussed in Chapter 3.
14. There are other types of linkages that must be taken
into consideration in a full evaluation of the linkages,
such as the services rendered by repair workshops or the
growth of box manufacturing to meet the need of rising
output.
15. The survey includes 30 farmers and does not claim to be
statistically representative of the Valley's farm
population. See also League of Arab States, 1974, and the
Ministry of Agriculture, Annual Reports.
16. Bull estimates that out of the 500,000 cases of reported
pesticide poisoning in 1972, half of them occurred in the
Third World, with 6,700 cases being fatal. Third World
consumption of these chemicals, however, amounted to only 15
per cent of global consumption.
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Chapter 5
CONCLUSION
Here, we indicate the significance of findings in the
preceding chapters for applications. In Section I, final
evaluation is made of the appropriateness of the existing
agricultural practices, given conditions prevailing in the
Valley and national priorities. In Section II, the
hypotheses of the Dependency perspective, set out in models
I and II (Chapter I), are examined in light of the
historical experience of Jordan's agriculture and the
Valley's agricultural transformation after World War II.
Finally, issues raised in the Green Revolution literature on
technological diffusion are compared with the results found
in the Ghor's agriculture.
Section I
Which Technology is Appropriate?
In Chapters 3 and 4, we analyzed the attributes and
impact of various technologies employed in Valley
agriculture. Here,we synthesize these results and rate the
technologies as to their "appropriateness." The notion of
appropriate technology has come to replace and subsume
several notions of technology, such as intermediate, low
cost, labor-intensive, and surplus-maximizing which
prevailed during the 1970s. The term "appropriate" is broad
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enough to include a variety of technological choices. It is,
in addition, relative, whereas the other terms are absolute
and thus require verification against specific criteria and
conditions. Furthermore, appropriateness is judged against
multiple criteria, as opposed to the single criterion other
technological notions employ. Because multiple criteria
contain, in all likelihood, complementary and conflicting
elements, they help clarify the gains as well as compromises
entailed by technological choice (Dobrska, 1981; Eckaus,
1977).
The criteria against which the appropriateness of the
drip irrigation and plastic houses employed in the Valley's
agriculture will be weighed are: (1) resource use (land,
labor, capital, water), (2) social equity, and (3) linkage
(internal and external) generation. Several remarks
regarding these criteria are in order. First, the order in
which they are listed does not signify relative weight, only
presentational convenience. Second, they are not mutually
exclusive. For instance, increasing yields (intensification
of land use) may necessitate securing export markets, hence
amplifying external linkages. Whether the two goals
complement or contradict each other depends on the existing
conditions in the country. Third, only three technologies
are compared: traditional, drip irrigation, and plastic
houses. Plastic tunnels have not found wide acceptance and
may be discontinued. Finally, appropriateness is to be
judged from a societal point of view, not just from that of
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users, for captialist farmers base their technological
choise principally, and often solely, on considerations of
profit. On family run farms, other criteria may be added,
such as physical effort and leisure time, but in neither
case are wider social and national priorities be taken into
account.
With respect to labor use, both drip irrigation and
plastic houses generate more employment opportunities than
traditional agriculture. But how important is employment
generation in the Jordan Valley context? A commonly held
view of the Third World countryside is that it contains a
large resevoir of surplus labor. This is not always the
case, however, as illustrated by the Ghor. A steady process
of migration to urban centers and to neighboring countries,
as well as employment in the government, have strained the
supply of agricultural labor. A recent survey (Snobar,
1984:160) reveals that the agricultural sector as a whole is
losing farmers and farm workers of Jordanian nationality,
and that farming is becoming a part-time occupation. In the
Jordan Valley, the population has stabilized at about 75,000
since 1974 (Fraenkel, 1980:29). Because of tight labor
markets in Jordan and the region as a whole in the wake of
the oil-based economic boom and the inhospitality of the
climate in the Valley for human habitation in summer time,
relative to the adjacent plateau region, population growth
and attendant labor supply are likely to be checked in the
future (Ibid.). The extra labor needed at present is
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supplied by Egypt. Whether, and to what extent, employment
generation is a desirable objective in the Ghor rests on
whether Jordan is to be taken alone as the unit of analysis
or as a part of the regional Arab context. The creation of
employment is not a priority in Jordan itself today. And
plastic houses, especially, with their greater labor inputs,
may not be desirable.
If Jordan is viewed in its regional context, however,
the answer becomes less obvious. The migrant workers come
primarily from Egypt which, unlike Jordan, has a large
resevoir of surplus labor (Ibrahim, 1982). From a regional
perspective, creating employment opportunities may then be a
desireable goal. In economic terms, employment increases the
market size and encourages the establishment of local
industries. Dependency theorists often cite the small market
size in Third World nations as a major obstacle to
industrialization. But in the Middle East, labor remittances
have exacerbated the problem of import dependence, as we
have seen. Such questions relating to inter-Arab migration
are of direct relevance to the Dependency perspective; they
are, however, beyond the scope of this text. The point here
is that they must be considered when evaluting how
desireable employment generation is.
Another aspect of labor input, besides employment, is
physical exertion. This is often overlooked in the
assessment of agricultural technologies. Traditional
agricultural practices in the Valley are physically
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draining, particularly zig-zag furrowing and irrigation.
Drip irrigation makes possible the mechanization of both
tasks, thus acquiring an edge over traditional agriculture
or plastic houses without drip.
Drip irrigation as well as plastic houses are capital-
intensive technologies, the latter being much more so than
the former, whereas traditional agriculture is labor
intensive. Financing the technologies was made possible by
making capital available to richer farmers, either from
their private sources or as loans from credit institutions
and commercial banks the liquidity of which swelled during
the 1970s. Nonetheless capital outlays for these techologies
are comparable to those for agriculture in developed
countries. If we bear in mind that Jordan is only a "middle
income country," with a considerable portion of its income
originating abroad in the form of aid, grants, and
remittances, large capital outlays, especially of plastic
houses, may represent a misallocation of resources. This
conclusion becomes even more warranted in light of the fact
that the rainfed sector, which constitutes over 90 per cent
of arable land area in the country, has received only meager
investments.
In addition to labor and capital, water consumption is
another resource to be accounted for in determining the
appropriateness of an agricultural technology in an arid
place like Jordan. Drip irrigation uses less water per dunum
than plastic houses or traditional technology. It is
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therefore more favorable to local conditions than either of
the other two. Plastic houses, on the other hand, are the
least favorable due to their greater water requirements.
The final resource of moment in the context of Jordan is
land. The arable land area per person in the country is only
about 2.5 dunums. Plastic houses offer yields that are
superior to those of drip irrigation, and by far surpass
those of traditional agriculture. Hence, they are more
suited to Jordan's scarcity of arable land than the other
two technologies. Linked to yields is surplus generation,
and it goes without saying that plastic houses are the more
appropriate technology in this respect.
The second major criterion according to which
technological appropriateness is to be assessed is the
impact of the technologies on social equity. The ways in
which traditional agriculture, drip irrigation, and plastic
houses have affected equity vary among social classes. In
the case of labor, both drip irigation and plastic houses
can be said to have made a positive contribution to equity
inasmuch as they have opened employment opportunities.
Although wages fell following the inflow of foreign workers,
women receive higher wages than they did formerly, and their
wages have become equal to those of men. The foregoing
picture looks different, however, when seen in relative
terms. The returns to labor, measured by the increment of
wages in gross or even net returns, are small both from drip
irrigation and plastic houses, but they are greater in
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traditional agriculture. Put differently, capital has gained
a disproportionately higher share of the revenues generated
by the new technologies, widening the gap between the
incomes of workers and capitalist farmers.
As for sharecroppers, they have been included in over
ninety per cent of the farm area covered by drip irrigation.
The old fifty-fifty system of sharing costs and returns
still holds. Sharecroppers may even pay less than fifty per
cent of the costs and receive fifty per cent of the
revenues. Their relative incomes may have risen under drip
irrigation, but their smaller contribution to costs, coupled
with the reduction of the sizes of the plots they till,
makes them more providers of capital and less of labor, a
change that may have compromised their power position vis-a-
vis landowners. It is difficult to assess the impact of the
plastic houses on the sharecroppers, because they have been
all but excluded from sharing in the techology. The
sharecroppers included in it come most frequently from
professional backgrounds, not from the traditional pool of
sharecroppers.
Among landlords, incomes of those who have not adopted
the techologies lags behind the incomes of those who have.
The uneven diffusion of the new technologies has produced a
new dualism within the Valley itself, between adopters and
non-adopters. Inequalities deriving from land distribution
have thus been furthered by drip irrigation, and, even more
so, by the lucrative plastic houses.
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Finally, the appropriateness of the technologies is to
be measured against their relative contributions to the
national economy. All material inputs--machinery,
pesticides, fertilizers--are imported. This is true for
traditional agriculture as well as the other two
technologies. The only exceptions are components of the drip
system. Besides the manufacturing of these components, the
only other internal linkage generated by the new
technologies of consequence occurred in the R&D field. So
internal linkages generation has been minimal. By contrast,
external linkages, imports and exports, are extensive.
Plastic houses score highest on material imports followed by
drip irrigation and then traditional agriculture. Such
outcomes make drip irrigation and, to a greater extent,
plastic houses incompatible with the country's need to
reduce its imports.
In conclusion, it can be said that plastic houses are
the least compatible of the three technologies with the
local resource base, standard of equity, and reduction of
the country's dependence, whereas drip irrigation is the
most. Plastic houses may indeed be an inappropriate
technology for Jordan's agriculture at the current stage of
the country's development.
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Section II
Some Implications for the Dependency Perspective
A case study does not lend itself to the drawing of
general conclusions. It may, at best, confirm or refute
certain hypotheses, bring forth previously overlooked or
underemphasized aspects of phenomena, and point to new
directions for future inquiries. The following discussion of
what the present study implies for the Dependency
perspective should be seen in this light.
By the Dependency perspective we specifically refer to
models I and II, constructed in Chapter 1. The two models
both show that development and underdevelopment in the Third
World can be properly analyzed only by examining the
interrelationships among the local systems of production and
exchange, the State, and the world-system at large. The
weight each factor exerts, and the outcomes of their
interactions, are historically specific and can be
discovered only through empirical investigations.
In brief, elements of Model I can be stated as follows.
The mercantile nature of international capital, and the
colonial, or the oligrachical and mercantile-based states in
the periphery, conspired to drain surplus from Third World
nations into the developed ones, and from the hinterlands to
the cities; little incentive existed for industrialization
or agricultural development because of external competition,
and when investment was undertaken, it was limited to raw
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matierals of a single cash crop. The rest of the
agricultural sector was kept stagnant and industry remained
largely absent.
Model II describes countervailing trends with regard to
surplus and its utilization, engendered by the alteration of
the structure of the world economy and polity after the
Second World War. Model II can be summarized as follows. (1)
The size of the surplus is augmented. (2) Investment takes
place in industry and much less so in agriculture. (3) The
state is a central agency of economic development. (4) The
resulting development excludes the majority of the
population. (5) The international system is characterized by
varying degrees of bipolarity among capitalist, socialist,
and mixed-economy states. (6) The MNCs are major economic
actors and promote certain types of industrial development.
Furthermore, it has been indicated that, roughly
speaking, the two models apply to two different historical
periods: model I to the period preceding the Second World
War, and model II to the period following it. The rest of
the section compares and contrasts the findings of the
preceding chapters with these two models: the historical
changes in Jordan's agriculture before World War II are
compared to model I, and the Valley's agricultural
transformation after World War II is compared to model II.
The creation of the Jordanian state--the grafting of the
Hashemite dynasty onto the country, the setting up and
financing of an administrative apparatus and army, and the
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building of basic infrastructure--was accomplished primarily
by the British. This complete restructuring of the social
formation in Jordan even transcends the broad view of
Dependency as to how development and underdevelopment in a
peripheral region are conditioned by the center. The
founding of the Jordanian state, however, was motivated by
Britain's geopolitical, rather than economic, interest in
the country. Its imperatives dictated the mandate power's
rural policy. In order to divert the loyalties of villagers
and tribesmen away from their localities to the new center
of authority in Amman, Britain abolished the part-communal,
part individual land tenure regime (the mushac) and launched
a largely successful campaign of land registration and title
settlement. It sought to win the allegiance of the rural and
tribal elites by offering them or their relatives
administrative or army posts, and, in some instances, by
granting them large tracts of land. It did not invest in
agriculture nor change the cropping pattern as it did in
Egypt and Sudan to obtain supplies of cotton. Neither did
Britian "drain surplus" from agriculture. This conclusion is
difficult to reconcile with model I, which stipulates that
surplus would be drained from the periphery to the center.
Although it is true that the agrarian regime was altered
as a result of being incorporated into the center's
"orbit,", as Dependency theorists would suggest, only
production relations were affected in the main. The
motivations that shaped the change were geopolitical.
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Influenced by the Leninist theory of imperialism, Dependency
theorists have a tendency to accent the economic factor, and
downplay the political. Of course, not all writers do this
to the same degree. Politics for Cardoso, for example, is
crucial in explaining development in the Third World
(1979:177-216). Our case study testifies to the importance
of the political factor. Attempts to explain the dynamics of
state creation and agricultural policy in Jordan during the
mandate period on the basis of immediate British economic
interests are bound to fail.
The ensuing production relations in agriculture varied
across the country. Some have been identified as "tribal,"
others as "semi-feudal," and still others as "capitalist."
But many questions--such as how entrenched was the oligarchy
and what were the mechanisms of control over the tiller and
extraction of surplus--are still unanswered. The historical
record in Jordan is sketchy, and current categorizations of
production relations as being this or that type must be
taken as tentative. It is therefore difficult to state
whether model I's postulate that oligarchies or large
landownerships are the dominant form of agrarian relations
obtains.
Agricultural practices and productivity, on the other
hand, are known to have remained unchanged, as model I would
anticipate. This was not, as has already been discussed,
because of surplus transfer to the center. The causes of
stagnation remain open historical questions: was surplus
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meager? Did oligarchs and tribal chiefs maximize it through
extra-economic means rather than by increasing labor
productivity? Did the availability of alternative sources of
income in the army and bureaucracy reduce the importance of
agriculture as a source of livelihood, and hence the
willingness to invest in it?
Next we compare findings from the experience of Jordan
Valley agriculture after the Second World War with model II.
Relations of production are treated first, followed by the
manner in which the interaction between the three factors--
local, state, world system--effected the agricultural
transformation, and finally, the characteristics of this
transformation.
By the late 1950s, agricultural production in the Ghor
was overwhelmingly geared for the market. Wage labor also
grew steadily, in part as a result of the diffusion of the
new technologies. Wage labor and commodity production are
the primary features that define capitalism. It can thus be
said that the Valley's agriculture has become increasingly
capitalist. The existence of sharecroppers, who are neither
wage laborers nor landowners, does not conflict with this
conclusion. Sharecroppers are "freely" recruited in the
market. There is no system of patronage or other extra-
economic coercion mechanism that tie them to a particular
landowner. Landlords or commission agents may exploit
sharecroppers through high-interest credit or in the
marketing process, but this is not the chief source of
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profit for the landlord, because increasing labor
productivity through technological innovation is more
lucrative. Furthermore, the position of sharecroppers, in
both income and status, is one notch above wage workers. In
a sense, they may be viewed as a "semi-peripheral" class,
between landowners and laborers. They may thus function as a
buffer between these two classes, and prevent class
polarization. If this is the case, it would be similar to
the function of the semi-peripheral states in Wallerstein's
world-system scheme. Be that as it may, sharecropping as
practiced in the Valley's agriculture is compatible with
agrarian capitalism. Not every sharecropping system can
therefore be dubbed "pre-capitalist" or "semi-feudalist."
Only after the specific relations governing the regime have
been explicated can the productive relations be categorized.
Owner-operated holdings, cultivated mainly by family
labor, on the other hand, pose a different problem.
Information that would enable us to characterize the family
labor-based mode of production is lacking. But what is known
for certain is that family-operated farms were producing for
the market at the time of the 1960 census. So it can be said
that the family farms have been capitalized in the sphere of
exchange, not production. Family labor still makes up a
signficant proportion of total labor, although its
importance has been on the decline. Dependency writers,
notably S. Amin, argue that capitalism in the periphery
lacks the necessary vigor to transform the "pre-capitalist"
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mode into a capitalist one. This hypothesis holds true for
the situation in the Ghor today.
The radical transformation in agricultural technology,
we have shown, was facilitated by opportunities created
externally: the construction of irrigation works beginning
in the early 1960s and the Arab economic upsurge following
the rise in oil prices in 1973. Irrigation works were funded
by the United States. The motivations for U.S. involvement
in the Valley were political, stemming from its wider
geopolitical interest in Jordan, which it inherited from
Britain. The U.S sought to ensure stability in the Middle
East as part of its policy of containment of the Soviet
Union. The water dispute among Jordan, Israel, and Syria in
the early 1950s, together with the presence of Palestinian
refugees in the area, was seen by the U.S. as a source of
threat to this stability. Thus the East Ghor Canal and the
accompanying development scheme were designed to resolve the
water dispute and resettle the refugees. Once again,
Dependency theorists, with their emphasis on the economic
and the urban in the post-War period, are hard pressed to
explain such results, though they would help us see the
issue within the specifics of the global system.
The rise of oil prices, on the other hand, provided the
surplus, export market, and migrant labor which made on-the-
farm technological transformation possible. Ghor produce is
exported to Arab states, not to center countries as the
Dependency perspective would assume. We suggested that this
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should be seen as a contribution to regional Arab
development and food self-reliance. This export market,
however, has been volatile, thanks to inter-Arab political
disputes and lack of coordination on food policy among the
region's governments. The case thus illustrates some of the
problems that have to be dealt with if collective self-
reliance is to be realized.
The third factor that, in addition to the local and
global system of production and exchange, contributed to the
agricultural transformation of the Valley is the Jordanian
state. Characteristics of the Jordanian state, which would
shed light on its agricultural policy (or lack thereof) in
general, and the Valley in particular, have not been a
concern of this thesis. Only brief descriptions of its role
have therefore been offered. The state's intervention has
been confined to off-the-farm projects, save for the
truncated land reform and the banning of land sales. The
state neither invests in land improvement nor dictates what
farmers ought to produce. It does not even regulate the sale
or use of inputs like pesticides. The off-the-farm schemes
consisted mainly of infrastructural facilities, the
financing of which has been provided by international, and
mainly U.S., aid.
While the infrastructural projects, built by the state,
have been crucial for on-the-farm technological
transformation, it would be difficult to call the state's
role "entreprenurial"--the property that, according to model
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II lends the state its vigor. But according to Duvall
(1983), for the state to be called an entrepreneur it must
own, solely or jointly, economic enterprises, and run them
by market criteria. As in the case of most Third World
agricultural scetors, these conditions are not present in
Jordan Valley agriculture. The entreprenurial aspect of this
may then apply to industry, not agriculture.
The last topic in the Valley's agricultural
transformation that may be fruitfully compared to model II
pertains to the technologies used, and their socio-economic
ramifications. We have already discussed the attributes of
the technologies in section I. The attribute that is
relevant to model II is the capital intensity of the
technologies. Both drip irrigation and plastic covers are
capital-intensive technologies. Model II criticizes use of
capital-intensive technologies in the Third World primarily
because they fail to generate sufficient employment
opportunities. Employment may be a decisive criterion for
evaluating the technology in places where unemployment is
widespread. Yet, through reference to more inclusive
criteria and local conditions, we concluded that drip
irrigation, though capital intensive, is superior to
traditional cultivation practices, and is appropriate to the
Ghor's agriculture.
The socio-economic results of the technological
transformation, however, conform to model II's notion of
"uneven development." First, the major beneficiaries have
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been the big landowners; the income gap between this stratum
and sharecroppers and wage laborers has widened. The
diffusion of the technologies among landowners, too, has
been uneven; small farmers and many medium farmers typically
have been left out of the adoption process. It is useful to
point out in this connection that it is not the relations of
production alone that determine whether accumulation takes
place in agriculture, but also the size of landholdings. For
the size of landholdings, among other things, determines the
size of surplus available to farmers and consequently their
access to technology. This aspect is often overlooked in the
"mode of production" debate as a factor affecting
accumulation.
The consequences of the transformation for the rest of
the economy, expressed in terms of internal and external
linkages, is also revealing in relation to model II. Model
II asserts, with little empirical evidence, that imported
technology does not succeed in establishing strong linkages
with other sectors of the economy. Agricultural
transformation in the Valley has not been devoid of
spillover effects, but on the whole they are weak, a
conclusion that corroborates model II. Still, much needs to
be done in Dependency discourse on the spillover effects of
technology importation.
The resulting external linkages, on the other hand, have
surpassed the internal linkages, both in terms of imports of
inputs and exports of produce. The rise in the import of
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agricultural intermediates parallels the rise of industrial
intermediate imports in Third World import-substitution
industry. Model II holds also on this point. The question of
exports has been analyzed previously.
To sum up, the nature of historical change in Jordan's
agriculture has been found to agree only in part with model
I. Some aspects of the model could not be verified because
of the sketchy state of historical writing on Jordan. The
dynamics of the transformation of the Valley's agriculture,
on the other hand, conform substantially to model II.
Overall, the discrepancies between our results and the two
models can be attributed to Dependency theorists' lack of
attention to: (1) aspects of technology other than its
capital intensity, (2) spillover effects produced by
technology once introduced, and (3) trade among Third World
countries.
Section IV
Some Implications for Diffusion Studies
The technological revolution in Jordan Valley
agriculture differs in scale from what has come to be known
as the Green Revolution. The technologies of the latter
consist of High Yield Varieties (HYV) seeds, chemical
fertilizers, pesticides, and sometimes, mechanization. The
Ghor's technological revolution has gone far beyond these
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inputs and transformed the entire gamut of traditional
agricultural practices. The capital investments required to
bring it about were of a different order of magnitude. As
such, it may be called a super-Green Revolution.
Diffusion research is micro-oriented. It focuses
primarily on the diffusion of technology in particular
localities: its extent, underlying causes and consequences,
and, quite frequently, policy recommendation arising.
Implications for the national economy have been explored far
less. The present study also focuses on local diffusion but,
in addition, it appraises the contributions of the Valley's
agricultural trasnformation to the structure, linkages, and
other aspects of Jordan's ecoomy. We have already discussed
these contributions. What is relevant here are the questions
they raise appropos of devising an optimal development
strategy for agricultural development. How are investment
outlays to be distributed among agricultural sectors? At
what price will consumers obtain the produce and how will
various income groups be affected? Is a particular
technology more likely to generate wider spillover effects
than another? Will the national research institution be
capable of adopting the technology to local conditions? What
impact will the technologies have on exports and imports?
etc. The stress on the locality, while necessary because it
touches upon the sector and population most affected, is
insufficient from a national development strategy
perspective.
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With respect to adopters, we have found that most of
them have been, up to the time of the study, big landowners
and city professionals. It is too early to tell the extent
to which the new technologies will be disseminated in the
future. But the constraints against their adoption are
substantial among small farmers and, to a lesser degree,
medium farmers.
These results are comparable to those where the Green
Revolution took place. Among the countries of the Indian
subcontinent for instance, only in India has Green
Revolution technology been widely diffused. Even there, the
adoption among small farmers is widespread only in wheat
production, not in rice. In Pakistan, the technology has not
"trickled down" to small farmers even after a long period
has elapsed since its introduction and adoption by big
farmers, nor has it in Bangladesh where the majority of
landholdings are small (Singh, 1979:52-62).
The central factor that we found to affect the capacity
of a farmer to adopt the new technologies is access--to
surplus and credit. Access, in turn, rests primarily on
landownership. The size of his landholding determines a
farmer's surplus from the land and his ability to obtain
credit and take risks. It is obvious that a larger holding
will generate more surplus. Credit institutions, which in
theory could augment small farmers' surplus, have been shown
to favor big landlords: they have sufficient collateral
against which they can borrow, and they exert influence
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within the lending institutions themselves. The bias in
dispensing credit is similar to what has been observed in
many Third World rural areas (Gordon, 1976). These findings
suggest that it is unrealistic to expect that credit will
reach small farmers so long as the rural power structure
itself is asymmetrical. In order to succeed, credit-for-
small-farmers programs must be accompanied by efforts to
curb the power of the rrual elites.
An analysis of risk has indicated that if risk taking is
at all essential in a farmers' decision to adopt a
particular technology, as some economists and sociologists
argue, it does not lie in his psychic constitution but in
his assets. This view has gained wider acceptance in recent
years. Risk analyses, however, have stressed production and
often overlooked the marketing sphere. In the Jordan Valley,
the volatility of the market, especially after the
introduction of the new technologies, has come to be a more
serious source of threat to farmers' incomes than
production. Unless appropriate pricing policy measures are
taken, marketing constitutes an important source of
uncertainty. The emphasis in the literature on production is
understandable: first, it is easier to apprehend because the
factors affecting it exist on the farm; and second, if
production fails, pricing policies could be of little value.
But where new technologies are introduced and production
grows, a host of factors enter that influence prices,
particularly if crops are destined for export. Risk
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eveluation in the marketing sphere, while difficult, cannot
be overlooked.
In brief, the main conclusions of this section are:
(1) The key to a farmer's capacity to adopt a new technology
lies in his access to resources. This is similar to findings
in what was called here the social-structural model. (2)
Sharecropping does not constitute an obstacle to the
proliferation of technology. This is similar to recent
theory and empirical work, especially that of Cheung and
Griffin. (3) The marketing sphere must be investigated
further as a source of risk. (4) Extension of the domain of
investigation to include the national economy can reveal
aspects of technological change that would not be perceived
by studying the locality alone, as diffusion literature
often has done.
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APPENDICES
Appendix 2.1
Estimation of the Number of Landless in 1959-1960
This estimate is based on figures from the census of the Department of Statistics
(1961).
Total population = 36,877
Number of households = 7,258
Therefore, average size of household = 5.08 members
The ratio of landless households to total household then = 90 per cent
o
The census staff estimated that 78.1 per cent of the workforce was engaged in
agriculture, and that 86 per cent of household heads were employed. Assuming uniform
occupational distribution, the number of household heads engaged in agriculture becomes =
.78 x .86 x 7,258 = 4,875. In other words, the ratio of landless households to those
engaged in agriculture = 85 per cent.
Appendix 3.1
Stage I Irrigation Projects in the Jordan Valley:
Construction Years, Costs, Irrigated Areas
Projects Years Irrigated Costs in Source of
area (dunum) JD millions financial aid
(1) (2) (3) (4)
East Ghor Canal
70 km extension 1962-69 120,000 -- USAID
8 km extension 1966-69 13,000 -- Kuwait Fund
Zarqa River Complex
King Talal Dam 1972-78 Kuwait Fund,
18 km extension of 36,500 56.0 Abu Dhabi Fund,
EGC 1975-78 USAID
Zarqa Irrigation
Project 1975-78 15,000 5.8 USAID
Total 171,000
Source: Dajani et al (1980).
Note: Financial aid may cover part or all of the costs.
km = kilometer
EGC = East Ghor Canal
Appendix 3.2
Division of Labor and Related Work Tasks, Before and After Drip Irrigation in Zbeidat
Work Performed By:
Work task Before drip irrigation After drip irrigation
mach men women child mach men women child change
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Ploughing *
Harrowing
Furrowing
Manuring
Cover ing
manure
Irrigation &
cleaning
furrows *
Plastics &
drip lines
Sowing &
transplanting *
Weeding * *
Spraying * *
Fertilization
Harvesting
Packing
Hauling
Peddling
by road
Appendix 3.2(contd.)
Work Task Work Performed by
Before drip irrigation After drip irrigation
mach men women child mach men women child change
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Clearing drip
lines and
plastic sheets *
Source: Tamari, 1980.
Notes: 1) n.a. = not applicable
2) Zbeidat is a village in the West Jordan Valley
*= applicable
Appendix 3.3
Average Costs of Material Inputs in Traditional Agriculture in the Jordan Valley, 1973
(Values in JDs at current prices)
Input ~ Costs/dunum
(1)
Ploughing and furrowing .62
Chemical fertilizers 4.54
Manure 4.12
Chemical sprays and dusts 1.58
Water 1.24
Total 12.15
Source: Department of Statistics (1973).
Note: The source gives the costs separately for each segment of the valley. To obtain an
average, we weighted the discrete numbers according to area in each segment
to the total area: .57 for the North, .32 for the Middle , and .1 for the South.
Appendix 3.4
Annual Cost Estimates of Drip Irrigation System and Plastic Tunnels and Houses
in the Jordan Valley, 1978-1979
(Values in JDs at current prices)
Equipment Item Purchase price Estimated life Average annual cost
per dunum (years) per dunum
(1) (2) (3)
Drip system
a. Control station 135 10 13.50
b. Main and submain
pipes 40 3 13.33
c. Drippers 80 3 26.67
d. Plastic mulch 25 1 25.00
Total 280 78.50
Plastic tunnels
a. Plastic sheets 42 1 42.00
b. Arc wires 40 3 13.43
c. Pegs and upper wire 4 3 1.40
d. Threads >1 1 .20
Total 87 58.83
Plastic houses
a. Plastic sheets 400 2 200.00
b. Frames 1,300 10 130.00
c. Threads and wire 180 2 90.00
Total 1,718 420.00
Appendix 3.4(contd.)
Source: Cited in Dajani (1980) from Stetieh and Abbas. 1978. A Preliminary Economic
Analysis of Returns from Producing Cucumber and Tomato under Plastic Covers and
Drip Irrigation. Amman, University of Jordan, Faculty of Agriculture (mimeo).
Note: The values in column 3 do not take into account the discount rate. As such, they are
average annual rather than actual costs, which would vary from one year to the next.
Appendix 3.5
Gross and Net Returns from Producing Cucumbers and Tomatoes
under Different Farming Technologies, 1978-1979
Technologies Average Yield
whole- ton/
sale dunum
price
JD/ton
Gross
returns
JD/
dunum
Produc-
tion
costs
JD/
dunum
Market-
ing
costs
JD/
dunum
Total
var ia-
ble
costs
JD/ton
Net
returns
JD/
dunum
Initial Inter-
capital nal
invest- rate
ment of
JD/ton return
Cucumber
a. Plastic
houses and
drip
b. Plastic
houses and
surface
irrigation
c. Plastic
tunnels
and drip
d. Plastic
tunnels and
surface
Tomato
Open farm-
ing
and drip
256.0 8.5
266.5 6.0
283.0 2.2
283.0 1.7
113.8 3.4
2176.0 337.3 313.7 651.0 1525.0 1998.0 >100
1599.0 296.5 225.8 522.3 1076.7 1718.0 >100
622.6 111.4
481.0 111.7
386.9 82.4
85.3 196.7
65.9 177.6
88.7 171.1
425.9 366.7 >100
303.4 86.7 >100
215.8 280.0 >100
7312.9
4871.9
1966.8
1707.8
801.5
Source: Stetieh and Musa (1980).
Net
pre-
sent
worth
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Appendix 3.6
INTRODUCTION OF DRIP IRRIGATION AND PLASTICULTURE
IN THE JORDAN VALLEY
Drip Irrigation
The first landowner to introduce drip irrgation into the
Jordan Valley was al-Sharif Bin Jamil, the maternal uncle of
King Hussein, in 1975. We were told more than once that he
brought the equipment from Israel, with which Jordan has a
trade boycott, and trucked it across the bridge between
Jordan and the West Bank. He used the equipment to irrigate
400 dunums on his farm in the Southern Ghor.
In the following year, an American company, Reed, set up
a branch in Amman to sell drip irrigation equipment. Soon it
was taken over by a local merchant, commission agent, and
landowner in the Ghor, Ibrahim al-Shaykh. It remained the
sole company for the next two years. We interviewed the
company's representative and now partner, al-Haj Said
Atiyyah, who marketed the system in the Ghor. He gave the
following figures, from memory, as he said he had kept no
sales records at the beginning.
Year No. of users Total area Average area
(dunums) (dunums)
1976 3 2000 667
1977 10-12 8000 667-800
Total 13-15 10,000 769-667
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It is worthwhile to mention here that the introduction
of drip irrigation "sabotaged" plans by USDAID/JVA to
install sprinklers at relatively low prices. The
"demonstration effect" persuaded farmers of the
profitability of drip irrigation. At the same time, they
feared that sprinkling of vegetables might exacerbate the
disease problems, and in the case of tomatoes, might crack
the skin (Dajani, et al, 1980:74). Farmers' fears have been
substantiated by consultants who visited the Valley
(Ibid.:74-75). As a result, sprinkler equipment sufficient
to irrigate 93,000 dunums remains in warehouses (Khouri,
1981:186). Only a few sprinklers have been put to use
(Ibid.).
The episode may be read in three ways: (1) as an
illustration of the perils of planning within an unregulated
capitalist economy; (2) as an instance of how planning might
fail if the planned-for farmers are not consulted in
advance; and (3) as an example of how unstudied plans might
fail.
Plastic Houses
Plastic houses were first brought into the Valley on a
commercial basis by a large landowner (Barham, 1982; Khouri,
1981:181). Before starting to work on the family farm, he
spent thirteen years in the United States in car dealing and
racing. In 1974, he imported 25 plastic houses from France
(Barham). Between 1972 and 1974, other wealthy farmers also
imported their own plastic houses, "seeing as none were yet
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available in the market in Amman" (Khouri, 1981:181).
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APPENDIX 3.7
MATHEMATICAL MODELS OF RESOURCE ALLOCATION
UNDER SHARECROPPING
A. The Tax-equivalent Model
Because under sharecropping a portion of every output
unit produced is taken as rent, it is assumed to be
equivalent to ad valorem (by value) excise tax. Hence, the
distribution of output is not the same as with fixed rent of
owner cultivation, where the tiller obtains the entire
incremental product. This gives the tenant less incentive to
work or invest in the land, and inefficiency and stagnation
result.
Mathematically, the approach is illustrated in Figure
3.3
Where,
t = labor input of sharecropper (assumed the only input,
for simplicity)
q = output/unit of labor
w = prevailing wage rate
= marginal tenant cost. Assuming competitive
market it = w
= marginal product of sharecropper
r = landowner's share of yield
= marginal tenant share of yield
The problem can be "solved" in two steps.
Step 1. Under a fixed-rent contract or wage labor the
landowner maximizes his rent at Point B, where q/ t =
(Wt)/ t, and the corresponding quantity of labor is t2. The
total rent accruing to the owner = MBD.
Product
Labor
D
E
M
0
Figure 3.3
tl t Tenant Labor(t)
The Tax-Equivelant Approach
To Sharetenancy
Source: Cheung(1969)
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Step 2. The sharecropper, on the other hand, maximizes his
receipts at Point A, where (Wt/ t) =
( q/ t) (1-v), and the corresponding quantity of labor is t2 '
In this case, the landlord's rent = DEAj, and the
sharecropper's remuneration = Ot1AE or MEA above his
hypothetical earnings OtlAM as a 'wage laborer. From a
landowner's point of view then, there is an economic waste =
ABj. This waste represents the presumed inefficiency of
sharecropping in the tax-equivalent model.
B. Cheung's Model
Cheung's model hinges on the assumption that under
unrestrained property conditions, landowners will opt for
altering the shares in such a way as to make their income
equivalent to that from wage labor or fixed rent. In other
words, the shares are not invariable as in the tax-
equivalent model. Cheung's model also rejects the notion of
marginal tenant receipt curve ( q/ t) (1-r) as illusory. It
argues that, under restrained private property rights,
decisions are made on the basis of average tenant receipts.
The mathematical representation of the problem is shown in
Figure 3.4.
The objective of the landowner is to obtain rent equal
to MBD, and the tenant OMBt 2 . This the landowner achieves by
alloting a new share to himself r* > r. The solution can be
obtained in three steps.
Step 1. Assume the tenant works tl, and receives a share (1-
____________:N W~Q 4b
K H
t ta t 3  Tenant Labor
Figure 3.4 The Tax-Equivalent Apprach and
Cheung's Model of Sharetenancy
Sources Cheung(1969)
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r), then
Rent = EDjA < MDB
Sharecropper receipt = OEAtl > OMBt 2
The solution is unacceptable to the landlord.
Step 2. Assume the tenant works t2 , and receives a share (1-
r), then
Rent = EDBC < MDB Assuming,
Sharecropper receipt = OECt 2 > OMBtl ABC < MEA
Again the solution is unacceptable to the landlord.
Step 3. Assume the tenant works t2 and receives a share (1-
r*), then
Rent = GDBI = MDB Assuming,
Sharecropper receipt = OGIT 2 = OMBT 2 and IKB=GMK
This is the optimal solution for the landowner. It gives the
sharecropper a wage-equivalent income.
The equilibrium becomes
q/ t = (Wt) t = (q/t) (1-r*) at point B, where the
amount of labor is t2 '
While this may actually happen under unrestrained,
private property conditions, and competitive labor market,
it does not mean that the sharecropper is not "exploited" by
the landowner, a position that Cheung (1969: 159) does not
seem to accept. For as we saw, the final solution (Step 3)
is optimal from the landowner's vantage point, but not from
the sharecropper's. The sharecropper could have obtained a
reciept higher than OMBT 2, by working less time and
receiving a higher share (Step 1 or Step 2). But he is
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forced precisely by the competition from wage workers and/or
other sharecroppers to settle for the solution in Step 3
which is less optimal for him.
1. Based on Cheung (1969).
Appendix 3.8
Average Crop Distribution in the Jordan Valley, 1975-1979
Crop Area (dunums) % of Total
(1) (2)
Vegetables
Tomatoes 50,000 20.0
Eggplants 23,000 9.2
Cucumbers 9,000 3.6
Squash 21,000 8.4
Potatos 6,000 2.4
Cauliflower and
cabbage 5,000 2.0
Other 3,500 14.0
Total 148,000 59.2
Fruits
Citrus 27,000 8.4
Bananas 3,000 1.6
Other 3,000 .8
Total 33,000 11.6
Field Crops
Wheat 51,000 20.4
Other 22,000 8.8
Total 73,000 29.2
Total Valley 250,000 100.0
Source: Complied by Dajani et al (1980) from relevant Department of Statistics sample
surveys of the Ghor.
Note: Tables may not add due to rounding.
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Appendix 3.9
Cropping Patterns in the Jordan Valley, 1975-1979
Crop Type Cropped Area (dunums)
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Field crops 93,640 89,040 75,390 62,760 43,970
Vegetables 114,370 145,320 146,220 168,847 168,877
Fruits 25,720 22,070 30,680 32,970 32,910
Total crop area 233,730 256,430 252,290 264,200 245,650
Total cultivated
area 219,600 219,380 202,030 223,250 155,480
Cropping
intensity (%) 106 117 125 118 158
Source: Compiled by Dajani
surveys.
et al (1980) from relevant Department of Statistics sample
Note: Cropping intensity = crop area/cultivated area
Appendix 3.10
Average Yield Per Dunum of Selected Crops Grown in the Jordan Valley, 1975-1979
Crop Average Yield (kg. per dunum)
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 Mean
Tomato 1,763 1,085 981 2,458 2,115 1,680
Eggplant 1,833 1,667 1,158 2,269 2,044 1,794
Cucumber 1,429 1,000 1,000 1,546 1,300 1,255
Squash 1,000 652 1,000 1,708 1,520 1,176
Cauliflower
and cabbage 1,333 500 1,667 2,400 1,500 1,480
Potato 1,333 1,571 1,200 1,333 1,500 1,395
Citrus 706 684 1,650 1,304 963 1,061
Wheat 11 97 98 163 36 102
Source: Compiled by Dajani et
surveys of the Ghor.
al (1980) from relevant Department of Statistics sample
Appendix 3.11
Output of the Major Crops Grown in the Jordan Valley, 1975-1979
Crop Total Output (thousands of tons)
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 Mean
Tomato 67 51 51 145 110 85
Eggplant 33 40 22 59 47 40
Cucumber 10 9 6 17 13 11
Squash 11 15 23 41 38 26
Cauliflower
and cabbage 4 1 5 24 12 9
Potato 4 11 12 8 6 8
Citrus 12 13 33 30 26 23
Wheat 8 6 5 7 1 5
Source: Compiled by Dajani et al (1980) from relevant
surveys of the Ghor.
Department of Statistics sample
Appendix 3.12
Area Distribution of Drip Irrigation and Plastic Covers Among Various Crops
in the Jordan Valley, 1978-1979
(Areas in dunums)
Crop Housesa Tunnelsa Drip Irrigation
Area % Area % Area %
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Vegetables
Tomatoes 27.8 3.7 90 1.5 3,736 43.9
Tomatoes @
other vegs. -- -- 469 7.8 3,301 38.8
Cucumbers 671.5 90.1 4,454 74.0 362 4.3
Other 42.0 5.7 1,002 1.7 1,115 13.3
Total 741.3 100.0 6,015 100.0 8,514 100.0
Fruits
Citrus 989 55.9
Bananas 685 38.7
Other 95 5.4
Total 1,769 100.0
Source: Stetieh and Abbas (1980).
Notes: aHouses and tunnels include both surface and drip irrigation.
Percentages may not add due to rounding.
Appendix 4.1
Production and Exports of Tomatoes in Jordan, 1973-1977
(Units in tons)
Activity 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1973-1977
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Exportsa 38,187 82,604 53,214 67,520 62,587 304,112
Production 83,100 133,500 145,100 87,900 85,700 535,300
Average exports/
production -- -- -- -- -- .57
Source: Royal Scientific Society (1979).
Note: aThe steady level of exports regardless of the amount of production we can see in
the table indicates one of the following conclusions: (1) that in the open-market
economy of Jordan, exports are given priority because they are more profitable;
(2) that the export figures may include some West Bank production, which is
exported through Jordan (the source we consulted, however, specified that the
figures were for the East Bank only); or (3) that there are statistical errors. If
the figures are to be believed, only conclusion (1) is valid.
Appendix 4.2
Estimate of Producer's Price as a Ratio of Purchaser's Price
for Jordan's Agriculture, 1979
The estimate is needed in order for us to be able to determine the value of imports
from on-the-farm production costs. It can be made from the input-output tables, Dar al-
Handasah (1981) gives the values of intermediate inputs for agriculture in three forms:
(1) at purchaser's price for the combination of imported and domestic inputs, (2) at
producer's price for domestic inputs, and (3) at producer's price for imported inputs.
These values are offered in the table below.
Value of inputs at purchaser's price = 79.9 (column 1)
Value of inputs at producer's price = 20.08 + 11.60 = 31.7 (columns 2 and 3)
Therefore, producer's price/purchaser's price = .40
In addition, the table enables us to determine the value of imported to domestic
intermediates:
imported inputs/domestic inputs = 11.66/20.08 = .58
(contd.)
Appendix 4.2 (contd.)
Input Values at Values at producer's price
purchaser's price
imports & domestic Imports Domestic
(1) (2) (3)
1. Agriculture 8.22 2.93 3.54
2. Prepared animal
foods 8.62 2.75 2.37
3. Industrial and
other chemicals 5.60 3.79 1.33
4. Petroleum refinery .46 .12 .32
5. Rubber and plastic .28 .24 .00
6. Machinery
(non-electrical) .58 .42 .04
7. Water supply 1.44 .00 1.44
8. Distribution 52.92 1.10 10.33
9. Transportation .82 .32 .48
10. Finance services .08 .03 .05
11. Other services .18 .00 .18
Total 79.20 11.66 20.08
Source: Dar al-Handasah Consultants (1981) .
Appendix 4.3
Consultants and Contractors for Stage I Irrigation Projects in the Jordan Valley
Project Consultant Contractor
(1) (2)
East Ghor Canal
a. 70 km extension larza Engineering Co. Imprese Vanete
(U.S.A.) (Italy)
b. 8 km extension Harza Engineering Co. Imprese Vanete
(U.S.A.) (Italy)
c. 18 km extension Dar al-Handasah Cho Suk
(Lebanon) (S. Korea)
King Talal Dam Energo Project Planum
(Yugoslavia) (Yugoslavia)
Zarqa Irrigation
Project Dar al-Handasah Cho Suk
(Lebanon) (S. Korea)
Sources: Dajani et al (1980) except for a. and b. from Khouri (1981).
Note: For other data on the projects, see also Appendix 3.1.
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